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PREFACE
Since the resumption of the
re-emergence of physical
1960s

scientists

Ireland problem.
books,

-

historians,

sociologists and

have been predictably attracted to the Northern
As

articles

Nevertheless,
he

force republicanism that began in the late

and continues to this day

political

"troubles" - a euphemism for the

a consequence there

and

other

works

has been a plethora of

produced

on the

subject.

although Gerry Fitt is often mentioned in general texts

has not been the subject of an in-depth study.

This is surprising

in view of the extremely high profile he held for over twenty five
years
that

in
he

Irish
has

politics.

Indeed it would be no exaggeration to say

been a major protagonist in this turbulent phase in the

history of Anglo-Irish
dissertation,

relations.

therefore,

is

to

The primary purpose of this

provide an account of the political

career of Gerry Fitt.
If the
sufficient

breaking of new ground were all, this work would be of
interest.

It

is my contention,

political

career constitutes

Socialist

Republican

to

however, that Fitt's

a seemingly remarkable volte-face from

Peer of the Realm.

Accordingly, the second

purpose of this dissertation is to analyse this intriguing paradox.
Given
will

this work's biographical nature the approach I shall adopt

be largely chronological.

introduction,
comprise,
background,

seven chapters and a conclusion.

for

identifying

the

An

The introduction will

benefit of those unfamiliar with the historical

a sketch of modern Irish history from the late eighteenth

century until
ascertain

It will consist of nine sections:

partition

Fitt's

in

political

important

1921.

In addition, it will attempt to

orientation,

if not

factors in his early life which
iii

philosophy,

by

helped shape

his subsequent career.
Chapter
the late
Fitt's

I discusses the transformation in Catholic politics from

1950s to

political

the mid 1960s.

Against this, Chapter II traces

development during the

machinations during,

and

his

very same period.

relationship with

Fitt's

the Civil Rights

Movement of the late 1960s, form the substance of Chapter III.
Chapter
and

IV

investigates the formation of the Social Democratic

Labour Party

first

leader.

(S.D.L.P.)

of which Fitt was a founder member and

The basis of Chapter Vis an analysis of the role

played by Fitt and the S.D.L.P. in the attempts to find a solution to
the political
increasing

breakdown

isolation

that

took place in the mid 1970s.

within

the

S.D.L.P.

and

his

Fitt's

subsequent

disenchantment with the party in the late 1970s provide the framework
for Chapter VI, the penultimate chapter.
The

final

chapter traces

the events which led to the loss of

Fitt's Westminster seat (after seventeen years) to Gerry Adams, head
of Sinn
Army
Lords.
will

Fein, the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican

(P.I.R.A.)

and

Fitt's

subsequent elevation to the House of

The conclusion assesses Fitt's place in Irish history.
follow

a tabulation of electoral

political career.

iv

There

results relevant to Fitt's
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INTRODUCTION
Historical Background

In

1798 Wolfe Tone and his fellow United Irishmen attempted an

insurrection designed to subvert British rule
assert

Irish

consequence was

independence.

Ironically,

in

Ireland and to

the most

significant

the Act of Union of 1800 which directly linked

Ireland to the British

parliament at Westminster.

The forced

amalgamation provoked hostility and led to opposition movements
committed to its undoing.
Throughout the nineteenth century this opposition came in two
forms.

First,

attempted

political

a rebellion

Fenians of the
overthrow

revolutionaries, such as Robert Emmet who

in 1803, the Young Irelanders of 1848 and the

1860s,

British rule

all
in

championed the use of physical force to
Ireland.

Second,

the parliamentary

constitutionalists who sought repeal of the Union and Home Rule for
Ireland through
Daniel

O'Connell

Stewart

Parnell

century,

non-violent methods.
in the
in

the

constitutional

1840s, Isaac Butt in the 1860s and Charles
1880s.

Towards the end of the nineteenth

nationalism gained the ascendency primarily

because of Parnell's leadership.
of

an

Irish

Foremost amongst these were

parliament

A demand for the re-establishment

to control

Irish

affairs

became an

increasingly urgent request that the British found hard to ignore
because of the success of the Irish Parliamentary Party.
The situation was complicated by the attitude of the Protestant
settlers concentrated in the north-east of Ireland in the province of
Ulster.

They viewed the development of the Home Rule movement with a

great deal

of anxiety.

Unlike the rest of Ireland, Ulster had

benefited from the union with Britain.
1

This was due to the fact that

2

in economic terms
Ireland was

Ulster was largely industrial whereas the rest of

predominantly agricultural.

Shipbuilding, engineering

and the linen industry generated prosperity and caused the north-east
of

Ireland to develop differently politically and socially from the

rest of the
Ulster's

island.

In

an effort to

preserve this condition,

Protestant unionists were determined to

towards Home

Rule.

Tension was

resist any move

further generated by Protestants

equating Home Rule with Rome Rule.
Accordingly,
Carson,

in

1912,

400,000 Ulster Protestants, under Edward

signed the Solemn

League and Covenant, pledging to use all

means necessary to defeat Home Rule.
Force

In 1913 the Ulster Volunteer

(U.V.F.) was formed and 100,000 volunteers threatened to revolt

against the Home Rule proposal and establish a provisional government
in Ulster should Ireland be given its own legislature.
in 1914,

Furthermore,

the U.V.F. landed 25,000 rifles and two and a half million

rounds of ammunition at Larne in County Antrim.
In contrast to
Occasionally
coalesced

the

but

unionist cohesion,
constitutional

John

Redmond,

had witnessed the formation of a large army of
fight for Home Rule and he feared that

widespread violence might result

from the existence of two private

To prevent such an outcome Redmond took command of the Irish

Volunteers.
counties

had

The leader of the Constitutional Nationalist

Irish volunteers pledged to

armies.

revolutionary strands

it was more usual for them to operate as distinct and

antagonistic entities.
Party,

and

nationalists were divided.

When

Prime Minister Asquith proposed that the Ulster

be allowed to opt out of the Irish parliament for a period

of six years,
Plebiscites

Redmond agreed although

he

insisted that there be

in each of the counties and in Londonderry.

Carson,

3

however,

rejected the compromise.

linked to Britain.

He wanted all of Ireland to remain

Thus, by 1914 confrontation seemed inevitable and

was only averted by the outbreak of the First World War.
great faith
would

Redmond had

in the British parliament and was convinced that Britain

be more responsive to the Home Rule cause if Irishmen aided
He, therefore, supported the British Empire

Britain's war effort.

and urged Irish volunteers to join the British army.

Eighty thousand

heeded his call.
Revolutionary republicans took a decidedly different view of
events

in

Ireland's
leader,

They argued that Britain's difficulty was

Europe.
opportunity.

In April 1916, James Connolly, the socialist

allied himself and his

nationalists

led by Patrick Pearse.

Easter rebellion
republic.

citizens army to the revolutionary

and

Together they organized the

signed the proclamation establishing an Irish

The rising was poorly planned and collapsed after a week.

For the most

part the

towards the rebels.

Irish people were apathetic or even hostile

This hostility changed radically, however, when

Britain decided to execute the leaders.
watershed

in

Irish

history and Redmond's

gradualism was discredited.
main

voice

by-elections

of
held

self-government was

Their deaths marked a
brand of parliamentary

Sinn Fein, founded in 1907, became the

mass militant republicanism and,
in

1917,

was

successful

in

in the four
all.

Limited

no longer their goal, now they demanded a full

republic.
After sweeping gains
Ulster),

in the general election of 1918 (outside

Sinn Fein decided to ignore the British parliament.

Fein subsequently formed

the Dail

legitimate governing body of

Eireann declaring

Ireland.

Sinn

itself the

This declaration to secede

4

from the United Kingdom resulted in the Anglo-Irish war in which the
new provisional
the

Irish

government

Republican Army

used

its own volunteer army, now ~alled

(I.R.A.), in a guerilla campaign against

the British army.
In

an

attempt to end the conflict,

Government of Ireland Act (1920).
Ireland with two

Britain proposed the

This offered limited Home Rule for

separate parliaments

in Belfast and Dublin.

The

unionists of the north-east now reluctantly agreed to division but
opted only for six of the nine Ulster counties creating an area with
a

built

in

Protestant majority.

relationship of the

Partition coupled with the

new state with the United Kingdom was totally

unacceptable to Sinn Fein, and the Anglo-Irish war continued.
In

1921

elections took place for

parliaments.

In the

referendum on

national

while,

south,

Sinn

the

new Home Rule

used the election as a

independence and won 124 of the 128 seats,

in the north, the unionists won 40 of the 52 seats.

elections,

the British again tried to end the conflict.

a new treaty which
Commonwealth

and

was

After the

They offered

afforded the south dominion status within the
a large degree of self-government.

partition was still a thorny problem.
Act

Fein

both

non-negotiable,

However,

Britain declared that the 1920

but offered a boundary commission

to

determine the final borders between north and south.
The southern

Irish delegation to the talks with the British

government reluctantly accepted the treaty on
state.

On the delegation's return, however, a bloody civil war broke

out which those
Partition
control

behalf of the new

had
in the

in

favour of the treaty eventually won in 1923.

become a reality.

In the north the unionists took

knowledge that their border contained a substantial

5

and resentful

Catholic minority deprived of the right to be part of

an overall majority in a larger state.
developed

The south, on the other hand,

into a homogeneous Catholic state that finally achieved the

status of a republic in 1948.

GERRY FITT - FORMATIVE INFLUENCES
Gerry Fitt

is

a Catholic and was raised in the working class

area of Dock in Belfast.

That seemingly innocuous sentence condenses

information that is extremely significant and needs to be appreciated
in order to gain a full understanding of Fitt's political career.

I

will deal with each element in turn.
First,

as

a Catholic, Fitt was a member of a permanent minority

within Northern

Ireland, which was governed by the unionist majority

(Fitt was

born

in

hankerings

to

island,

intent on

Catholics were regarded by many unionists as
undermining the link with

suspicion was regularly

members of the
employment,

administration,

Britain.

This

invoked to justify discriminatory practices

in places of work which were,

of

Through their

be part of a majority in a single state comprising the

whole of the
subversives

1926, six years after partition).

by and large, staffed and owned by

Protestant community.
such as

heavy

In other words, major sources

industry

(shipbuilding etc)

were closed to Catholics.

confined to work of an

and

They were, therefore,

unskilled or temporary nature.

Indeed

Catholics often emigrated.
Second,

coming from the working classes would not have enhanced

a Catholic's life-choices.
state

Prior to the creation of the welfare

in the United Kingdom in the late 1940s which was to prove so

influential

in the development of nationalist politics, and will be

considered

in

later chapters,

access

to the normal

means

of

6

self-improvement,

education,

secondary education,

was

The cost of

strictly limited.

the vehicle of social mobility, would have. been

too great a burden for most families.
Finally,

Belfast

is

a predominantly Protestant city.

Protestant community outnumbers
to one.

The

the Catholic by approximately three

The Marquis of Donegall, the landowner who created Belfast

built on land where no prior settlement existed, unlike the provinces
second city of Londonderry.
welcomed Catholics,

Protestant inhabitants tolerated, even

so much that they made substantial donations of

land and money for the

building of Catholic churches.

successive waves of Catholic migrants
employment,

to

the city

However,

in search of

together with the militant revival of both the Catholic

and Protestant churches from the mid-nineteenth century on led to a
worsening

of relations

manifested

itself in sectarian riots which increased in savagery and

frequency

throughout the rest of the century. 1

Catholics

in

insecurity.

Belfast

between the two communities.

have

In contrast,

suffered from

virtue of their numerical

unjustifiable generalization,

Londonderry, by

identity.

but

This may appear to be an

it is often supported by the fact

sectarianism which has characterized the political violence

in Belfast has not
Catholics

in

sense of

superiority and history, are relatively

confident of their nationalist

that the

Consequently,

a certain

their counterparts

Conflict

differ

been evident in Londonderry.
in

disposition

In short, Belfast

to their co-religionists

in

Londonderry and the rest of the province.
As will
untypical
interest

be revealed,

of his

class,

Fitt's early years

are

by no means

generation and community.

However, an

in politics would ensure that Fitt's life would not remain

7

orthodox.
Fitt's father died when
mother with

six children.

working class
of the

household

he was eight years old, leaving his
His family would not have been the only

in Belfast to endure poverty, but the death

breadwinner could only have aggravated its plight.

school

in

1940 at age fourteen.

He left

He had obtained the primary school

leaving certificate which would have enabled him to go to the local
Since education was considered a luxury rather than

grammar school.
a right,

he,

instead.

like most working-class males, sought paid employment

He worked at various jobs between the ages of fourteen and

fifteen,

including a position as a soap boy in a barber's shop.

fifteen,

he

legal

joined the Merchant Navy,

age to enlist.

war,

saw service

goods to Russia.
County Tyrone,
operator.

in

At

two years younger than the

He remained at sea until 1952, and, during the

in the North

and Baltic seas in ships conveying

Fitt met his wife, Ann, a native of Castlederg,
London where

she was working

as

a telephone

In 1947 the Fitts' moved to Belfast.

After leaving the Merchant Navy in 1952, Fitt held a number of
interim jobs, ranging from insurance agent, encyclopedia salesman and
clerk.

However,

view of his

much of his time was taken up with politics.

subsequent political

career,

it

In

seems that Fitt was

imbued with the same sense of resentment against the unionist state
as his co-religionists.
the

Irish Marxist,

organizing the
of the
question.

While at sea, Fitt had become a disciple of

James Connolly, who had been so instrumental in

1916 rebellion.

Connolly argued that the subjection

Irish working classes was a result of the unresolved national
He saw British domination of Ireland as a continuation of

neo-colonialism and

an obstruction to the establishment of politics

8

based

upon

loyalties. 2

class

Fitt now maintains that the

writings of Connolly have been his main political inspiration.

His

own poverty and the poverty he witnessed while at sea prompted his
initial

interest

political

Connolly. 3

in

thoughts

to

Fitt

has

never

put

his

paper and we must assume therefore that his

allegiance is more emotional than intellectual.
While on leave from the Merchant Navy in 1951, Fitt took part in
his first
unite

election campaign.

Fitt's goal, like Connolly's, was to

the Catholic and Protestant working classes.

Beattie,

He supported Jack

a Presbyterian, who stood on an Irish Labour ticket and was

thus opposed to partition.
seat from the

unionists

Beattie won the Westminster West Belfast
by twenty-five votes after five recounts.

The drama of the close election ensured that Fitt's concern with
politics was
stood

as

a candidate

government)
lost on
raised

now a commitment rather than an interest.

and

in

Corporation.

him to

the

Belfast Corporation

(the

1958, for the Northern Ireland parliament.

both occasions,
for

for

In 1957 he
local
Fitt

but his political profile was sufficiently

be elected in his second attempt to the Belfast

So began Fitt's uninterrupted twenty-five year period

of electoral success.

NOTES

1. See I. Budge and C. O'Leary, Belfast, Approach to Crisis:
study of Belfast Politics 1613-1970 (London: Macmillan, 1973).
2.

(London:

See C.D. Greaves,
Macmillan, 1973).

3.
Lord
Lords, London.

Fitt,

The

Life and Times of James Connolly

interview by author, 19 December 1988, House of
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CHAPTER I
CATHOLIC POLITICS IN TRANSITION
It is often argued that we never accepted the state. That is true
for most of us.
But we had little choice.
We were the
unfortunate baggage of a partitionist arrangement. We were the
human flotsam floating about in the political limbo of an
unfinished struggle. 1
This

is Gerry Adams's, the President of Sinn Fein, synopsis of

the plight of the Catholic/nationalist population after partition in
1921.

The historians, Lord Longford and Ann McHardy, concluded that

the workings of the Northern Ireland state contained "serious genetic
defects:" 2

The

most

blatant

being

that

a

substantial

Catholic/nationalist minority was deprived of the right to be part of
an overall majority in a larger state.
As a result of their opposition to Home Rule and the well known
British tendency to compromise, unionists found themselves with their
own Home Rule of sorts.
what

unionists

considerable

In order to preserve the Northern state from

perceived

to

discrimination

employment and government,

be the enemy within there was

in housing,

policing,

education and welfare spending.

results of such machinations were twofold.
denominations

votes,

local
The

First, Protestants of all

and classes coalesced under an oligarchy;

second, they

reinforced the alienation of the Catholic population who were already
unwilling

to

institutions.

accept

the

legitimacy

the

the

state and

its

The Northern parliament at Stormont Castle was totally

dominated by the Unionist Party.
fuelled

of

Nationalist resentment was further

by security measures designed to protect the state, namely

establishment

Constabulary

of an

exclusively Protestant Ulster Special

(the B Specials)

and the Special Powers Act
10

which

11
allowed for

a total

suspension of civil

emergency situations.
intentional,

its

liberties

in so called

Although discrimination was in many in~tances

workings

were

considerably

aided

by

unco-operative attitude of the defeated Catholic minority.
Farrell,

the

Michael

in his Marxist critique of the history of Northern Ireland,

The orange State, describes the consequences:
Devlin and his colleagues 3 were treated with contempt and
forced into abstentionism, and the frustration of the minority
eventually erupted into an abortive campaign by the I.R.A. This
was the first of several cycles of parliamentary agitation
followed by rebuff and abstentionism, then by a military
campaign.
All strategies proving equally unsuccessful and only
confirming the total
alienation of the minority from the
state. 4
This pattern continued
attitude could be perceived
politics were

the

late 1950s when a change of

- on both sides of the border Catholic
Signs indicated that Catholics were

in transition.

willing to participate
state.

until

in the workings of the Northern Ireland

They evidently had recognized the futility of the armed

struggle.
The failure

of the

I.R.A.

border campaign of 1956 - 1962 had

discredited the tradition of physical
co-operative

and

conciliatory

position,

accepted the role of official opposition.
National

Unity,

the National

Campaign for Social

force.

Goaded into a more

the Nationalist

Party

New groups emerged such as

Democratic Party

(N.D.P.),

and the

Justice (C.S.J.), content to improve the lot of

northern Catholics within the system with minimal reference to the
border.

In

emerged which

Britain,
reflected

the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster (C.D.U.)
a growing awareness

Plight of British Catholics

and sympathy for the

in Northern Ireland.

Perhaps the most

positive sign was the fact that in 1965, Sean Lemass, prime minister

12

of the Republic and
enjoyed a convivial
importance of the

his northern counterpart Terence O'Neill, had
summit

in

Belfast,

it seemed to reduce the

In short, in the mid-1960s, the future

border.

would see less emphasis on the issue of partition and more on social
reform of the Northern

Ireland state.

The Dublin based current

affairs publication Hibernia remarked in November 1965:
The little, bitter, closed in world of Ulster is everywhere being
penetrated by the greater problems of human progress and human
survival.
The people are less satisfied in seeing themselves as
either outposts of the British Empire or defenders of the ideal
Republic.
They belong to Ireland and the modern world. They
desire for their children prosperity, peace and progress. They
want an ending to the tyranny of upholding ancient old
quarrels. 5
As

Paul

Bew and Henry Patterson note, events" ... seemed to

indicate that the Irish question as traditionally posed was no longer
pertinent." 6
At this

juncture Gerry Fitt, the Catholic Republican Socialist,

was elected to Westminster.
and

in

politics

an

attempt to gain

in the

period,

To fully place his election in context,
a greater understanding of Catholic

the rest of the chapter will be devoted to

analysing the developments mentioned above.

THE I.R.A. BORDER CAMPAIGN 1956 - 1962
Nationalist

claims

republican creed.
Britain and

Ireland

for

Irish

unity were based

upon

the

Republicanism interpets the relationship between
as

little more than

a morganatic marriage.

Consequently,

military insurrections designed to sever this union and

establish an

independent

Ireland have punctuated Irish history.

We

have seen that after the establishment of the Northern state, the
political

history of the six counties was likewise characterised by
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J. Bowyer Bell explains why this

intermittent military campaigns.
physical force reaction has endured:

For a few, generation after generation, what Pearse and Connolly
began in the name of Tone on April 24, 1916, is an unfinished
legacy - but a clearly defined responsibility. As long as the
British border cuts across the Republic of 1916, as long as
Ireland and its people are neither free of exploitation nor Gaelic
in tongue and heart, then men will turn to the task as defined by
Tone no matter how bleak the prospects: to do less would be to
betray the past and deny the future. 7
One such commitment to the
began

with

the

I.R.A's

Harvest." 8

Cronin's

state was

implemented

campaign

intent

administrative,
assumed,
bring

adoption of Sean Cronin's

on

in

1956.

the

contradiction

The strategy envisioned a guerilla

wholesale

destruction of political,

and economic centers.

its

"Operation

plan for the extirpation of the six county

would paralyse the
about

"clearly defined responsibility"

Such destruction,

it was

infrastructure of the state and thus

demise.

The strategy contained one major

- Belfast, which was the main political, administrative

and economic center was not attacked because of the fear of reprisals
against
This

the

unprotected nationalist enclaves within

the city. 9

incongruity was one of the major inadequacies of the campaign

which ultimately led to its failure in 1962.
Nevertheless,
patriotism in the
1957,
gained

taking

Irish

up of arms

Republic.

once again

parliamentary

seats. 10

aroused

In the elections to the Dail in

Sinn Fein candidates polled 66,000 votes

short lived.
general

the

Such patriotism,

and four of them
however,

was

The ineffective military strategy was compounded by a

lack of discipline throughout the movement.

were a number of fatalities
significant enough

in

However, there

border areas and the campaign was

for the governments of both Belfast and Dublin to
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take stringent security measures.
The republic re-introduced
had always
Despite

been

some

internment

a major component
spectacular

in 1957, a policy which

in the weaponry of Stormont.

exploits at the

internment severely weakened the

I.R.A.

beginning of 1958,

Towards the end of 1958,

when 187 men were interned south of the border, not only was military
escalation greatly hindered through lack of man

power,

but the

command structure lost any cohesiveness it had established. 11
The performance of the political wing reflected the decline of
I.R.A.

In the 1959 Northern Ireland Westminster elections

fortunes.

the Nationalist

Party,

in what had become standard policy, stood

aside in order not to split the Catholic vote.
all

twelve seats but managed to poll

Sinn Fein contested

only 73,415 votes. 12 This

was less than half the number they received in the 1955 election and
the vote was clearly indicative of declining support.
This pattern of Sinn Fein decline was repeated in the Republic in the 1961

Dail

election the votes polled were likewise less than

half received previously and no republicans were elected.

Thus, on

both sides of the border popular support for the campaign had been
greatly reduced.

Tim Pat Coogan in his sympathetic history of the

I.R.A. explains the attitudes to which that fall may be attributed:
In the North the nationalists refer to the campaign to day as "the
incidents" because this is in fact what it was, a series of
incidents along the border, impinging very little on Belfast and
annoying rather than terrifying the Northern administration ... But
once it became obvious that the campaign could have no effect on
the permanency of the Northern regime public interest diminished.
As regards the sentiment in the South, Coogan concludes:
At no time did this interest ever betoken any hostility to England
or indeed towards the North. Most people in the Republic were
rather puzzled by the whole thing and were inclined to write the
whole thing off as the "I.R.A. at it again", without any clear
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appreciation of why it should have been at it again. 13
The

I.R.A then

became increasingly isolated.

finally ended the struggle in February 1962.

The organization

Its statement read:

The decision to end the resistance campaign has been taken in view
of the general situation. Foremost among the factors motivating
this course of action has been the attitude of the general public
whose minds have been deliberately distracted from the supreme
issue facing the Irish people - the unity and freedom of
Ireland. 14
The declaration contained no self criticism, no recognition of
Instead,

inherent strategy inadequacies.
people.

The campaign had resulted

estimated at

a million pounds,

and

in

the

I.R.A.

fifteen

blamed the

deaths,

damage

increased security in the six

counties was estimated at ten million pounds. 15
In retrospect,
and

early

1960s

nationalists.
newspaper)

it is apparent that the I.R.A. in the late 1950s
did

not really reflect the

In the North,

the

aspirations of

Irish News (the Catholic daily

editorialized that the physical

force tradition was no

longer enough:
Unionists in commenting on the I.R.A. decision to abandon their
campaign of violence against the North describe it as an admission
of defeat.
It is forgotten that the I.R.A. were from the start
doomed to defeat without the support of the Irish people and that
they did not receive. 16
Elsewhere,

the physical force tradition was seen as no more than

an historical relic.

In the United States the New York Times argued:

Partition is resented but the present generation knows that if
partition is ever to be ended it must be by peaceful arrangements.
The few young thugs who make up the tiny remnant that now lays
down its arms used a grand and famous name for their organization,
but the Irish Republican Army belongs to history, and it belongs
to better men in times that are gone. So does the Sinn Fein. Let
us put a wreath of roses on their grave and move on. 17
Above

all

things,

the failure

of the border campaign showed

that political and social conditions within Northern Ireland were not
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conducive to the creation of a mass movement striving for a united
Ireland through

physical

represented a crisis
the response was
grass-roots

force.

The collapse of this campaign

for militant physical force republicanism, and

the re-emergence of social republicanism.

movement

replaced

the

elitism of physical

Policy was transformed from a rigid

republicanism.

A more
force

refusal to

recognise the status quo to an involvement in left wing politics,
combined with

a resolve to

bring down

the

system from within.

Quintessential

physical force republicanism was apparently a thing of

the past.
Accordingly,

the New Nation magazine in Northern Ireland argued

in 1964:
As nationalists our first concern is with all those who wished to
see the ultimate unity of Ireland brought about by peaceful
means.
In this statement we do not wish to deny that there have
been times when Irishmen were justified in using other means and
that such times may come again, but we do maintain that at the
present
time
there is no justification whatever for
violence. 18
Apart

from the odd symbolic gesture of defiance,

the most

spectacular being the destruction of Nelson's Pillar in Dublin on
March

7,

1966,

very low profile.

physical force republicanism in the mid 1960s kept a
In the words of J. Bowyer Bell:

Physical force as a means to break the connection with Britain had
never seemed more irrelevant. Ireland in the sixties seemed more
concerned with the fruits of the good life than the bootless
ambitions of the romantic past. All the wild dreams were dead and
gone, the roads were clogged with traffic and the pubs with
whiskey drinkers. 19

THE NATIONALIST PARTY
Any difference between Sinn Fein and the constitutional strand
of

Irish

nationalism as

represented by the Nationalist Party - the

direct descendant of John Redmond's party-concerned only what method
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to use to obtain a united Ireland.
conservative

organizations,

policies.

The

word

with

"party"

Both were essentially Catholic
anti-partition

and abstention

as a collective noun

for the

constitutional

nationalists of the North was something of a misnomer,

for they did

not resemble a modern political party in structure or

organization.
denied

From the

its legitimacy.

It was only after 1945 that they attended the

Northern parliament with
refusal

to

reflected

in

inception of the state, the nationalists

some regularity.

Prior to that time their

acknowledge the existence of Northern
frequent

abstention.

Ireland was

Ian McAllister presents

the

unenviable dilemma of the nationalists and their response to it:
They had no incentive to participate in the normal political
activity of the state because they could never hope to influence,
let alone become, the government, yet they were committed to
parliamentary politics.
In the event, the nationalists overcame the dilemma by a half
hearted commitment to constitutional politics.
They failed to
organise and restricted their activities to enclaves where they
possessed a numerical majority moreover they frequently abstained
from parliament and continued to emphasise partition to the
exclusion of other social issues affecting the welfare of their
supporters. 20
These social

issues included matters of housing, employment and

welfare spending.

To the Nationalist Party, all social problems were

summed

up

in the word

maintained from 1921
nationalist,

"discrimination"

to the

a united

1960s.

Ireland was

and this

position was

Thus, to the constitutional
the panacea for

all

social

grievances.
Nationalists,
system.
failure
question,

then,

made no real

attempts to work within the

Their efforts probably would have been ineffectual but the
even

to articulate measures of reform outside the national

which would have benefited the people they represented, led

18

in turn to disillusionment and general apathy within that community.
The Nationalist
thus
this

Party, with the exception of the partition issue was

highly conservative.
characteristic.

reflected

Its close clerical links only strengthened
The stagnant nature of its profile was

in the only legislation that it saw through Stormont, the

politically

unimportant

"Wild

Birds Act"

of 1931. 21

It

is

little wonder that Bernadette Devlin (now McAliskey) would come to
refer to them as the "Green Tories of Ireland." 22
Eddie McAteer,
Nationalist
policy is
partition
must be

Party,

a Derry Catholic,
articulated

a realistic one.
is

and the 1960s leader of the

its passivity when

"Our

Broadly speaking we realise that

a matter between Dublin and London.

a passive role.

he said:

On that issue ours

We oppose partition as a great evil, but we

ourselves cannot change the partition situation." 23
There were,

as we shall see, groups on both sides of the border

who were no longer convinced of the validity of this "passive role."
They challenged what they perceived as
isolation and non-co-operation.
Party came under

the futile indulgence of

During the 1960s, the Nationalist

increasing pressure to improve its performance and

profile.
One of the party's most vociferous critics south of the border
was the Dublin-based current affairs

review Hibernia.

It was

particularly critical

lack of structure.

In 1961

Hibernia

complained:

organization whatever.
sense

but

rather

in

of the party's
"The

nationalists

of course have no

The party is not a party in any political
an Alice

in Wonderland

sense." 24 Later in

1963 it argued:
In order to hold and improve its standing in the 'Province' to the
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point where it can be considered as an alternative to the Unionist
government, the Nationalist Party must become a more purposeful,
vigorous and progressive looking organization.
It must organise in every constituency in Northern Ireland and not
as heretofore in safe constituencies only.
It must
policies
Northern
challenge

plan and produce for the electorate vigorous progressive
covering all aspects of economic and social endeavours in
Ireland, policies which could become a real and dangerous
to the unionists policy of step by step with Britain.

Most important of all:
the future policies of the Nationalist
Party, even allowing for the ideal of a united country, must
appeal to all sections of the community and not at present, to one
section only. 25
Throughout the early 1960s Hibernia was consistently critical of
the
its

irredentist profile of the Nationalist Party.
nationalism

reunification

was

envisaged

not

only as

The narrowness of
an

obstacle to

but actually a bulwark of partition and

a main

condition of its continuance.
North of the border, criticism of the "Green Tories" was equally
strong.

The

McElroy,

when

leader of the Ulster Liberal

Albert

asked in 1962 what he thought of the Nationalist Party

in Stormont replied:
the unionist penny.
Protestants

Association,

"Politically speaking, it is the other side of
Most of its members,

had they been born

instead of Catholics, would find themselves quite at home

on a Twelfth of July Platform." 26
However,

the nationalists would have been most sensitive to the

criticism which came from within their own community.
Hume,

a Derry school

activist

who later became a civil rights

and leader of the Social

{S.D.L.P.),
article.

teacher,

In 1964, John

Democratic and

chastised the Nationalist

Party

in

an

Labour Party
Irish Times

While rebuking the Unionist administration for the plight

of Northern nationalists, Hume also blamed the Nationalist Party for
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the situation:
Good government depends as much on the opposition as on the party
in power.
Weak opposition leads to corrupt government.
Nationalists in opposition have been in no way constructive. They
have quite rightly been loud in their demands for rights, but they
have remained silent and inactive about their duties. In forty
years of opposition they have not produced one constructive
contribution on either the social or economic plane to the
development of Northern Ireland which is, after all, a substantial
part of the united Ireland for which they strive. Leadership has
been the comfortable leadership of flags and slogans. Easy no
doubt but irresponsible.
With regard to the Nationalist Party's ambiguous attitude toward
the Westminster parliament, Hume expressed an opinion which but a few
years

previously would have been construed as virtual heresy.

argued that

acceptance of the constitutional

He

position could

be

reconciled with the aspiration of a united Ireland
There is nothing inconsistent with such acceptance and a belief
that a thirty-two county republic is best for Ireland. In fact,
if we are to pursue a policy of non-recognition, the only logical
policy is that of Sinn Fein. If one wishes to create a united
Ireland by constitutional means, then one must accept the
constitutional position. 27
The Nationalist
becoming more

and more vocal.

converging forces,
which pledged

Party could not ignore such criticism which was
In November 1964, under pressure from

it published a thirty nine-point policy statement

it to work within the system.

The party also declared

a commitment to become a modern political organization.

In addition,

the statement demanded an end to discrimination and gerrymandering,
and made reference to economic considerations. 28
In January 1965,
Lemass,
meeting,

the

premier of the Republic of Ireland, Sean

visited his counterpart in the North, Terence O'Neill.
the

first

of its

kind,

This

was correctly considered a major

watershed in the relationship between the two states.
One

immediate tangible result of this

summit was

that the
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Nationalist Party,

prompted by Lemass, decided for the first time in

;ts history to form the official opposition.
Eddie McAteer made the following statement:
The Nationalist Party has reviewed the whole political landscape
and has reached the following conclusions. Stormont must be seen
as a federated or regional Irish parliament to continue in
existence until fears of an all Ireland parliament are finally
resolved.
There must be co-operation to ensure that the Stormont
parliament makes good or better laws for the benefit of all the
people thus promoting better harmony. 29
The nationalists had ended a negative policy which had endured
for over forty years and had finally accepted the status of Northern
They had committed themselves to co-operate within the

Ireland.

system wherever their principles would permit, and superficially at
least,

Northern

Ireland appeared to be entering into a period of

conciliation.

NATIONAL UNITY AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
The

questioning

of traditional

beliefs and the resultant

criticism of the Nationalist Party stemmed from a new generation of
Northern

Catholics,

more

concerned

with

social

and economic

conditions than with the ideal of a united Ireland.
John Hume's
change

Irish Times article was

in attitude.

indicative of a growing

Now there really was a Catholic nationalist

desire to pursue a reasonable political

dialogue as regards the

constitution and government of Ireland.

Hume and others were

activated by a sense of frustration with their position in public
life

and

violence.

an exhaustion with the seemingly endless cycles of
Catholic grievances over discrimination continued, but

there was a willingness to adopt a fresh approach to old grievances.
Much of the impetus for improving the status of Catholics within the
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existing political framework sprang from a new middle class which was
no longer prepared to tolerate discrimination.
In November 1959,

the Catholic organization National Unity was

It was largely composed of University graduates who had
formed.
benefited from higher education opportunities resulting from the 1947
Education Acts.
Initially,
integral
it

members of National

Unity saw themselves as an

part of the Nationalist Party, a reform body that would push

towards

more

progressive

concept of National

positions. 30 The

socio-economic

Unity suggested that a united opposition to

unionism was now an attainable goal.

Hibernia commented in 1961:

"At the moment, there is no Nationalist Party to join, a circumstance
which has

brought into existence a group, National Unity, which aims

to unite the nationalist people with a solid blow." 31
Middle class National

Unity saw itself as providing (for the

Northern nationalist community) an intellectual and moral leadership
which had been lacking within the Nationalist Party.
instill

confidence

Its aim was to

in members of the minority community so that they

would play a part

in political

nationalist politics.

life and influence the course of

In short, National Unity hoped to provide a

rallying point for a new brand of nationalism.
Towards the end of 1963 it had become apparent to National Unity
that the Nationalist Party was

irreformable

- its profile had

remained stagnant for so long that any change at all in policy verged
on

the

revolutionary.

Thus,

the party's conservative nature

militated against any worthwhile adaptation to the changing times.
In January 1964 National Unity published the first issue of an
independent quarterly journal

for social,

cultural

and political
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comment on

Irish affairs.

McAllister

points

parallels"

32

out,

This magazine was New Nation, and, as Ian
title

its

was

intended to

with the newspaper of the Young

"invoke

Irelanders founded

33
The growing rift between the group and the
in 1842.
Nationalist Party was made clear in the April 1964 edition.

It was one of the minor ironies of history that the Parnellite
line of succession from the first Irish party should be maintained
to this day in the persons of the Nationalist parliamentary
representatives in Stormont. The irony is contained in the fact
that the Irish party was the first example of an organized
political party in these islands while the present nationalist
representation is the very antithesis of party organization.
For the academic historian such a reversal provides a lengthy
footnote to a political history of Ireland. For the nationalist
electorate on the other hand it implies a state of confusion,
frustration and bewilderment. 34
A major effort to establish some uniformity
policy was

attempted when

National

in nationalist

Unity called a convention of

anti-partition groups in Maghery, County Armagh in April, 1964.
convention

was

Other delegates
and M.P's
National

attended by nationalist elected

This

representatives.

included Republican, Labour and Independent senators

as well as many members of the professions which composed
Unity itself - doctors, teachers, solicitors and a number of

university students.

They discussed a previously circulated motion

calling for the creation of a united democratic political party to
represent all
aspiration for
formation

components of the nationalist movement and fulfil its
a united Ireland.

of a new political

Afterwards McAteer said that
forces

The outcome of the meeting was the
unit - The National Political Front.

"The keynote was

and the end of weakening divisions."

unity of national

Thus, the resolution

contained the following:
In conjunction with the Nationalist parliamentary representatives
and with other M.P's, who support the national ideal to take
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immediate steps to create such a national political front with all
the machinery of a normal political party in such areas where
these do not already exist. 35
An Irish News editorial welcomed this outcome.
Any political movement .... that works for the unity of national
groups deserves encouragement and support.
Wise counsel and
single hearted purpose can repair past errors and mend broken
friendships.
Force has proved a failure. But there should be no
other failure in fresh and determined efforts to heal the wound
that has weakened the country and to end the friction that has
kept so many unity workers in rival camps. 36
It seemed,

therefore,

as

if a start had

creation of a united political party.
the

Nationalist

However,

it

Party

still

was

certainly

been made on the

The political domination of
drawing to a close. 37

retained sufficient prestige to ensure the

fragmentation of the nascent "National Political Front."
In September 1964,
via

a

resolution

the N.P.F. condemned the Nationalist Party

censuring

its decision not to contest the

Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat at the forthcoming Westminster election.
This decision was consistent with the party's policy of standing
aside at

imperial

with the unionists.

elections and allowing Sinn Fein a straight fight
The resolution also declared:

situation has developed due to the failure

"That the present

of the Nationalist

Parliamentary Party to co-operate within the National Political Front
in the creation of a normal democratic political party."
Commenting on the Resolution, McAteer said:
This has placed the future of the front in grave jeopardy. In my
opinion it has crumbled and will require rebuilding from the
foundation ....
I am disappointed that it has not been found possible to build a
~ew organisation.
In my judgement the materials were
incompatible.
Certainly the high hopes of the Maghery Convention
are a long way from fulfilment but I am hopeful that a new phoenix
may arise from the ashes. 38
Unfortunately for McAteer and his fellow Nationalist M.P's, what

r
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did emerge from the ashes was
further fragment

a new political party which would

Catholic politics.

The Nationalist Party's _thirty

nine point plan in November of 1964 was too little and too late.
Finally in

1965, National Unity created the National Democratic

Party (N.D.P.).

Its open membership was designed to attract the best

talent from the total
impression upon
profile,
forces.

nationalist community.

N.D.P. made little

the electorate despite its secular and progressive

and had

little success

in

uniting the anti-partition

McAllister explains the failure of the party strategy:

The overall aim of the strategy was to form a radical and viable
alternative to unionism and to appear as a responsible and
constructive opposition in the British tradition. In a province
with a permanent opposition and an equally permanent one-party
government this was a forlorn hope.
The failure to achieve a
credible parliamentary representation had lasting consequences in
shortening the life of the N.D.P. 39
In the mid 1960s,
nationalists

unionism thus seemed as secure as ever and

had deemed it necessary to work within the system - yet

their ability to do just that was hindered by continued fragmentation
and disunity.

THE "CAMPAIGN FOR DEMOCRACY IN ULSTER" AND THE "CAMPAIGN FOR
SOCIAL JUSTICE."
National

Unity and the N.D.P. were not the only organizations to

evolve from Catholic frustration

in the 1960s.

Two other groups,

which were to make a great political impact on both unionism and
indeed

the history of

Democracy

in

Ulster

Ireland

(C.D.U.)

also emerged,

the Campaign

for

and the Campaign for Social Justice

(C.S.J.).
Ed Moloney and Andy Pollack, in their biography of Ian Paisley
correctly consider July 1960 as a watershed in Northern nationalist
politics. 40

In that month,

Orangemen were given

permission to
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march through the Catholic village of Dungiven by the Home Affairs
"Paisley's pressure had established the right of Loyalists

Ministry;
to

parade

their

triumphalism

through

Catholic districts." 41

Frustration with the attitude of Stormont led nationalists to seek a
meeting with a British Home Office Minister to vent their anger, and
Dennis Vosper,

a Parliamentary Secretary, agreed to see them.

meeting did little to pacify the nationalists;
stray from unionist policy.
lies

The

Vosper refused to

The importance of that meeting, however,

in the fact that it was the first time a British Minister had

listened

to

Catholic

grievances

and

therefore encouraged a

significant change

in nationalist tactics.

would

strive

begin

to

for justice

Thereafter, nationalists
in Northern

Ireland via

Westminster. 42
This change

in tactics came to fruition in June 1965, when a

group of backbench Labour M.P's set up the Campaign for Democracy in
Ulster their aim being an enquiry

This group had been founded as a result of the House of

Ireland.
Commons'

into the affairs of Northern

refusal

to change the Convention whereby Ulster's affairs

could not be discussed at Westminster.

The C.D.U. based its demand

on Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920.
that

supreme

Westminster.

authority

over

Northern

Ireland

This stated
remained

at

One of the most prominent members of the reform group

was the M.P. for Blakeley, Manchester, Paul Rose.

He argued:

What riles us above all is that when we question injustices in the
six counties we are accused of interfering, yet there is no
question of any Constitutional limit on the voting powers of the
unionist members in the House ....
He insisted that the border was not a concern of the new group.
It is not for us to raise the issue of the border in this
campaign.
We are intent on drawing attention to injustices over
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which the House of Commons has direct or indirect control. The
Irish people themselves will solve the border problem in
time. 43
As we will

see,

the C.O.U.

gained considerable impetus when

Gerry Fitt was elected M.P. for West Belfast in March 1966.
The struggle against discrimination
another step forward
Justice was

in

Northern Ireland took

in January 1964 when the Campaign for Social

inaugurated

in Belfast.

This non-political body had

sprung from the Homeless Citizens league which had been established
in Dungannon,

The league was

Patricia.

discrimination
consciousness
C.S.J.

County Tyrone,

by Doctor Con Mccloskey and his wife
a protest organization against housing

in the county.

Reflecting the new civil rights

in the Catholic community, the League evolved into the

This movement, like National Unity and later the N.O.P. was

composed largely of middle class, professional Catholics and declared
its immediate aims:
The first objective was a fact finding investigation of injustices
against people of all creeds and political opinions ....
The government of Northern Ireland's policies of apartheid and
discrimination have continued to be implemented at all levels with
such zeal that we have banded ourselves together to oppose
them. 44
The campaign endeavoured to rise above political parties by
striving to end

injustice for any group or individual Protestant or

Catholic with the question of the border being incidental.

The

C.S.J. was the start of what was to become the Civil Rights Movement.

THE WELFARE STATE
The question that

now begs an answer is why in the 1960s did a

significant number of Catholics abandon their passivity and demand
first class citizenship in Northern Ireland?
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The establishment of the British welfare state seems to provide
Social

an answer.
changes

in the

policy in Northern

1940s. 45

areas of public

transport,

Considerable

Ireland underwent radical
improvements were made in

health and social services, housing and

These measures compared favourably with the

education.

situation south of the border.

static

Northern Ireland appeared materially

superior in comfort to the Republic.
Perhaps the most
to the Northern

Catholic was

the 1947 Education Act, based on the

This facilitated

British Act.

1944

significant of all the welfare state advances

free post-primary education,

which

enabled children of working class parents to continue at school

until

the age of fifteen.

Improvements in the University grants

system also created the opportunity of further education.

Michael

Farrell believed that in the late 1950s and early 1960s:
The first generation to go through University on scholarships
under the post-war education scheme emerged.
They had no
experience of the previous defeats and were not demoralised. They
chafed at their own second class status and began to articulate
the grievances of their community. 46
Thus,

National Unity and the C.S.J. can be construed as examples

of the changing social structure.
class emerged.
Northern
united

A Northern Irish Catholic middle-

It started to become involved in the public life of

Ireland without endangering the
Ireland.

In

fact,

ultimate aspiration of a

since the Republic seemed to compare so

poorly with the Northern state, those people were in no particular
rush

for

immediate unity

Willingness to participate
borrow Professor J.A.
l947

sowed

Dragons

- which again contributed to their
in the existing political framework.

Murphy's phrase:
Teeth." 47

historian, Kevin Kelley, also suggests:

To

"Thus, the Education Act of

The American

journalist and
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seemingly tangential events like the election of President John F
Kennedy and the installation of Pope John XXIII were in fact key
morale boosters for nationalists in the North. A dashing young
u.s. President of Irish C~tholic desce~t and a Pope committed to
social justice and ecumenism had their effect on the Northern
minority's self esteem and its own sense of potential. 48
In retrospect then,

there are grounds to suggest that the

emergence of a new minority attitude in the 1960s was a direct result
of the establishment of the welfare state and international changes
in

the

status

and

focus

of Catholicism.

A new Catholic

intelligentsia became dissatisfield with the moribund nationalist
politics of the
I.R.A.

previous forty years.

It reacted angrily to the

border campaign and thus initiated a new less militant brand

of nationalism prompted

in part

by the liberalising tendencies of

Vatican II on Catholic politics.

THE O'NEILL/LEMASS SUMMIT
Another

important factor

politics within

Northern

politics of the Republic.
looked South

in

the transformation of Catholic

Ireland, was the significant change in the
Northern nationalists had traditionally

for the impetus to end partition.

However, in the late

1950s and early 1960s, politicians in the Republic began to realise
that partition would not be ended by dramatic gestures, but rather by
a slow process of atrophy.

This change of perception, combined with

a conversion

in the mentality of certain elements in the unionist

ranks,

it was

believed ensure the end of the political

which

had characterised the history of Northern

would

petrification
Ireland.

In the mid 1950s, the Republic was in the throes of an economic
depression.

Unemployment and

inflation were rising, resulting in
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poor

living standards

for

its citizens and large scale emigration.

furthermore, the economic indicators did not suggest any improvement
in the foreseeable future. A new brand of politicans and economists
argued that

the traditional

redundant by the late 1950s.

policy of protectionism had

become

They maintained that economic expansion

required the establishment of free trade relations with the rest of
the world.

In 1958, the new Fianna Fail government accepted the validity of
They abandoned the old Sinn Fein economics of high

this argument.

tariff barriers to develop

Irish

industry and

agricultural self

sufficiency in favour of an economic expansion programme designed to
inject foreign
incentives.

capital

into the country through

tax and plant

Accordingly in 1961, the Republic's government announced

its intention to join the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and
to participate

in

free

trade with Britain and the rest of Europe.

Bew and Patterson point to the significance of the twenty year period
after World War

II

for the Republic,

and,

in

particular,

the

watershed of the late 1950s and early 1960s:
... the significance of the period analysed in the study (1945-65)
lies in the fact that we can see the emergence of a quite novel
attitude.
We are no longer dealing with a formal programme of
agrarian radicalism and a nationalist industrialisation drive
which only a few really believe in but which is also never
rejected outright.
In this epoch - by the late 1950s and early
1960s at any rate - the dominance of grassland production, foreign
capital and economic liberalisation is openly recognised and
avowed. 49
Much of the impetus for this policy change can be attributed to
Sean Lemass, who replaced DeValera as Taoiseach (prime minister) in
19 59. On becoming leader of Fianna Fail, his rhetoric suggested that
co-operation

between North

and South made economic sense, without

threatening the aspiration of Irish unity.
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We desire to see our people and country reunited. Our method is,

nd we are making clear - to try and abolish memory of past
~issensions and to strengthen contacts and promote co-operation
between the two areas
into which the country is now
divided.so
and

The fact that we have that hope of eventual unity is not a reason
why people in the North should refuse to consider even now
possibilities of converting activities for the practical economic
advantages that may result.SI
These overtures,
then

prime

made to the North in 1959, were ignored by the
Lord

minister,

nationalism of Lemass was
eventually undermine
Ireland
political

that

Brookeborough.

to

become

Nevertheless,

sufficiently diluted

the
as to

the traditional antagonisms between Britain and

had perpetuated partition.

philosophy dramatically

Furthermore,

the new

improved the living standards of

those south of the border thus reducing the importance of partition.

This modernising
North.

trend

in

the

Republic was paralleled in the

It also featured a new style politician, in this instance,

one intent on

regenerating

unionism.

When Captain Terence O'Neill

succeeded Brookeborough in 1963, the machinations that for over forty
years had

kept the heterogeneous unionist bloc together were dropped

in favour of a policy ostensibly designed to woo the Catholics.
O'Neill

was more moderate than his predecessors at least in tone

and was the first
Catholic school
clergy.
modernise
Republic,

prime minister of Northern Ireland to visit a

and

be

photographed with members of the Catholic

His seemingly non-sectarian style was part of an attempt to
the Northern economy.

Like the

politicians

of the

he realised that in order for Northern Ireland to survive,

foreign capital

would

intended to attract

be required to stimulate expansion.

O'Neill

potential investors by selling Northern Ireland
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as a state of religious concordance.
The extent to which O'Neill had distanced from the traditional
tenets of unionism was no more radically manifested than in his
invitation to Lemass in 1965 to meet in Belfast.
This meeting was perhaps the most sensational event in Irish
politics since the establishment of the border some forty five years
earlier,

and was

a direct result of both states adopting free trade

They could now expect considerable profits through

policies.

increased trade and other forms
politics of pragmatism had,

of economic co-operation.

it seemed, triumphed.

gone as far as to recognise Stormont,
traditional

antagonisms

yet

The

Lemass had not

it looked as if the

between unionism and republicanism had begun

to wane.
Both premiers feared
militants
yet

risks

involved from the

in their respective camps as a consequence of this summit -

these

O'Neill

the political

proved groundless. 52

fears

On the

unionist side,

went to the electorate in October 1965 to seek public

endorsement for co-operation between North and South.

He swept the

country and then asked "where was the backlash against my invitation
to Mr Lemass?

It did not exist except

in the minds of the

extremists .... 1153
In the Republic, Hibernia commented:
A reassessment of Captain Terence O'Neill is necessary. His
meeting with Mr Lemass was not only an act of courage the whole
manoeuvre was carried off with greater political skill than his
past record would have promised. The Northern premier begins to
fulfil the hopes of those who welcomed his accession as the
beginning of a new era in the six counties. 54
The response from Northern Catholics was also favourable.
New Nation reported:

The

r
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Men and women of every political
allegiance, of every
denomination, and of all classes welcomed the meeting between
captain O'Neill and Mr Lemass, and in their almost universal
welcome revealed the fanatics for what they were - a divided and
meaningless rabble of inconsequential men whose apparent power was
founded only upon the silence of the majority, a silence that too
often was taken as approval. 55
The

Irish News

editorial

also fully endorsed the

historic

meeting:
If this and further meetings are fruitful it is the whole people,
and especially the working population in Ireland, who will benefit
from this co-operation and harmony in high political quarters.
The two Premiers need have no misgivings. They and the majority
of the Irish people know that they are doing the right
thing. 56
The healthier atmosphere
seemed to bode well
perhaps at
appeal.

in relations between North and South

for the future

and there was a feeling that

last the old Orange and Green cliches were losing their
Optimism that ancient hatreds were abating grew in Belfast,

Dublin and London.
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CHAPTER II
FROM DOCK TO WESTMINSTER
GERRY FITT 1958 - 1966
From the late 1950s to the mid

1960s Catholic politics had

changed from stagnation to a greater involvement in Northern Ireland
politics.

In the

same period,

Gerry Fitt was building his own

political

career.

Electoral success in Northern Ireland was followed

in April

1966 by election to the Westminster parliament as M.P. for
Hibernia commented on this his greatest triumph thus

west Belfast.
far:

The most melodramatic event was, of course, Gerry Fitt's elevation
to the Palace of Westminster as the simultaneous holder of the
offices of city councillor, Stormont M.P. and Member of Parliament
in London.
This is quite some attainment for a working class boy
who left to become a seaman and entered political life while being
an unemployed man on the dole. He has become something of a myth
in Belfast. He has already made his mark in Irish history. It is
bound to deepen with time. 1
The aim of this
period.

It

will

chapter is to clarify Fitt's politics in the
demonstrate

that

his

republicanism was

It will further demonstrate that he was very much a

opportunistic.

nationalist politician who held strong views on the reunification of
Ireland.

The following pages will also prove that his socialism was

not doctrinaire.

It was based on bread and butter issues rather than

a strict adherence to a Marxist creed.
of James
different.
socialist.

Connolly,

we will

Fitt was
Fitt,

see that the two men were completely

a moderate reformer, Connolly a revolutionary

unlike Connolly,

parliamentary tactics;

Although he used the rhetoric

Connolly,

believed

in change through

on

the other hand, believed in

change through working class militancy.

We will also see that Fitt

had to cope with the sectarian complexion of life
37

in Northern
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Ire1and ·

Therefore, he had to expand much of his undoubted energy
at

redressing discrimination

both

and

local

national

government levels.
This chapter makes two further assertions.

Fitt's
that
metamorphosis

First, it will prove

1966 election victory was not
in Catholic

gove_rnment

symptomatic of the

politics outlined in chapter 1.

Although

Fitt was possibly aided by the increased hankering for representation
and attendance,

he was essentially a "lone operator" uninterested in

large parties and

fundamental re-organization.

important ramifications

have
second,

it will

in

This contrast would

Fitt's later political

career.

show that there is some substance to Fitt's claim

that he obtained Protestant support in his early career which enabled

him to win West

Belfast

implications due to the

in 1966. 2
fact

that

claimed that the religious divide
equal. 3
politics,

Considering

His contention has important
political analysts at the time
in the constituency was about

the sectarian nature of Northern

this was a considerable achievement.

to contend with

Irish

For Fitt had not only

sectarian politics but had also to compete with the

new aggressive Catholic middle class who wished to lead nationalist
politics.

Middle class strength should not

be over estimated, however.

For the rank and file of the nationalist community was overwhelmingly
working class.
division

Also the dichtomy between classes was not the only

in nationalist politics.

a geographic factor:

E. Rumpf and A.C. Hepburn discern

"One of the clearest characteristics of

anti-partitionist politics

between

1945 and 1969 was the total rift

between Belfast and the rest of the Province." 4

The

strained

relationship

between

the

rural

and city
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nationalists was

a product of the conflicting

Fundamentally,

societies which they represented.
would benefit the farmer
commodities would

be,

as

interests of the

regards the

by necessity,

policies which

price of agricultural

to the detriment of urban

dwellers wishing to see food prices kept low.

There were antagonisms

within the Unionist Party for the same reasons.
In

Belfast,

nationalists

used socialist rhetoric which alarmed

their conservative colleagues

in the countryside, particularly west

of the River Bann,

where rural

constituencies predominated.

The

conservative characteristics of nationalist politics in these areas
were

reinforced,

Outside Belfast,

if not produced,

through clerical

influence.

the Catholic church paid for the services of a full

time Registration Agent whose function was to compile a register of
the eligible Catholic voters.
only

constituency

Catholic rural

organization

and,

therefore,

quantified the

community vote. That vote was employed to support the

Church's opinion on
pulpit.

The agent was the Nationalist Party's

Furthermore,

how society should be run, as directed from the
in most instances the local parish priest was

chairman of the convention called to select a candidate.
Mccann says

"Nationalist candidates were not elected,

As Eamon
they were

anointed." 5
Rural

politics contrasted with the more secular inclinations of

Belfast anti-partition politics.
found
e.g.
did

it difficult to thrive

Attitudes prevailing in rural areas
in a large industrial urban setting,

Catholic doctrine as regards family planning and mixed marriages
not

national

receive quite so easy an acceptance.

Therefore, in Belfast,

identity gradually became separated from its religious base.

By 1952 the Nationalist Party was no longer an electoral force in the
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capital.
Belfast anti-partition politics were not however,
Schism and fragmentation were common.

division.

devoid of

This

can be

explained by the failure of local Belfast nationalists to agree on a
united political
and

the Northern

party to replace the discredited Nationalist Party
Ireland

Labour Party

(N.I.L.P.)

that

in

1949

formally acknowledged that it was pro-partition.
Belfast working class Catholics, no longer content to listen to
traditional
with the

nationalist and Catholic rhetoric, became more concerned
social

problems of housing and unemployment.

They could

choose between a multiplicity of Labour parties - one was pro-border,
more were anti-border,

and

some based on individual personalities.

Of the anti-border groups Rumpf and Hepburn note:
The various groups all had in common a radical stance on social
questions and an ability to bring the socialist republican
arguments of James Connolly into play when necessary, but they
relied far more for support on their own efforts and individual
popularity than on any formal Trade Union backing, while their
socialism, unlike Connolly's would scarcell have alarmed the most
moderate member of the British Labour Party.
One can assume that the Belfast working class
knowledge of socialist theory,

yet

it was

had

little

the recipient of the

tangible benefits of post war parity policies implemented by the
British Labour government.
the term "labour"

The creation of the welfare state gave

positive connotations,

area where there was

particularly in an urban

a great deal of deprivation.

The deprivation

being somewhat reduced by socialist policies.
Gerry Fitt was
that

an

anti-unionist, but astute enough to realise

in order to have electoral success in Belfast, he needed to have

the term "labour" on his ticket.
Although

Belfast is predominantly Protestant and unionist, there
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were three Stormont seats within the city that were potentially
Falls,

nationalist
because

it

and Dock.

The

latter was unique

had never successively elected the
always

politician;

same party or

alternating between unionist and some form of

Unlike

labour.

Central

Falls and Central

which had

large Catholic

majorities, Dock had a small Protestant majority.
Gerry Fitt became part of a fairly
machine
Irish

He became a member of the Dock

in this waterfront area.
Labour Party,

accountants,

Dock

working class

financed in part by Catholic publicans and turf

Irish

and

sophisticated political

Labour's

break down

stated intention was to unite the

unionism.

Fitt became one of the

group's most prominent operators in the 1950s;

so much so, that in

March 1958 he was chosen to contest the Stormont election for Dock
Labour in a straight fight with the unionists.
From its establishment

in

1921, unionists dominated Stormont.

The Northern parliament served merely as a rubber stamp for policies
that shored up sectarianism.

Elections were invariably fought on the

issue of partition, rather than social and economic questions.

Focus

on the border ensured that voting would be conducted on factional
lines

- Protestants,

border;
Ireland.
In
arguments
News

Catholics,

turning out

in

favour of maintenance of the

for the restoration of the territorial unity of

The 1958 election was no exception.
Dock,

like every other constituency,

orange and green

prevailed over social and economic problems.

Letter

(the

The Belfast

Protestant daily newspaper) sketched the character

of electioneering in the area with particular reference to Fitt:
The Unionist Party in Dock have no difficulty persuading the
electorate of the paramount importance of the constitutional
position.
It is placed there, priority number 1, by the Eire
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Labour candidate (sic) who is opposing Alderman William Oliver
Wl'th the aid" 7 of a van flying the flag by O'Casey in "The Plough
and the St ars .
At the time of the 1958 election, Fitt was employed as a clerk
and his opponent, William Oliver, a shopkeeper, was also a member of
Belfast

Corporation,

working

Redevelopment Committee.

as chairman of the Housing

and

The see-saw nature of the seat made for its

close observation by the press.
In 1949,
unionists

Alderman T.L.

by 284 votes,

Eire Labour)
election.

but

by 179 votes

Cole had won this Dock seat for the
lost it to Murtagh Morgan (unofficial
in 1953 - the smallest majority in that

Given the margin of success and failure in the past, party

workers were of the opinion that whichever coterie could get closest
to a 100% turnout would win the day.
Oliver's appeal to his supporters lay primarily in stressing the
benefits of social

services in Northern Ireland compared with those

available outside the United Kingdom. 8

On the other hand Fitt

and the Dock Irish Labour Party employed non-sectarian rhetoric, but
their instincts and tendencies were always
nationalism.

in

line with

Irish

Fitt proclaimed "James Connolly came into this historic

division forty-five years ago to ask for your vote and we come to you
under

flag." 9

his

declared that
banner and
died. "10

Michael

it was

for the

Ferran,

chairman of the

"fighting the same enemies, under the same
same

ideals for which Connolly fought

To supporters of the

in terms

and

union the name of Connolly was

synonymous with the concept of a united Ireland.
words were couched

party,

Although Fitt's

of labourite solidarity, it was quite

clear to which section of the community he was directing his appeal.
He argued:

"There was no fear of losing the contest if the people
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rallied to the cause of Labour.
minded electors

It was the duty of the nationalist

to cast their vote as he was not only fighting a

unionist opponent but the full weight of Glengall Street." 11
Conforming to the nationalist ideal that it was the panacea for
the country's economic problems,
wish to see a united Ireland:

Fitt made no attempt to hide his

"Ulster's economic problems will never

solved by the Unionist Party.
• "12
through a 32 coun t y repu bl 1c.

The only way it could be would be

be

Fitt was clearly anti-unionist and hence anti-Stormont.
made an appeal

to the Protestant workers.

Yet he

Jack Brady of the Irish

Transport &General Workers Union ( I.T.G.W.U.) assured the people of
Dock

and

"that if elected Gerry Fitt would prove a worthy representative
serve

religion. "13

the

of

all

classes,

This aspect of Fitt's political

later become very
this election

people

irrespective

of

philosophy would

important when he did take public office, but in

he tended to seek redress for the traditional Catholic

grievance of discrimination in the face of Protestant privilege.

In an attempt to swing the election in favour of the unionists,
Prime Minister Brookeborough

announced a proposed visit to the

constituency.

Fitt fulminated

the provincial

Lord on a tour of the working class area.

would see the misery which

policy and
years. "14

their

that he would:

Perhaps he

had resulted from the Unionist Party

mismanagement

F1'tt endeavoured to focus
regardless of religion.

"Personally conduct

of affairs for the past 40

attention on the rich-poor divide

These "Parliamentary Marionettes ... had no

interest whatsoever in the well

being of the common people. "15

He also stated: "I am determined to fight the Unionist Party and if
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elected will

show unrelenting opposition

to the vicious policy of

discrimination being practised by our opponents." 16
Nationalist politicians
in housing

had

heterogeneous

had always asserted that discrimination

been one of the mechanisms which
unionist

advantages

kept the

The argument ran

bloc together.

protestants were granted

had

in

housing allocation

effort to ensure their loyalty to the state.

franchise

elections

in an

Another reason for the

charge of housing discrimination was that the restricted
government

that

local

(a person could only vote in local government

if he or she was

allocation of local

a property owner)

authority houses

allocation of votes.

meant that the

in effect also meant the

Therefore, constituencies and wards could be

gerrymandered.
Fitt's
claimed

1958 campaign was very much concerned with housing.

the

Corporation

Housing

and

Redevelopment

He

Committee of Belfast

had shown a consistent policy of discrimination in siting

new estates.

As

for his own area he declared:

"This division has

already been cruelly gerrymandered and with the erection of flats in
Victoria Barracks which would

be handed to Unionist supporters the

nationally minded majority would be wiped out." 17
Oliver

contemptuously

dismissed

Fitt' s

charges

of

discrimination:
Mr what-do-you-call-him this man talks about discrimination.
Roman Catholics know what treatment they are getting from the
Ulster Government.
Instead of the 50% grants they get towards
their schools in Great Britain, here they get 80 or 90%. Yet this
man talks about discrimination. 18
As

polling day drew closer, the unionists became confident of

Victory -

it was

after all their turn.

whip of the Unionist

Brian Faulkner, then chief

Party and later prime minister of Northern

,
.

.
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'

Ireland,

"We have a really good chance of winning this

speculated:

seat because our candidate has been active in housing and social work
and is well known in the constituency.

Dock is always a see-saw seat

but our chances were never better." 19
Faulkner's conjecture proved correct.

On March 20, 1958, it was

the Protestant community that turned out in greater numbers.
polled 3,156 votes to Fitt's 2,900.

Oliver

The unionists had established a

majority of 256 with a swing of 500 votes.

However, Oliver's poll

was below that of Cole's who lost the seat in 1953, and, in the not
so distant future,

Oliver would recall the name of his opponent a

little more readily.
In May 1958 elections for the Belfast local government took
place. 20
namely:

The Dock Irish

Labour Party forwarded two candidates,

Fitt and James O'Kane, a spirit merchant.

In the Dock ward,
unionists and one
election for local

Fitt and O'Kane campaigned against three

independent unionist,

and although this was an

government, the issues were essentially the same

as the Stormont election two months earlier.

Fitt again focused on

what he considered a sustained policy of discrimination
allocation of houses.
to

denude

Dock

ward

in the

He alleged that unionists' "ultimate aim was
entirely

of

the

nationally

minded

voters." 21
On the eve of the poll, Fitt again made no attempt to hide his
nationalist sentiment and brought the
forefront.

issue of partition to the

He claimed:

The Unionist Party would throw everything into this fight and only
the good will of the working class people of the area could
prevent Dock from once again being handed over to the unionist
reactionaries.
If he was successful in this election his policy
would be based on the ideals of the labour movement in Ireland - a

'

'
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policy that will lead the working class people of not only the six
counties, but all Ireland to an Irish socialist working class
repu bl 1· c. 22
In a recent

interview with the author,

Fitt claimed he was

always more of a socialist than a nationalist:

In the context of Ireland I am a socialist.
Unhesitatingly
socialist.
I would like to see Ireland united in the belief that
in a united Ireland you would have Protestant Labour supporters and
catholic Labour supporters, you would have the class division that
you would have say in London and elsewhere. But put to the crunch
I would say I was many more miles a socialist than a
.
l 1s
. t . 23
nat,ona
At the risk of being churlish, it certainly seems that in 1958
the relationship between Fitt's nationalism and socialism was at best
ambivalent and

at worst opportunistic.

Labour was very successful in the election.

Nevertheless,

Dock Irish

Its two representatives

ousted the returning unionist members with Fitt leading the poll.
Fitt's success can be attributed to the fact that it was a local
government election,

and, although the constitutional issue was again

used as an election tool, the electorate would have considered it a
secondary issue as regards community politics.
If Fitt's and O'Kane's non-sectarian, socialist rhetoric somewhat
blurred the

sectarian nature of elections

in Dock, their party's

victory parade clearly showed the divide in the district.

The Irish

News reported:
The parade which was headed by the Wolfe Tone Pipe Band, was large
and a number of people carried green flags, the tricolour having
been banned by a police order.
The two successful Dock Irish
Labour Councillors travelled in a brake on which the Plough and the
Stars, flag of the Labour movement, was carried in addition to a
number of green flags.
During the parade, unionist supporters - a number of them teenagers
- ~ssembled around bonfires on blitz ground adjacent to Earl Street
waving Union Jacks and singing orange songs. Police had to patrol
the area to keep the parties apart.
In the aftermath of his victory, Fitt showed that he was quite

47

capable of playing the nationalist card.

He commented that on

polling day the electors had dealt the Unionist Party one of the most
telling defeats
six counties.

in the whole history of the Municipal battles in the
During the election campaign he claimed that they had

been faced with all sorts of handicaps and were not permitted to fly
the National Flag in the Ward. 24
Other indications of the sectarian characteristic of Dock were
two questions tabled for answer at Stormont after the election.
After defeating Fitt in March, Oliver, the unionist member for Dock,
asked the minister for Home Affairs, Mr. W. Topping:
attention has

"Whether his

been drawn to the fact that on the declaration of the

result of the municipal

elections

in Dock Ward a Union Jack was

snatched from a person and trampled on the ground, and whether the
police have made an arrest?"
Topping was aware of this incident but answered that no arrests
had been made.

Oliver then suggested that a riot could have resulted

but for the timely intervention of the police.

Cahal Healey, the

Nationalist Party member for South Fermanagh, then asked:
Does the Right hon. and Learned Gentleman not think that the time
has come when the party opposite (Unionist) should cease carrying
the Union Jack as a party flag in order to incite their
opponents?
Does the Minister not know that Councillor Fitt was
assaulted in Belfast City Hall in the presence of the police by a
lady carrying the Union Jack with a very robust stick attached to
it?
He merely threw the stick back and it fell to the
ground. 25
It

is clear that religious and hence political allegiances in

Dock were quite evident at all elections.
non-sectarian rhetoric,

Although Fitt mostly used

it was obvious that the vast bulk of his

supporters came from what he himself termed the "nationally minded"
population

- the Catholics.

Fitt had achieved public office and it
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was as

a Belfast city councillor that he would endeavour to make Dock

a non- Po larized constituency.
Fitt now maintains that the three most important years in his
political career were between 1958 and 1961 because it was during
this period that
he established himself as a working class
representative who helped both Protestant and Catholics in a very
underpriviledged area. 26
to all

He did

indeed make himself available

sections of the community both at home and at the window

ledges of Belfast City Hall.

His hard work and warm personality

quickly overcame the reservations of many Protestants.
was also

at this

discrimination

point that Fitt began a campaign against unionist

in housing, votes and jobs.

Belfast Corporation
represent

the

However, it

His maiden speech at the

indicated the dual purpose of his politics - to

working

class and focus

attention on Catholic

inequality.

Fitt claimed that his attitude in the council would be one of an
open mind and any criticism he had
honesty and sincerity.
taking place
beneficial

to offer would be done with

Yet he also asserted that if he saw something

in the council

which was worthy of commendation, or

to the working class he would not hesitate to commend

1t.27

In August 1958,
lleeting.

the Dock Irish Labour Party held its quarterly

Michael Ferran, chairman of the group, referred to the work

of both F1'tt and 0'Kane in local government.
three

He said "that in the

months they had been members of the Council

interviewed over 300 people of all
houses and other matters."
unemployment benefit,

they have

·
cree ds an d cl asses concerning

Many of these other matters pertained to

then called National Assistance.

At the time
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entitlements to National Assistance were somewhat vague.
than not people were not receiving their full
familiarised
Acts,

himself with the features

More often

allowance.

Fitt

of the National Insurance

and represented both Protestants and Catholics who had been

previously rejected at local
constituents,

tribunals.

For fighting

for his

he acquired the name Perry Mason, after the aggressive

American television lawyer.

If Fitt secured Protestant support, much

of it stemmed from his concern for their interests.

Nevertheless,

Ferran also drew attention to the main composition of the party of
which Fitt was now vice chairman:
record,

and

"The membership at present was a

it proved that the nationally minded people of the area

were behind the party." 28
Fitt neglected socialist theory,

replacing it with short-term

remedies based on welfare improvements designed to assist the working
class.

Housing was one of his prime concerns - resisting evictions

and generally safeguarding working class interests.
In August

1959,

Fitt made one of his strongest attacks against

discrimination against Catholics

in housing.

Belfast Corporation

allocated houses on a points system which allowed none for more than
three children.

As Catholics tended to have larger families than

Protestants,

policy worked against them.

this

He also argued that

the Estates Superintendent should not be allowed the discretionary
powers which enabled him to accept or reject a family's suitability
to be rehoused, regardless of how many points they had.
that this denial

Fitt argued

of justice to Catholics was a violation of the

Government of Ireland Act, which explicitly said that there should be
no discrimination against the minority.

While Catholic families of

nine and ten were being refused houses, Protestant married couples
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with only one child were being given three bedroomed houses.
claimed that was
He

amendment.

an outrageous

He

state of affairs crying out for

knew a Catholic family where the father had to sleep

in the armchair at night because there was no room, and yet although
registered

for

years

this

family

were

refused

a house. 29

fitt's motion describing the system as unsatisfactory, and calling
for a review and appropriate amendments, was defeated by 28 votes to

a.

such defeats prompted indignation and action in Catholic circles.
As we have seen

in Chapter

I,

National Unity was formed in

November 1959 to press the Nationalist Party to organise and thus be
better equipped to contest such discrimination.

Fitt's reaction to

it at the time is not on record but he now says they were completely
sectarian:

"National

Unity was

a misnomer.

National Unity meant

Catholic nationalist against Protestant unionist."

If Fitt's opinion

at the time was similar it demonstrates that he was not part of the
transformation in Catholic politics inspired by the new middle class.
As for the Nationalist Party, he says:
They got the Catholic vote. A Catholic Registration Officer meant
that they got Catholic votes and the Protestants had to look after
themselves.
It was totally tribal. I would have agreed with the
nationalists in their opposition to the unionist treatment of
Catholics that was about all. 30
In 1960,
class,

Fitt continued to champion causes

challenging

proposed

for the working

increased rate charges from
for

local

government,

objecting to salary increases

the heads of major

departments

and their deputies in the Corporation, and exhibiting a

tendency to push for Belfast jobs for Belfast people. 31
In

December

discrimination
companies

in

1960,
voting.

holding local

Fitt

began

his

campaign

to

highlight

He lodged an objection to two limited
government votes

in the Dock Ward and
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considered them test cases.

In the event,

Fitt's case was

However, it would not be long before the principle of "One

rejected.

Man One Vote"

in

local

government elections would become a basic

demand from the Catholic community.
In

1961,

Fitt had to defend

election tested

his

success

in

his local government seat.

The

attracting the Protestant working

class vote.

As the election drew near the dichotomy in the community

was further

highlighted

polling station,

in,

by Fitt's objection to the re-siting of a

as

he said a, "hostile area."

that positioning the new station
would

reduce

complaint was

the

anti-unionist

rejected.

He maintained

in the heart of a unionist area
vote

considerably. 33

The

Yet the fact it was made at all further

confirms the polarization at election times in Dock.
The election was
very trying

in May.

Fitt said the coming months would be

for the ordinary people of Belfast.

He claimed the city

was entering a period of recession comparable with the "hungry
thirties."

He argued that the working class

representative to
Stormont M.P.
Party with
said that

for

Fitt,

speak on their behalf. 34

needed

a strong

Harry Diamond, the

Falls, who would later form the Republican Labour
spoke in favour of his future party colleague.

He

he had known Fitt for many years especially as a member of

the City Council
years that he was

and

he felt that he had proved in the last three

a capable and

authentic representative of the

interests of the working class people of Dock.

In fact, as a

constant attendee at the City Hall, Councillor Fitt had made himself
available to everyone

- regardless of creed, politics or where they

resided - who needed his assistance. 35
Fitt was confident of victory.

Again referring to the moving of
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the polling station to
the people of this

a "hostile area", he declared that "knowing

area where I have been born and reared, I feel

that they would travel to Sandy Row (an ultra-Protestant and Loyalist
area

in

Belfast)

•
H36
elect1on.

to

Evidently,

support base

record
he

their
was

vote

still

for

me

aware that

in this
his main

lay within the Catholic community and his optimism

proved accurate when he again topped the poll.
At the enthusiastic Dock victory parade, Fitt declared:
I attribute my magnificent majority to the fact that I received
support from all sections of the community in Dock Ward,
irrespective of creed, in this election. This indeed has been a
vindication of the policy which I have carried out during the past
three years and I solemnly pledge to the electors that I will
continue with that policy, should any man or woman in Dock Ward be
in need of a friend at any time, I will be at their
service. 37
It would not
reputation

for

working class,

be unreasonable to conclude that Fitt's growing

hard exertion as

a public representative for the

provided him with

a stick to break, partially at

least, the barrier of religious politics.
Fitt's commitment to the working class was further illustrated
in October 1961.

In the previous August, he had voiced querulous

opposition to

increases

rent

in the Ward.

At that time the Lord

Mayor warned that as Fitt was himself a tenant, he would be open to
the accusation of self interest.
advice and face

the consequences. 38

Corporation enquiry
the statute

in

Fitt decided to disregard the
They turned out to

be a

in which Fitt was named for an alleged breach of

"voting or taking part on a matter in which he had a

pecuniary interest."
but questioned their

He represented himself, did not deny the facts,
interpretation, saying that when he decided to

speak it was not on his own behalf.

He argued that he was not a man
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of affluence
concluded:
will

and had a similar financial position to his tenants and
"I regard myself as a working class representative, and I

fight tooth and nail against anyone who attempts to take away my

right to usurp my functions." 39

The Corportion

inquiry found

that Fitt took his stance from conscientious motives.
1962 was

an election year for the Northern parliament, and in

March Fitt was unanimously selected as the Dock Irish Labour Party's
candidate.

This

nomination came as

no

surprise.

He had been

narrowly defeated by Oliver in 1958, and since then had topped the
poll

at two

successive Corporation elections.

Ferran declared:

"I

feel

there can be no doubt about the outcome of this election as the

working class people in the area of all creeds have found Councillor
Fitt a sincere friend and a valuable representative."
In

accepting the nomination,

Fitt exhibited his

nationalism and working class solidarity.
proud and honoured to

be

blend of

He said that he:

"Felt

asked once again to carry the banner of

Connolly into the contest against the traditional

enemy of the

working classes in Dock. 1140
Whatever rhetoric

Fitt may have used,

and

however he was

perceived by the Protestant electorate in Dock itself, it is noted by
Moloney and Pollack that the "Ulster Protestant Action" organization
(U.P.A.

was

an

association

formed by Paisley in 1959 ostensibly to

encourage the employment of Protestants in industry) was aware of "a
Republican

Labour Councillor called Gerry Fitt, who was making his

mark

an

as

aggressive exponent of the nationalist cause." 41

Evidently not all

strands of Protestant opinion were impressed with

Fitt's non-sectarian oratory.
As

usual,

the 1962 election was characterised by accusations of

,

54

Fitt challenged Oliver to an open debate on the

sectarianism.

economic situation

challenge which will
unionist opponents,
endeavouring
wrang l e.

to

"But I know it will be a

in the six counties:
not be accepted.
far
make

My information is that my

from meeting me on the economic issue, are
the

forthcoming

election

a sectarian

n42

Fitt endeavoured to focus

on economic and social issues.

He

challenged Oliver to deny "that the constituency has suffered a
greater degree of unemployment and poor housing than any other in
Belfast."~

He also argued that Lord Brookeborough was afraid

to enter Dock to put his record to the working class people. 44
He castigated the Unionist Party record in the Ward:
They are a party that has shown no conception of the industrial
problems as they affect the working class in 1962. It has always
been the unionist boast that the constitutional position has
safeguarded the employment in the shipyards. What is their answer
now?
When the ships are lying empty and thousands of workers are
walking the streets of the city? 45
Fitt's election address also was overwhelmingly concerned with
social and economic issues:
When I contested the last parliamentary election a slogan was
written on a wall in North Qeeen Street drawing attention to the
fact that there were 40,000 people unemployed. Today that slogan
has faded a little but the terrible scourge and heart break of
unemployment is still with us, more poignant than ever.
He emphasized his connection to the ward:
Unlike my opponent I was born and reared, and I still reside, in
the area which I seek to represent at Stormont. I am married with
a family of four little girls of school age and it is my humble
opinion that I am more in touch with the everyday needs of the
working classes than any representative of the reactionary Tory
Unionist Party.
Fitt presented himself as a man of the people regardless of
th eir religious faith and relied on his record as a councillor:
I have now represented this area on the City Council for over four
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years and during this time I have endeavoured at all times to give
of my utmost for the poor and underpriviledged, irrespective of
creed.
My horn: ha~ been my Advice Centre and no one seeking my
help has done so 1n va1n.
The only hint

of republicanism was his conclusion: "Under the

banner of Connolly I go forward with confidence. "46
In

contrast

partition

to

issue.

prospen•t Y• H47

Fitt's,

Oliver's campaign emphasized the

"I intend to keep unionism in Dock, the only way to
In

1958 Oliver's majority was

only 256, and in

a seat which regularly changed hands, Fitt predicted a "working class

revolt

with

an

Irish

victory." 48

Labour

Even

the

avidly

pro-unionist Belfast News Letter suggested "It is Eire Labour's (sic)
They have a 256 unionist majority to upset, not a

turn to win.

Herculean task." 50 A prophecy that proved correct.

Fitt polled

3,288 votes to Oliver's 2,781.

Fitt's victory was the only unionist defeat in the city, and the
swing to Dock Irish Labour was 6.4%.
declared

in what was

sentiment:

"I

After the results were in, Fitt

fast becoming a hackneyed, although necessary

regard

it as a signal honour.

spokesman for the working class and

I now feel I am the

I will continue to serve the

working class in Dock irrespective of their creed."~
Fitt now says that he won
election and the

1962 Stormont

Protestant community.
unionist
figures

where

no

"I was
other

both the

1961

local government

election with the help of the
breaking through to the Protestant

nationalist

had." 51

The election

support his claim, although his remark also reveals that Fitt

was indeed a nationalist.
Paddy Devlin,
involved

in

then

a member of the N.I.L.P., and thus very

Belfast politics, makes the interesting observation that
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Fitt's victories
working

are due

against him,

thereby making the Dock Irish Labour Party's

success more pronounced.
the Housing

in part to Oliver's unionist patronage

As we have noted, Oliver was chairman of

and Redevelopment Committee of the Belfast Corporation.

Devlin suggests that by rehousing his own supporters, for services
rendered

in elections,

machine

out of Dock.

Oliver effectively transported his political
Devlin does,

however,

acknowledge

that

Protestants voted for Fitt because of his work on the Corporation and
the

Tribunals. 52

Devlin's

account reinforces

the

image of

Belfast politicians' dependence on brokerage.
All

in all,

Dock seat,

it seems that despite the sectarian nature of the

Fitt's victory was,

to some extent, a tribute to his

popularity in the area, and an appreciation of the service which he
had provided since entering local government.
hard to quantify,

yet it seems the triumphs could not have been won

without some cross community support.
Queen's University
to date:

The Protestant vote is

Charles Stewart, M.P. for

at Stormont, commented on Fitt's greatest victory

"In the

see-saw constituency of Dock, Mr. Fitt won a

comfortable victory.

The result was not exactly a surprise and was

due to the great work done by him in the Corporation and to a well
planned campaign."~
The fusion
Fitt should not

of Protestant and Catholic working class under Gerry
be exaggerated.

After the election result it was

unionist losers who received the oration outside the Ulster Hall, and
Fitt deemed

it judicious to leave by the side door following the

announcement that he was the victor. 54

Furthermore, the police

presence at the victory parade is evidence that the authorities had
expected communal strife.

The Irish News reported:
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Belfast's Dock Ward showed its support for Councillor Gerry Fitt
last night when 2,000 people turned out for a victory parade.
The parade started in the New Lodge and wound its way around the
entire constituency.
At times the victory wagon carrying
councillor Fitt and his supporters was almost stopped by the
enthusiastic constituents.
Throughout the parade, the entire
constituency was circled by a water tight contingent of police.
At every strategic point the police were noticeably in force
with vans, land rovers, walkie-talkies and man force. 55
Fitt now had a larger platform to express his views.

His maiden

speech at Stormont contained the same components of the oratory that
put him there.
Northern

He began by explicitly attacking the entity of

Ireland.

He described the Queen's Speech as an "innocuous

and insignificant document"

relating to an artificially composed

artifice which could not exist

if it had to rely on

its own

Fitt argued that the situation would remain the same

resources.

until Ireland was reunited:
This Government, this puppet Government in Northern Ireland, this
artificial Government has been bolstered up and subsidised by the
Lancashire lassies and the boys from the Chiltern Hills. They may
be ignorant of that fact, but it remains that it is purely and
simply from the subsidies of the English working-classes that this
Government exists at all.
The Government could never exist on
their own economic foundations and will never exist until the
industrial north is joined to the agricultural south and Ireland
is once more united.
Housing was again one of Fitt's main topics of concern.

Again

he did not exhibit doctrinaire socialist theory but reacted against
injustice. 56
As noted

in the first chapter, the I.R.A. border campaign was

called off at the end of February, 1962.

During that campaign Fitt

had represented the Dock Irish Labour Party at the annual 1916 Easter
Rising commemoration ceremony held at the republican plot in Milltown
Cemetery,
the

Belfast. 57

I.R.A.

offensive

In retrospect,
"as

a

Fitt maintains that he saw

completely

sectarian fight."~

Evidence suggests that his attitude at the time was a little more

r
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Again, in his maiden speech, he made a strong appeal for

equivocal.

the release of over twenty men who were still in prison as a result
of the campaign.

Fitt argued for compassion, claiming the prisoners

were only guilty of adherance to a widely held maxim:

After all, these men had a principle and they had the courage to
go out and try to put that principle into practice. They may have
acted wrongly.
Perhaps they did act wrongly, but in the state of
affairs that exists in our community the Minister would be doing
nothing wrong in releasing those men.
Fitt's sympathy for the plight of the republican prisoners could
well

stem from the notion that the physical force tradition was now

superfluous

to contemporary politics.

resumption of political
committed

violence and made

to constitutional

lifetime will

He did not envisage a

reunification.

it clear that he was
"I rel and within my

be united constitutionally and it is my ideal to see

Ireland united under the terms of Connolly who founded my party and
that it will eventually finish as an Irish workers republic."~
The wrangle over the republican captives persisted throughout the
year.

In October 1962, Fitt, Republican Labour M.P., Diamond, and

Independent Labour M.P.,

Hanna,

release of all

those

activity during

1956 and 1961.

Faulkner,
motion,
that the

tabled a motion calling for the

imprisoned for actions arising from political
In December the debate began.

then Minister of Home Affairs,

Brian

refused to accept the

insisting that the government could not act on the assumption
I.R.A.

was

finished.

Fitt again was dismayed by what he

felt was a lack of compassion from the administration.

He also

bestowed a measure of political credibility upon the I.R.A.

"If the

government had one spark of humanity or christian charity they would
have relented over the past months.
an

implacable

hatred

towards

But they were still activated by
their

political

opponents. 1160
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The prisoners'

debate was concluded on December 18 when a

government amendment asking for approval
passed.

of the status quo was

Fitt said of the prisoners' condition:

If he was incarcerated he would not get down on his bended knees
and ask for forgiveness and seek the prerogative of mercy from the
Minister. As these young men did not recognise the court he could
not see how they could be expected to ask for the prerogative of
mercy. 61
It would be fair to say that Fitt's attitude to the I.R.A. at
this point of his career was at least supportive.

He was shrewd

enough to realise that an attentive concern for the predicament of
the prisoners would strike a chord with those of his supporters who
had a republican

inclination.
As we will

his advantage.

In short, he used the situation for
see,

Fitt's relationship with the

re-emerged I.R.A. in the 197Os was not so accommodating.
In March 1963,

Terence O'Neill

became leader of the Unionist

Party and prime minister, heralding, many hoped, the beginning of a
new era.

In hindsight, Fitt says that he believes that O'Neill did

try to reform the Unionist Party:
But he was like Botha trying to reform South Africa and they have
exactly the same mentality, the unionists in Northern Ireland and
the whites in South Africa.
It was an impossible task.
Consequently, he fell between two stools, the unionists regarded
him as some sort of a traitor and the Catholics as some sort of a
liar that could not deliver. 62
Throughout the rest of 1963 at Stormont, Fitt continued in his
capacity as a working class representative, attacking the Unionist
Party's handling of the economy,

highlighting discrimination

in

housing and employment, and frequently denouncing the machinations of
the Orange Order.~
Towards the end of the year his political profile was seemingly
altered when,

with Harry Diamond,

he formed the Republican Labour
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The coalition was anti-partitionist and comprised former
party.
members of the Dublin-based Labour Party. Thus, there was now an
Irish Labour Party with local leaders, which despite its republican
label, was committed to participate within the system.

Fergus Pyle

of the Irish Times recently asked Fitt about the formation of that
party and reported:
Looking back on nearly 40 years in local and national politics,
Fitt says that he was never interested in nationalism and that the
Republican Labour tag that he took to form a two-man party with
the veteran M.P. for Falls, Harry Diamond in the 1960s was purely
tactical.
A Journalist launched the idea and he found himself
swept along. 64
Fitt's recollection that he was never interested in nationalism
is not reflected in his political rhetoric at the time.

On the other

hand the term "Republican" is misleading for it conjures up different
images for different people.

In the recent sequence of violence it

has taken on pejorative connotations largely due to the methods of
the I.R.A.

In the 1960s, a republican in Northern Ireland was simply

someone who wished to see the restoration of the territorial unity of
Ireland in the form of a republic.
the nationalist community.
constituency,

The term was respected throughout

Nevertheless, Fitt, working in a marginal

was taking more of a gamble than Diamond, who was from

the predominantly Catholic Falls area.
was Republican Labour?"

When asked "How republican

Fitt replied:

It was not republican as such.
Harry Diamond had the term
Republican Labour before I had it. He could afford to have it in
the Falls Road where the Protestant vote did not count. In Dock
it was totally different, so I took a calculated chance in
bringing Republican Labour into Dock and succeeded in winning
election after election even with that term.
I won them not
because they were voting Republican Labour; I won them because
they were voting for Gerry Fitt. 65
Paddy Devlin also concurs that "Republican Labour" was only a
label . 66
Fitt made the name decision without consulting his
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colleagues in the Dock Irish Labour Party.

Although he managed to

persuade them to come with him, it is an episode which reflects an
individualistic and opportunist streak, a trait repeated during his
political
circles.

career.

The amalgamation was well received in nationalist

New Nation commented:

The recent news of the formation of the Republican Labour Party
following the merger of the Dock and Falls groups is heartening
news, especially in view of the forthcoming Westminster elections,
in which the party will be contesting West Belfast. By their
action this group has given a lead to all the other political
groupings on the National Front throughout the six counties, and
one would hope that there would be further mergers before the
election comes round. 67
Hibernia remarked:
The coming together of Mr. Harry Diamond and Mr. G Fitt to form
the Irish Republican Labour Party could be of real significance if
they can create a genuine Irish socialist group which would take
up where James Connolly left off and bring some passion and
intelligence to the solution of economic problems, especially in
relation to the unemployment crisis. 68
The

two

politicians frequently proposed motions aimed at

government reform.

For example at Stormont in April 1964, they

called for a reform in parliamentary and local government elections,
urging that legislation be

introduced to provide the right for all

persons over eighteen to vote in such elections and asked for removal
of

restrictions

in

the

local

government franchise. 69

This

motion was pedictably defeated by 20 votes to 14 and a major Catholic
grievance remained intact.
The local
were held

elections with which Diamond and Fitt were concerned

in May 1964,

whether or not the

and constituted the first indication of

"Republican" tag had adversely affected Fitt's

non-sectarian credibility.

He argued that they would be the most

crucial elections which had ever taken place in Dock and suggested
th at the result would decide if the Ward was to exist as a
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residential district or be developed as a commercial centre. 70
Fitt insisted that his record since being elected as a public
representative would defy all comers, that he had consistently served
the interests of all sections of the community in the Dock area, and
would continue to do so. 71

He ran with two more prospective

councillors from the Republican

Labour Party - Tom Fitzpatrick and

James McMenamin.
The unionists,

for their part, selected candidates with strong

connections in Dock to counter the reverses they had been suffering:
Sean McMaster,

chairman of the Local

craneman by occupation;
of the area;

Unionist Association and a

Charles Maginnis, a labourer, also a native

and Billy McDowell, a shop owner who had lived there

for twenty years.

Paddy Wilson, who ran on a straight Labour ticket,

was also a native of Dock working in an aircraft factory.

Thus,

Fitt's opponents could not be considered as opulent outsiders.
The Belfast News Letter conveyed something of the carnival
atmosphere of electioneering in the locality:
The other Wards had nothing on Dock, where pacemaker Gerry Fitt
set a swinging pattern for his Republican colleagues Messrs
Fitzpatrick and McMenamin. Youngsters and adults alike turned out
in their hundreds to add something of the 'Lagan beat' to the
proceedings and to add that final touch. St Peter's Brass and
Reed Band provided the music and accompaniment.
But wait, Gerry and his boys didn't quite have it all their own
way in Belfast's dockland. For although his party set a cracking
pace and the band struck up to the music of the 'Minstrel Boy' a
few yards around the corner was none other than a party of
unionists singing and dancing to the music of 'Derry
Wa 11 s' . 72
The results of the election were impressive for Republican
Labour - all three candidates were returned, with Fitt again topping
th e poll.
Gerry Fitt and the Republican Labour Party had achieved
dominance in Dock.

The next opportunity which the party had to test

rr
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their electoral

strength was the October 1964 United Kingdom general

election.
Diamond was chosen by Republican

Labour to contest the West

(It should be noted that the Dock Ward was within the

Belfast seat.

East Belfast constituency - one which always returned a unionist).
The unionist candidate was Jim Kilfedder, a Donegal born barrister.
The N.I.L.P.

selected Billy Boyd, whose platform was pro-border yet

non-sectarian and the Republican candidate was Liam McMillan.

Gerry

Fitt was Diamond's election agent.
The election became particularly noteworthy due to rioting which
broke out on Divis Street at the foot of the Catholic Falls Road.
his

Divis

Street

headquarters,

On

McMillan displayed traditional

republican regalia - pictures of James Connolly and Patrick Pearse
and the
Flags and

Irish Tricolour.

This was in direct violation of the 1954

Emblems Bill, which stated that it was illegal to display

any symbol that would cause provocation and lead to the disruption of
public order.

In such a situation the Royal Ulster Constabulary

(R.U.C.) were empowered to remove the objectionable material.
Loyalists,

led by publicity-hungry Ian Paisley, made it known

that they were offended by the republican display and threatened to
remove it

if the R.U.C.

Brian McConnell,

did not.

The Minister for Home Affairs,

capitulated under this pressure and ordered the

R.U.C. into Divis Street.
The police presence caused a riot, with Catholics emerging to
defend the republican symbols.
Northern

It was the worst disturbance in

Ireland since the 1930s, lasting for three days and ending

With twenty-one policemen and fifty civilians injured.

Fitt tried to end the fray by asking the Belfast Corporation to
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pass an emergency resolution calling upon

all

sections of the

community in the city "to desist from any action which could lead to
a

that

of relations." 73

exacerbation

further

This

action

showed

Fitt made some effort to end the internecine episode although he

was not convinced that all politicians shared his attitude.
After

the riots,

very critical

of the

unionist

He spoke at Stormont and alleged that the whole

administration.
affair was

Fitt was

an

intrigue,

and further maintained that the government

announcements to have the flags taken down were designed to bring out
the largest possible crowd to witness their removal.

In short, the

riot was a political stunt to swing votes away from Diamond. 74
It was thus

in these abnormal conditions that the election in

West Belfast took place.
Unionist

Government

unionists won,

but on

If Fitt's alleged machinations of the

were true,

it calculated correctly - the

a minority vote.

Kilfedder polled 21,337

votes, Diamond 14,678, Boyd 12,571 and McMillan 3,256.
It

is

unlikely that Diamond secured any Protestant support;

he

had no need to cultivate such a foundation as M.P. for Catholic Falls
at Stormont.

The Republican Labour support in Dock was inaccessible

and anyway much of it from Protestants would have been of a personal
kind for
the

Fitt.

It is also possible that Boyd made some inroads on

Catholic vote;

formidable.

McMillan

certainly the republican element was not
lost his deposit, as did his three colleagues

in the other city constituencies.

Indeed, he would perhaps have got

fewer votes

in Divis Street, which no doubt

but for the

unrest

propelled a percentage back to a more militant viewpoint.

Even with

this motivation the republican vote was still only 6%.
The New Nation, still voicing a demand for greater method within
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nationalist politics,

commented on the defeat of Diamond:

of the Republican

failure
indicates

Labour candidate in West Belfast clearly

a large number of enthusiastic

that

"The

helpers

is

no

substitute for a good machine." 75
In the Republic, Hibernia communicated disillusionment:
The Anglophiles, intent on guarding their dominant position,
behaved as though they were the injured party, the opposition
pathetically divided made feeble attempts to find a united banner,
aired their grievances without hope of redress, and lost their
deposits.
The result was the same as before. Twelve true men and
blue 76 represent us in the mother of Parliaments. 77
Diamond and Boyd both polled reasonable figures, 28.3% and 24.3%
respectively,
it was,

which combined, would have defeated the unionists.

As

both gained sufficient support to allow the common enemy to

win to the detriment of labourist politics.
The next time,
West

Belfast

different.

with

Fitt as the candidate, the results of the

election for the United Kingdom parliament were
The 1964 election had one wider implication for Northern

Ireland politics.
was elected.

In Britain, the Labour Party under Harold Wilson

Labour politicians did not enjoy the cosy relationship

that their Conservative counterparts had with the unionists and there
were many of them who became concerned and sympathetic to Catholic
complaints of discrimination.
In

the

same month

as

the 1964 election,

increasing pressure to formulate
invited the Belfast
join in

McAteer,

under

a vigorous nationalist coalition,

"Labour orientated anti-partitionist" M.P's to

a new organization and the Republican Labour Party agreed to

enter into talks.

Any optimism that there may have been about a

merger between nationalists of the rural areas and the Republican
Labourites was

soon dashed,

for on December 6 the party decided to

,

66

~

postpone consideration of a possible link-up.
decision,

Commenting on this

Fitt told the Irish News that he had been disenchanted in

the past that attempts at unity had fallen through.
while

he was very pleased to see the nationally minded moving in the

direction of unity,
all

Fitt added that

there would have to be definite guarantees that

sections of the working class were represented in any such united

front. 78
The voting of the party's executive was very close.

The Dock

branch was totally opposed to the prospect of a merger but on the
other hand,

Sean McGivern of the Andersonstown

branch and party

secretary resigned because of what he felt was a reluctance by the
leadership

to

create

a unified national

movement. 79

It

is

possible that Fitt and his Dock colleagues felt that to freely enter
an openly nationalist structure would have alienated
support in the area.

Protestant

However, it is also possible that careerist

concerns mitigated against unity - a point noted by the New Nation:
We regret the breakdown in the negotiations between the leaders of
the Nationalist Party and the Belfast anti-partitionist groups
especially as the reason given seems to amount to little more than
distrust arising over past experiences. In such an attitude there
is evidence of a pathetic lack of vision and a miserable concern
with merely personal prestige, which creates divisions and
prevents any real progress. 80
The episode

illustrates that Fitt's nationalist and socialist

sentiments could not

be reconciled

in an Irish context.

Fitt had

frequently posed as a champion of Irish unity, but when his possible
affiliation to a coalition geared to fulfil
proposed,

he fell

that aspiration was

back on his working class socialist credentials.

Fitt was something of a political chameleon.
Fitt's
December 9,

political
when

activity

was temporarily interrupted on

he suddenly collapsed while speaking at Stormont.

,
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He was admitted to the Royal Victoria Hospital and required a blood
transfusion for a gastric haemorrhage.
that the rigours of political

This was not the only time

life would hospitalise Fitt, but on

this occasion he was well enough to return to the House on January
19, 1965, and was personally welcomed back by O'Neill. 81
Five days
riots

previously, and just three months after the sectarian

in Divis Street, O'Neill and Lemass met in Belfast.

Although

Fitt would have considered his politics to be substantially different
from the two premiers,

he considered the meeting a welcome gesture

and articulated his feelings at Stormont.
voiced his approval
opposition,
political

In the same speech he also

on the Nationalist Party becoming official

a step which he felt had brought about "a more realistic
atmosphere

in Northern

Ireland."

conciliatory spirit of his speech and

In

keeping with the

indeed with the apparent

normalising of Northern politics at the time, Fitt re-affirmed his
own brand of constitutional

nationalism and showed that he was no

socialist revolutionary:
In my constituency there are many people who believe in the
ultimate ideal in which I believe, the eventual reunification of
this country.
The way to bring this about is to recognise that
Stormont exists, to use this House and all its institutions to
further the interests and well being of all constituents,
irrespective of their political beliefs. If we can bring peace
and harmony to this community it will be only a little step before
we can eventually bring about a unity of mind in the whole
isl and. 82
Two days after these words, the divisions within the Republican
Labour Party were becoming more apparent.

On February 5, 1965, the

Irish News reported that the Andersonstown Branch of West Belfast had
unanimously voted to disaffiliate from the party. 83
Evidently there were elements

in the party who were more

concerned with the Republican than the Labour tag and the fact that

,
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Andersonstown

is a Catholic area may well have accounted for this

emphasis.
The unionist administration was remarkably adept at taking
decisions which lacked political sensitivity and brought traditional
attitudes to the forefront.
Minister of Development,
Armagh,

Craigavon,

Ireland,

James Craig.

One such decision was made by the

William Craig,

after the first

the Catholic community.

to name the new city in

prime minister of Northern

James Craig was considered an arch bigot by
The Irish News reported Fitt's reaction:

The name could only be accepted as a calculated insult to the
minority in Northern Ireland.
It was the final insult at this
time when there was so much talk about building bridges between
different sections of the community.
The minority had often been charged with having long memories but
it was within the memory of many members that Lord Craigavon said
this was a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people.
The minority could never forget this statement and the naming of
the city seemed to show that the policy of the Northern Ireland
Government was to maintain a Protestant parliament for a
Protestant people. 84
The above statement was an emotional response from an emotional
politician.

Indeed much of his fluent rhetoric stemmed from fervent

reaction to prejudice.

The following day he argued that if the

inhabitants of the new city were going to be faced with sectarian
strife then any advantages would be negated.
not go the whole hog and call
accepted just as well

it

He fulminated:

Paisleyville?

"Why

This would be

by the people who are now congratulating the

Minister on the name selected." 85
Despite tension generated by Craigavon and other matters, such
as the siting of the new university in largely Protestant Coleraine
rather than largely Catholic and depressed Londonderry, and later in
early 1966,

the controversy over the naming of a bridge over the
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river Lagan,

there was an optimism about a thaw in community

re 1at ,. on S . 86

This was noted by Hibernia,

two editorials:
.1,&tter,

which re-publ i_shed

one from the staunchly pro-unionist Belfast News

the other from the more moderate pro-unionist Belfast

gleqraph, both confirming new attitudes:
senator Lennon 87 is entitled to call for more from the
Government than expressions of greater goodwill - deeds must
follow words if bridges are to be built between the two sections
of the population but he should appreciate that progress towards a
new order must be slow if it is to be sure, and that too
preci~itate action could wipe out the advances already
made. 8
As for the Unionist Party, the curiosity, some would say the
tragedy of the situation is that despite the knowledge of the way
rising living standards have dulled anti-partition protest, it
will not make a direct move to enlist support for the constitution
from members of the steadily growing Catholic population.
If a policy of co-operation is to mean anything more than window
dressing it must have this end in view. But what unionist will
brave the Protestant flank and say so? when in fact will the
attempt be made to diminish the influence of religion in
politics. 89
In the midst of this seemingly cordial era, Fitt had to defend
his Stormont seat since O'Neill called an election for November 25,
1965.

Dock,

as we have seen, had never been retained.

fighting against history.
again be put

Fitt was

The sectarian reputation of the Ward would

to the test.

The Unionist Party again put forward

William Oliver to contest the Dock seat.

In an attempt to swing the election, O'Neill decided to visit
the constituency himself.

this attempt to

The Irish News reported Fitt's reaction to

"cadge votes":

"No Arab tribesman or African pearl

diver could be more foreign to the people of Dock or more ignorant of
th eir needs and problems than the Eton-bred schoolboy who proposed to
de 5 cend on the place with scarf flying on election eve." 90
Also worthy of mention in this issue of the Irish News, was the
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publication of a telegram from James Connelly's daughter, Ina, to
fitt:

"I wish you every success and return once more to parliament

for this historic division which my father contested in 1913.

I

sincerely pray that the electorate of Dock will, to his memory, give
91
There can be little doubt
you an overwhelming majority."
that fitt had an acute sensitivity to what was required on the

ground,

and was well aware that an amalgam of Republican and Labour

would unite the various strands of potential voters.
fitt's

prediction for the result was assured.

doubt about the outcome.
peoples'

verdict." 92

"There can be no

I, as one of the people have faith in the

His optimism was well

founded since he

was again successful.
The result was the only substantial
Stormont election.

unionist reverse in the

Fitt more than doubled his majority despite a

lower poll and the Belfast News Letter acknowledged:
Dodgy Dock turned up trumps for Republican Labour man, Mr Gerry
Fitt, who withstood the unionist challenge, from Mr William
Oliver, whom Mr Fitt beat by 507 votes in 1962. He built on this
vote this time, adding nearly 1,000 votes. The result represents
a substantial swing to the anti-partition candidate. 93
The

Newsletter

nationalist.

clearly

still

considered

Fitt to be a

Fitton the other hand claimed that his victory was one

for the working class and socialism.

Yet it seems, that although the

election had perhaps lost some of its sectarian crudity, it was still
Protestant unionist versus Catholic nationalist.

Hibernia reported

Oliver's reaction to his defeat:
Alderman Oliver explaining on television why he had lost in Dock
to Republican Labour said some of his people had stayed at home.
Asked why they had done this he said it was because they favoured
Labour or Liberal or other parties. His people presumably include
all Protestants. 94
At the end of the year,

Harold Wilson called another United

r
.
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.

Kingdom general election for March 31, 1966.
stated its

The newly formed N.D.P.

intent to contest West Belfast. 95

In the following

week Fitt announced his candidacy for the same seat.

He combined his

nationalist and socialist credentials.
1 believe that this Division can only be won by someone adhering
to the principles of James Connolly and fighting tenaciously for
the ultimate reunification of this country. I realise that many
of the electorate in this area are of a different religious
persuasion to my own, but I also am aware that these people know
me as a Labour representative who has taken an unequivocal stand
where the needs of the working classes have been concerned. I
will
be fighting this election on my record as a Labour
representative, and as such, I feel confident that the working
class
in
West
Belfast
will
ensure my return to
Westminster. 96
intervention

Fitt's

clearly

threatened

to

split

the

nationally-minded vote and leave it open for the unionists to retain
the seat.

When

I asked Fitt why he decided to stand and perhaps

split the nationalist vote, he replied:
The new party were totally anathema to me. They were Catholic
middle class schoolteachers and they called themselves the
National Democratic Party.
They were people I had nothing in
common with.
They were Catholic middle class who believed they
had been educated and there was a God-given right for them to
represent the Catholic working class ... People who had no idea
how the Catholic people live in Dock or Falls or Ballymurphy.
Thev appointed themselves as such and totally infuriated
me.97
Evidently the middle class professional
caused

friction with other nationalist elements. 98

some debate within the Republican
should

image of the N.D.P.
There was

Labour Party about whether they

contest the election or not.

Fitt was

in

favour of

participation regardless of the result, because he felt that if the
N.D.P.

established their presence,

the Republican
Diamond,

Labour Party would

then the political influence of
be greatly diminished.

Harry

on the other hand, was against splitting the Catholic vote,

arguing that West Belfast was

a sectarian constituency.

Without

,
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consulting his party colleagues,
intention to the press

Fitt leaked Republican Labour's

- another indication of the individualistic

nature of his politics to which he now admits:

"I am very much of an

I make my own mind up on something and think that I

individualist.

am right and other people have their point of view but it is not
going to change my opinion - so
On this occasion,

leader. "99
day,

and as we have seen,

I was never the

ideal party

Fitt's dogmatic attitude won the

was

selected to contest the election

although Diamond was recorded dissenting to party involvement.
On March 2,

1966,

the N.D.P.

announced their candidate - a

thirty six year old primary school teacher, Mr Joseph Lavery, who
"The time has now come when elections in Northern Ireland

claimed:

must not be fought on shibboleths and slogans,
and

intelligent

rational

argument

but rather on

about

the

issues

involved. 11100
Fitt went on record regretting the N.D.P. decision, which he
believed would lead to the unionists retaining the seat:
The N.D.P. entered the political arena last year with the
intention of unifying the nationally minded forces against the
Unionist Party...
and since then they have adopted the attitude
that they are the only spokesman for the nationally minded
electorate.
In effect they are one more splinter party in
opposition to the unionists. 101
The

dispute

between

the two parties precipitated bitter

recrimination in the following week.
Not one single
Democratic Party
electors of the
distaste for the
Party .102

On March 6, Fitt declared:

vote has so far been cast for the National
in the City of Belfast and I am certain that the
Falls area will show in no uncertain manner their
tactics being employed by the National Democratic

Answering suggestions that the N.D.P. withdraw from the contest
to avoid a split vote, a party spokesman argued with an undisguised
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gibe at Fitt:
The Northern Ireland electorate is sick to death of the lone
operator and the opportunist in politics. We want to help build a
proper political party because this is the only way to get rid of
the unionists. We believe that the electorate recognises this and
will continue to support us accordingly. 103
Fitt retorted that the N.D.P.
sectional

appeal . 104

were campaigning on a purely

On the following day,

March

10, the rift

between the two parties widened as both indicated that they intended
An

N.D.P. spokesman declared that they

to remain

in contention.

would not

be stampeded by the "Tammany Hall tactics that are being

used in the West. "105
Meanwhile,

Fitt acquired the backing of eight Nationalist M.P's,

including McAteer and Austin Currie. 106
for Fitt from the Nationalist
compromise,
a united

This mounting

Party forced

support

the N.D.P. to seek a

and they suggested that he could win the nomination from
party - a merger between the two.

Diamond strongly opposed

this suggestion, his comment reflecting the temper of the conflict:
A proposal of a shotgun wedding or merger with a faction outside
of this unity (the unity of support for Fitt) on the eve of the
election cannot be taken seriously when accompanied by taunts and
sneers and statements dripPiing with hatred and abuse of a popular
hard working representative. 07
The threat of a three-cornered challenge for West Belfast was
finally ended on March

13 when the N.D.P.

increased pressure and withdrew Lavery.
withdrawal

followed

Council .

Fitt's

determination

an

appeal

nationalists"

The statement announcing the

from McAteer to the party's Central

inflexible attitude had won

had ensured that

a great deal
and the

the day.

His

he would be the only nationalist in

the contest against the unionists.
clash revealed

capitulated to the

Nevertheless, the severity of the

of enmity between the "working class

"middle class nationalists."

There would be

,
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important implications for Fitt in the 1970s due to this discord.
If Fitt was
had to gain

to overcome Unionist Party incumbent Kilfedder, he

at least 5,000 of the voters who had previously plumped
However, many of the people who would have voted

for the N.I.L.P.
for

Boyd

would have been appalled at

Kilfedder,

therefore,

predictably

Fitt's

republican

laid great emphasis on

opponent's republicanism and the question of the constitution:

tag.
his
"Why

doesn't Mr Fitt talk about his policies - his republicanism which
will

put us

reporter:

in with the south." 108

He told a Belfast Telegraph

"No amount of pretence at being the Labour candidate by my

Republican opponent can
referendum

- a vote

hide the fact that the contest is a simple
for or against the Ulster constitutional

position. "109
Fitt,
speeches,

however,

as was typical,

managing both

was ambiguous in his election

to emphasize his socialist credentials as

we 11

as hi s nat i on al i st asp i rat i on . 110

fool

all

Protestant electors,

Belfast Telegraph

indicates:

This

approach did

not

as the following appraisal from the
"Mr.

Fitt,

for

all

his

engaging

personality and his avoidance of an exclusively religious appeal, is
primarily an anti-partitionist, and it will be an elastic conscience

which is able to support both him and the constitution at the same
time. "111
In a letter to the Telegraph, Michael Farrell, then chairman of
the Queen's University Labour group, and later to become an important
member of People's Democracy

(P.O.),

wrote that he recognised the

dilemma facing Labour voters in West Belfast due to the importance of
th e constitutional issue.
Farrell appealed to the people who had
Voted for Boyd

in

1964 to vote for

Fitt

in 1966, citing three
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inducements:
Because the border is not an issue in this election and Mr Fitt
has made it clear he does not intend to make it one.
Because the issue in the election is whether there should be a
Labour or Conservative government at Westminster, and Mr Fitt has
made it abundantly clear that he will support a Labour government.
Because we believe that Mr Fitt has shown, since his election to
the Stormont parliament, that he is prepared to work extremely
hard for all his constituents and indeed for many outside his
constituency.
By this he has proved his claim to be a working
class and Labour representative. 112
Presumably

Fitt's victory and majority of over 2,000 was a

product of these factors.

Fitt polled 26,292 votes to Kilfedder's

24,281.

Fitt had
the unionists

become the first candidate to wrest West Belfast from
since 1955,

achieving this despite one of the most

concentrated campaigns ever mounted by the Unionist Party machine.
His victory was the most sensational, but the unionist support in the
other three Belfast constituencies was also severely reduced.

After

his victory, Fitt exclaimed:
West Belfast has shown its repulsion of unionism, and while the
majority of the support which I received came from those people
who believe in the national unity of this country, I also received
the working class support on my record as a public representative.
I have been elected on the Republican Labour ticket which to me
consists of the twin ideals of the unity of the island and the
betterment of all the people. In Westminster I will support the
Labour government on its initiation of social and progressive
legislation.
I will maintain my stand to propagate the unity of
Ireland and I have no doubt that I will receive the support of
many progressive British Labour M.Ps in this connection. This is
the happiest day of my life.
It is a victory for sanity in
Northern Ireland politics. I have received the confidence of the
working class.
Now I will carry on my efforts to bring the
workers under the Labour umbrella. 113
Reaction

to the outcome of the election

predictably corresponded to political

in West

and religious

Nationalist sentiment was obviously delighted.

Belfast

affiliation.

Diamond described the
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result as a "sensational breakthrough.

It is a tribute to the people

who disregard the sectarian appeal of unionism." McAteer sent Fitt a
congratulatory telegram which read

"and then there was eleven."

Nationalists clearly regarded Fitt as one of their own, and, despite
his non-sectarian and labourite rhetoric, he was.
reinforced this

perception.

Unionist reaction

Captain Willie Orr,

leader of the

Unionist Party at Westminster, said, "It is a sad thing for Ulster,
when the famous

constituency of West Belfast has chosen to go

republican." 114
To what extent then did Protestants vote for Fitt? A degree of
elucidation can be provided by looking at past elections for the
constituency.
The 1964 election was, as we have seen, a four-cornered contest,
with the opposition split three ways.
victorious but

The Unionists Party was

it was outpolled by 9,000 votes.

In that contest,

Kilfedder received 21,337 votes while the anti border candidates
representing the Republican
combined total

of 17,934 votes.

Ireland Labour Party
therefore,

Labour Party and republicans achieved a

(N.I.L.P.)

The pro-border socialist Northern
polled 12,571 votes.

In 1966,

the unknown quantity were the voters who had previously

supported the N.I.L.P.

It was these votes which would decide the

election.

Fitt's task, therefore, was to gain Protestant votes from

Kilfedder,

without alienating his nucleus of nationally minded

supporters.

The last straight unionist versus anti-unionist Labour

contest was Jack Beattie's triumph.
25 votes.

Beattie, as we have seen, won by

This would reinforce the claim that the religious divide

in the constituency was about equal.

If this is the case, it seems

Fitt did succeed in his assignment (although it is worth noting that

r
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Fitt's vote was exactly 3,113 below the total opposition vote in
1964 , and that Kilfedder polled 2,844 more than he had done in 1964 suggesting that many who had previously voted N.I.L.P. were merely
dissatisfied unionists).
element

was

One factor which would have persuaded this

Fitt's commitment to support the

Westminster on social issues.

Labour Party at

In addition he had already proved his

ability in local government elections to win Protestant working-class
votes.

It is also likely that he won the votes of a high proportion

of people who had previously voted republican.
combination of religious
elected to Westminster.

and political

It was indeed an odd

loyalties that

saw Fitt
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CHAPTER III
CIVIL RIGHTS OR NATIONAL RIGHTS
Chapter

I summarised what

developments within
retrospect,

it

illusory.

Indeed,

Northern

had seemed to be positive political

Ireland during

the mid

is obvious that these apparent

In

1960s.

improvements were

they proved to be negative rather than positive

portents for the six counties.
The Nationalist
more aware of its
Lemass'

visit

Party as
impotence

for

reform and
importantly,

stagnant political circumstances.

Democracy

plight of British Catholics
demands for

in

signalled an end to the Republic's indifference to the

The Campaign

North.

an official opposition, became even

in

in

Ulster's sympathy for the

Northern

Ireland developed

into

the liberalisation of the Stormont regime, electoral
the

abolition of all

the

comprehensive Civil

Campaign

for

forms

of discrimination.

Social

Justice evolved

Most

into

a

Rights movement which would achieve more reforms

than any armed struggle had managed.
Terence O'Neill

in

his capacity as prime minister, pinpointed

the year of deterioration
elected
the

to Westminster. 1

as

1966,

fighting

for

in

Northern

Ireland would

be

At Westminster, his attempts to highlight the

iniquities of unionism,
the reality.

same year that Fitt was

Fitt promised he would ensure that

discrimination which existed

vigorously exposed.

the

were met with an almost total ignorance of

However, four years later, the Unionist government was
survival.

Fitt had fulfilled his promise and must take

some credit for destabilizing the state.
labour government of the time was

This is not to say that the

instrumental in
83

helping him.

But
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if it were not for the Civil Rights movement, that government would
have adopted the policy of its predecessors towards Northern Ireland
and done nothing.

Even with the advent of the Civil Rights movement,

little was achieved.
This chapter will trace Fitt's political career in this crucial
period of Irish history.

personal

of Civil

spirit"

"guiding

James Callaghan considers that Fitt was a
Rights. 2

Fitt did

indeed use his

qualities and high profile to highlight the condition of the
Catholic.

Northern

He clearly enjoyed the freedom that his

style of politics allowed.

individual

We will see, however, that by

1969 there emerged a new group of articulate and pragmatic political
operators

- Paddy Devlin, John Hume, Bernadette Devlin, Ivan Cooper,

Paddy O'Hanlon and Austin Currie, who, although they did not obscure
Fitt,

did make him slightly less distinct.

created

the

This circumstance also

impression that Fitt was the elder statesman of

nationalist politics.

The contacts with senior members of the Labour

Party, which he alone established, further reinforced this image.
1970,

therefore,

moderation,

By

Fitt would increasingly be regarded as the voice of

which was bound to lead him into disagreement with

radicals like Bernadette Devlin who was also elected to Westminster
in this period.

Fitt says of their time at parliament:

There was no relationship. I was quite happy when Bernadette came
here to show her around.
She was after all an anti-unionist
representatiave but Bernadette always had a crowd of student
minders all around her. Michael Farrell, Louden Seth and Eamon
Mccann - and all these "nutters" were all around. They dragged
her up and down the country you just could not talk to
Bernadette.
She was under the influence of all the people who
were on her bandwagon. 3
Fitt's

socialism

in

this

period retained

its

characteristics but his nationalism was not unvarying.

intuitive
On occasion
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between 1966 and

1970,

Fitt showed himself to be militant, though

much of this militancy was voiced against a background of apparent
stability within Northern Ireland.

He would not have been the first

Irish politician to promote constitutional change through the threat
of the revolutionary scenario.

Furthermore, there is evidence that

Fitt's nationalism is more discernable in Northern Ireland and the
Republic than
venues.

it is in London, he had different voices for different

This wavering suggests that Fitt had no clear political

ideology.

It also left him open to the unionist charge that although

he said he did not want the border removed by force, in fact his
actions showed the opposite.
Chapter

II established that Fitt's

essentially tactical.

"Republican"

label

was

This chapter confirms this and also reveals

that he was totally unprepared for the re-emergence of the I.R.A. in
1969.

He recalls their appearance in his home constituency:

Dock area the I.R.A. formed the Third Battalion.
of the earth.
petty theft
I.R.A." 4

"In the

They were the scum

They were people who had all sorts of convictions for

- social rejects, and then all of a sudden they were the

He clearly allowed the

"Republican"

part of his label

to become totally inappropriate and was quite happy that British
soldiers were on the streets when the violence began.
Telegraph

quoted

him

saying

"Thank

God

for

The Belfast
the

British

troops." 5
Although
in 1969,
unprepared

Fitt was

he,

like all

for

the

responsible for much of the unionist dilemma
constitutional

nationalists,

was totally

discontinuity of the state. 6

His loose

commitment to the

idea of a united Ireland was no substitute for a

coherent political

philosophy.

In other words, it is easy to aspire

r
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~

'

for a united

Ireland

- it is not so easy to implement it.

In 1969

Fitt had not the strategy for promoting the ideal he had espoused
through the decade.
Civil

As the nationalist mood became more militant and

Rights was replaced by a demand for national liberation, Fitt

and his fellow constitutionalists fell
political

limbo.

any political
the

Thus, nobody represented the Catholic community in

discourse and this was only resolved a year later with

establishment

of

By then,

(S.O.L.P.).

into a period of temporary

the Social
however,

Democratic and

the

Labour Party

I.R.A. had filled the vacuum.

Much of the blame for this eventuality can be blamed on unionist
politics.
Although O'Neill could claim to have made some effort to win the
minority over to
However,

his

traditional

unionism, his liberalism was essentially a facade.

style of unionism was

sufficiently removed from

tenets that the monolithic unionist bloc which had been

maintained for over forty years began to disintegrate.

He had no

greater critic than Ian Paisley who adjudged the new politics to be a
betrayal

of both

Protestantism and

unionism.

Bew and Patterson

comment:
The effect of O'Neill's policies was therefore to create tensions
between his government and some of the most backward elements of
the Unionist Party, and this allowed him to represent himself as a
progressive force whilst in fact no actual strategy of reforming
sectarian relations existed. 7
On April

18,

1966,

Rebellion was celebrated
O'Neill

the

fiftieth

in Belfast with

had exhibited the typical

expression

anniversary of the Easter
a colourful procession.

unionist fear

of nationalist

by banning trains from Dublin to Belfast - an action which

exacerbated rather than reduced tension.
In the

parade,

Fitt walked with the I.T.G.W.U. and was loudly
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by

applauded

He

popular,'t y. 8
O'Neill's move

crowds,

had

reflecting

actually

not

his

tremendous

intended to march

but

prompted him to break a prior engagement in London to

part. 9

take

the

The

march,

as

always,

was

a tribute to the

Fitt's attendance presumably meant that he

republican martyrs.
endorsed the

ideal

behind the Easter Rebellion.

This conflicts

sharply with

his present view, he now maintains that Connolly made a

grave error in his involvement:
I believe Connolly may have
1916 because he was a Labour
but he was caught up in
time.
Patrick Pearse and
cheese. 10
In

made a mistake by getting involved in
man, a socialist, an internationalist
the whole nationalist upheaval of the
James Connolly were like chalk and

Fitt's view, Pearse and Connolly were fighting for different

Irelands.
issues

Pearse was

an Irish cultural nationalist who put social

in a secondary position.

The Easter rebellion would thus be a

blood sacrifice to rejuvenate the
their independence;

Irish people's desire to assert

an independence which history had shown they had

continually strived to achieve.

Connolly on the other hand, wanted a

independent workers' republic of Ireland.
Onlookers of the
distinction

and

identification with

Fitt

1966 parade would not
was

astute

enough

such a parade would have

have made
to

such a

know that his

secured

him some

support.

Yet, to be fair, there was no perception that such physical

force

a political

as

I.R.A.

was

weapon would ever be used again.

practically defunct

in the North.

In 1966 the

Danny Morrison, then

Education Officer of Sinn Fein, remarked "As far as we were concerned
there was

absolutely no chance of the 1.R.A. appearing again.

They

were something in the history books." 11
Bowyer Bell talks of the relationship between Fitt and Sinn Fein
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at this

juncture:

"In Belfast relations with Gerry Fitt who as good

as owned and operated the new Republican Labour Party, were good if
not

His

intimate.

Westminster to
emu 1at ed .

II

12

tactic of using his

seats

harass the unionist machine was
The display of mutual

republican elements

in the

respect

in Stormont and
analysed

between

if not

Fitt and

1960s would not continue in the 1970s.

Fitt made it clear that he wished to retain his individuality at
Westminster by discounting rumours that he would apply for the Labour
Party Whip.

He told the Irish News:

I am contemplating no such move but as I have already indicated I
will support the government on its initiation of social and
progressive legislation.
As a socialist I have admired Mr
Wilson's government in the last session and I have no doubt that
in the next session we will have a great deal in common in our
approach to present day problems.
Fitt went on to describe his relationship with the C.D.U:
on the friendliest
government.

terms with at least 60 members of the new Labour

They regard my victory

breakthrough and

"I am

in West Belfast as a signal

I feel I can now propagate the cause they have been

advocating."
Fitt then made clear his position on the twin ideal of national
unity and

social

"Never at

any time will I renounce either.

many members
eventual

and economic justice for the Irish working class.

in the British

reuniting

of

the

I realise that there are

Labour Movement who agree with the
country. 1113

Fitt,

evidently was

still a nationalist.
Considering this commitment to a united Ireland, in addition to
other statements throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, one would have
expected

a

maiden

nationalist sentiment.

speech at Westminster heavily spiced with
It did not happen.

The contradiction in what

,

~-
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Fitt told the

Irish News and what he asked for in his speech at

Westminster is revealing.

It is evident that Fitt had one voice for

London and another for Belfast.
The fact

that there was little or no nationalist bravado is not

to say that the speech was not dramatic.
and,

although

Imperial

Fitt was a skilful orator,

he was mindful of the Westminster convention that the

government would not interfere in Ulster's affairs, he used

the opportunity to make a decided impact on the House.
worth looking at
political

The speech is

in some detail as it is indicative of much of his

conviction.

He began with an elucidation of his personal

brand of republicanism.
Since the election I have read in sections of the British press
that I have been classified as an Irish Republican. I should take
this opportunity to classify my political allegiance. To classify
me as an Irish Republican is not strictly correct. The Irish
Republican Party in Ireland does not recognise the authority of
this House in any part of Ireland and its members would indeed
refuse to take their seats in this House.
He then reveals a trust of the British parliament and the
British people, a trust that he would never relinquish:
I have not given up hope, and I have not yet determined to follow
the line of the Irish Republican Party, because I believe that
during my term as the representative of West Belfast in this House
I will be able to appeal to every reasonable member in this
chamber, and, through them, to every reasonable member of the
British public. I feel certain that at the end of this parliament
dramatic changes will have taken place in the north of Ireland.
Fitt was

intent on presenting himself as a parliamentarian

rather than a revolutionary socialist,
His

which was indeed the case.

intuition that British measures would solve the Irish problem,

remained a dictum of Fitt's political philosophy and would eventually
lead him into confrontation with more radical elements.
In the next segment of his speech Fitt demonstrated a distinct
proclivity towards

integration.

Rather than lament the existence of
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the border, he explains the differences in elections in Great Britain
and Northern

Ireland showing that in the latter, they were devoid of

economic and social content.
In Northe~n Ireland, at every succeeding election there are no
economic issues involved.
In this island of Britain, the recent
election was fought on the different policies and philosophies of
the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Labour Party,
and the Labour Party were victorious. In Northern Ireland, no
such issues entered the contest.
Fitt's demand for assimilation focused on the 1920 Government of
Ireland Act,
Ireland.

which

implemented devolved administration in Northern

He asked for the Act to be modified to deprive Stormont

control over the electoral process.
The changing social conditions over the past 50 years make the
Government of Ireland Act completely unworkable. When we realise
how every concept of British democracy is being flouted in
Northern Ireland we conclude that now, immediately, is the time to
amend that Act.
A further demand for equity between the United Kingdom and
Northern

Ireland was voiced through a request for the extension of

the British Representation of the Peoples Act of 1949 to the
province.

Fitt claimed that the fundamental basis of democracy, that

is One Man One Vote was abused in the six counties:
We have an anti-democratic electoral system. This would not be
tolerated in any other freedom-loving country.
In Northern
Ireland the same people are elected to administer the different
Acts - the one applicable to Northern Ireland and the one
applicable for Imperial elections.
Can we expect these same
people to administer their own electoral laws, on the one hand,
and then to wear a different hat and administer the 1949
Representation of the People Act? The first aim of the Northern
Ireland Unionist Party is to perpetuate its own existence there.
Let there be no mistake about that.
Fitt was determined to

inform the House that Northern Irish

elections revolved around whether one was a Catholic or a Protestant.
Although Fitt went on to declare his socialist values, he did
not

propose

a

socialist hypothesis to resolve the political
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believe that it is only right that I should highlight this state
of affairs in the British Parliament, since entry into political
life I have always opposed discrimination or sectarianism in any
way.
This is not applicable to one religion only, because if
anyone not of my own religion was a victim of discrimination, I
would be the first to fight on his behalf. 20
Fitt

was

playing

still

the role of the constitutional

nationalist.
In June,
force

as

speaking at the Irish Club in London, Fitt discounted

an instrument to unite Ireland arguing that to love Ireland

did not mean it was necessary to hate England:
Ireland cannot be united by the use of force. Today, the world is
contracting.
The advent of the E.E.C. and economic factors will
lead to the abolition of the border. It is because Sinn Fein
advocates a Republic immediately that they win no seats and lose
their deposits.
Their slogan is: Give us a Republic now whether
everybody will starve or not is no concern of ours. 21
This declaration from the most well-known nationalist politician
was the only bright spot
regime.

in

a damaging month

for the unionist

Fitt's machinations had prompted the British media to probe

into Northern

Ireland affairs

a little more than

they had been

accustomed to, resulting in some derogatory conclusions. 22
Events

in

Northern

Ireland did not help.

Ian

Paisley's

demagoguery had led to two days of sectarian riots at Cromac Square
in Belfast, and at the end of June there were fatalities.
Volunteer Force

The Ulster

(U.V.F.), a Protestant paramilitary force completely

opposed to what they perceived as the liberal

unionist regime,

ambushed four Catholics at Malvern Street in Belfast, killing one and
seriously wounding two.

Although the crisis point had not yet been

reached, these were arguably the first deaths of the "troubles."
In the
called an

immediate aftermath of the murders, Fitt and Paul Rose
emergency meeting of M.P's at Westminster and decided to

form a deputation to

see Prime Minister Wilson and Home Secretary,

r
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Meanwhile,

in Northern Ireland, O'Neill announced at

Stormont that the U.V.F.

was to be declared illegal and he equated

RoY Jenkins.
them with the

I.R.A.

At Westminster, Wilson labelled the U.V.F. a

"quasi-Fascist organisation masquerading behind a clerical cloak."
Mere denunciation

from Wilson was not enough for Fitt and he again

called on Britain to exercise her responsibility.
government

to take action

"It is for the

and not the government of Northern

I rel and. "23
In August,
took place,
the facts
electoral
that

"the informal"

meeting

between O'Neill and Wilson

with Fitt having made sure that Wilson was equipped with
about Northern Ireland.

The agenda included discussion on

practices, discrimination in housing and jobs - the details

Fitt had highlighted at Westminster.

Evidently Wilson was more

conscious of minority charges than any of his predecessors.

Fitt for

his part, was optimistic about the meeting's results. 24
O'Neill's autobiography reveals, despite Fitt's hopes, that the
encounter between the two prime ministers was very cordial.
exchanges were
for

the

along general lines, with Wilson exhibiting sympathy

circumstances

Nevertheless,

in

which

O'Neill

had to operate. 25

it was Fitt who was responsible for bringing about this

meeting through his persistence at Westminster.
launched yet

The

Three days later, he

another attack on what he considered as Britain's

dereliction of responsibility

in not conforming to the dictates of

the Government of Ireland Act.
I say,
Sir, that this Act gives ultimate and over-riding
responsibility to the parliament of the United Kingdom, and as the
representative of Belfast West, as the representative of 26,000
people, I stand here to demand of the British government that they
accept the responsibility which they themselves have written into
this Act of 1920.
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He then launched a scathing barrage on unionist policy in the
north,

claiming that unemployment percentage figures in places like

Strabane,

Newcastle, Dungannon, Enniskillen and Londonderry had never

been brought to the attention of the London parliament.
that every one of these areas

He argued

had an anti-unionist majority and

consequently, money dispensed by Westminster was denied them:
These areas are denied any industrial development on the ground
that they are not worth it, that they are anti-unionist and worthy
of no consideration ... As a socialist I do not want to see any
unemployed man in Northern Ireland, irrespective of his religious
or political beliefs. This is not so with my unionist colleagues,
who deliberately deny employment to areas in the country because
they do not support the Unionist Party.
Fitt finished this parliamentary offensive with a plea to be
relieved of the restrictions of the Westminster Convention, a plea
which the Deputy Speaker rejected. 26
In the following week the
which

summed

Irish News contained an editorial

up the nationalist perception of what

accomplished thus far at Westminster.
that he had gained.

Fitt had

It also revealed the respect

Entitled the "Voice from West Belfast" it read:

In his direct and unaffected fashion, Mr Gerry Fitt is making a
habit of disturbing that august and leisurely institution at
Westminster to which he was elected earlier this year. Making no
genuflections to convention, he wants the House to remember that
there are other voices in this area than those of the cohort of
Unionist M.P's who sit so complacently on the Tory benches;
silent in their subservience to the Tory Whip, and trudging
dutifully into the division lobby against the government. Mr
Fitt's hard hitting speech on Tuesday night was another example of
his efforts to bring six county affairs to the attention of the
British government. Whilst he provides much needed illumination,
he is also adding considerably to the education of the new M.P's
who are less informed about this area than they are about Bangkok
or Bechuanaland. 27
After the summer,
slackened somewhat.
had

arisen

pressure on Wilson from Labour backbenchers
The lull can be attributed to the crisis which

in Rhodesia and which occupied much of the prime
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minister's

attention

but,

Westminster scene.
non-existent,

nevertheless, Fitt had made a mark on the

Although tangible reforms were negligible if not

he had

succeeded in isolating the Unionist M.P's, and

with the help of Paisley's actions,
undemocratic set-up in Northern
unionist administration

had focused attention on the

Ireland.

It

seemed as

if the

at Stormont would not be permitted to press

on regardless, as in the old days of Conservative government.
In 1967,
administration
on the

Fitt continued to push the Northern Ireland unionist
into a defensive position.

In February, a conference

Irish question was held in London and attended by delegates

from the British Trade Union and Labour movement.

In sharp contrast

to his maiden speech at Westminster, Fitt's address to the conference
was much more

"nationalist"

inspired.

Although again calling for

parity between Northern Ireland and Britain, Fitt also addressed the
problem of partition.
did not

He warned that if matters in Northern Ireland

improve 'men of principle' would take matters into their own

hands:
Many people in Northern Ireland have a Sinn Fein outlook, and
indeed in years gone by I have disagreed with them on the question
of violence.
An an Irish socialist I do not want to see one
Irishman shooting another Irishman.
I do not believe that they
will solve the Irish question. But these people have a principle
- they say that the partition of Ireland has existed now for
forty-seven years, that it is useless to try to talk to a British
government that they will not listen, that they themselves created
the problem and they are unwilling to take any steps to solve it,
and I have been told time and time again that the only answer to
the partition of Ireland, lies in the hands of Irishmen themselves
and it can only be reunited by force.
He again,

as

Catholic grievances

he had done at Westminster, recounted the various
and then

again reissued his clear warning that

the minority would not wait forever for civil justice:
There is no time for delay in facing up to the problem which
exists in Northern Ireland. Those people in Northern Ireland who

,
f
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are at the moment British subjects and citizens of the United
Kingdom are not being treated as such, and are looking to the
British parliament for reforms.
If reforms are not forthcoming
who could blame them for taking whatever action they see fit in
the circumstances?
I for one
would certainly not blame
them. 28
In the

1970s,

Fitt did what once he claimed he would not do.

When the P.I.R.A. emerged and embarked on a military campaign to oust
the British from Ireland, he continually denounced them.

To be fair,

he would not have been the first Irish politician to capitalize on
the

perceived

threat of unconstitutional

methods of political

agitation to gain constitutional reform - both O'Connell and Parnell
were prone to employ such methods to add weight to their political
rhetoric.

In 1967 sabre rattling would not have been taken seriously

and Fitt, like all constitutional politicians, was totally unprepared
for the revival of the I.R.A. in 1969.

Yet despite this, there is a

clear inconsistency in Fitt's politics.
As already stated,
liberalism was that

the principal

contradiction

it raised Catholic expectations

in O'Neill's
but avoided

authentic reform.

Northern Ireland remained a Protestant state for a

Protestant people.

Thus, the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association

(N.I.C.R.A)

was

inequalities.
C.S.J.
that

formed

in

February 1967 to combat religious

This organization sprang from the amalgamation of the

and the Northern Wolfe Tone Society.
the

movement was

throughout

its life,

LR.A.

In

nationalists,

It is wrong to suggest

an entirely Catholic one. 29

However,

unionists claimed that it was a front for the

reality

it was

communists,

a broad coalition of socialists,

liberals and even the leader of the Young

Unionists.
The N.I.C.R.A.

aims were:

one man one vote in local elections,

Gerry Fitt, M.P., leader of Northern Ireland's Social Democ
Labour Party
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the

ending of gerrymandered electoral

boundaries,

apparatus

to

eliminate discrimination by public authorities, the fair allocation
of public housing, the disbandment of the 'B' Specials and the repeal
of the Special
partition

The campaign was not designed to end

and eschewed the historic tradition of violence and

bloodshed.
all

Powers Act.

Like Fitt, it was intent on seeking "British" rights for

the people

in Northern Ireland.

Nevertheless, unionist opinion

was convinced that they were dealing with the customary bout of
nationalist

agitation, albeit in a somewhat unconventional form.

N.I.C.R.A.,

it was thought, was simply subverting the constitution.

Although

it was

The

Londonderry rather than Belfast which provided the

inspiration for the movement,

it was not to

be long until its

strengths and Fitt's would complement each other.
An

indication of how Fitt was viewed by the more extreme

elements
month,

in the Protestant community was revealed in April.
the

launched

Protestant Telegraph
by

Paisley)

demanded

complained at Westminster,
integrity as
demand,

an M.P.

(a violently sectarian newspaper,
"ARREST FENIAN

arguing that

it was

FITT. "3°

and

Fitt

an attack on his

The Speaker ruled that in publishing the

the newspaper was guilty of a prima facie

privilege,

In that

referred

the

grievance

breach of

to the Committee of

Privileges.

The Committee declared that the publication was in

contempt for

using

action

such statements.

in the matter as

statement. 31

The

It resolved to take no further

it would only highlight the

incident shows that

Fitt was

abusive

considered a

blatant nationalist and detested by certain elements of the unionist
population.
administration.

Undeterred,

Fitt continued to attack the

unionist

I
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Also

in April, Fitt brought three Labour M.P's over to Northern

Ireland - Paul Rose, Maurice Miller and Stan Orme, intending to show
them

the North's

allegations

he

"ugliest spots"

in an effort to verify the

been making at Westminster. 32

had

The four

toured the towns west of the Bann, including Coalisland, Dungannon
Austin Currie remarked that Fitt delivered the most

and Strabane.
"powerful

oratorial

performance"

he had ever witnessed at the last

stop. 33

Unionist M.P's were outraged at the intrusion, and not

impressed by the report submitted to the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins,
severely criticising the unionist administration.
that despite all

its problems and difficulties,

democratic rights than Northern Ireland.

Miller maintained
India had more

Orme told the Irish News:

There was a crack in the Tory edifice when like a breath of fresh
air Gerry Fitt came as a true Irish representative to
Westminster.
The Unionist Party at that time decided that Gerry
Fitt would not have much influence on his own, but Mr Fitt had
brought the Irish question fully and fairly before the British
M.P's.
He had been able to refute the quasi liberalism of the
unionists who were sweet reasonableness in Westminster. 34
Fitt promised that the fact-finding mission was only the first.

In

1968 this policy would pay handsome dividends.
In May,

the local

another occasion to

government elections took place.

This was

see if Fitt's machinations at Westminster would

cause his Protestant support to diminish.

The conflict between the

Republican Labour Party and the N.D.P. continued during the election.
Initially the two parties formed

a pact designed to prevent them

competing against each other for Catholic votes in the same wards.
The N.D.P.

claimed that the concord collapsed because Fitt failed to

carry out an undertaking not to put Republican Labour candidates into
the Falls Ward.

Fitt, on the other hand, claimed there was a faction

in the West Belfast branch of the N.D.P. which was bitterly opposed

I

:
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to him and the Republican Labour Party.
onlY

honourable

poss,. bl e. 35

course

The clash

was
between

He felt, therefore, that the

to fight

for

as many seats

Fitt and the N.D.P.

as

is a clear

indication that the antagonisms of the previous year had not abated.
It also shows that Fitt was quite capable of reneging on an agreement
if he felt it politically expedient.
During the election,
Dock but as was

Fitt was opposed for the Aldermanship in

becoming customary he was successful, as were his

three colleagues who were elected as councillors.
that the Republican
Dock Ward.
ever in

The results meant

Labour Party had gained complete control of the

Fitt polled 2,499 votes and won with the highest majority

local government in the history of Dock, presumably with the

help of non-Catholic support.

He now also had the backing of seven

party colleagues at the City Hall;

the three councillors elected in

Dock and two each from Smithfield and the Falls.
were firmly established in Belfast.

Republican Labour

After his triumph he reasserted

his nationalist attitude:
For far too long the opposition forces in the North have been
divided against themselves to the advantage of our unionist
masters.
I think that the results of this election prove that the
only alternative to unionism is a progressive labour and socialist
movement embodying the principles of the eventual reunification of
this country into a 32 county republic. 36
Fitt remained very much the darling of the Irish News.

In the

wake of his victory its editorial stated:
Only Mr Fitt, it seems, has the sort of influence that can
diminish prejudices, even among those not normally his supporters,
to carry his standard to victory at the polls. His rousing
victory in Dock, with three colleagues riding in on the tide, was
no inconsiderable achievement, and the overwhelming defeat of his
avowedly sectarian opponent set the pattern for a general
rejection of Protestant unionists in other Wards. 37
At the end of the month, Glasgow Celtic became the first British
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club to win

soccer

utterances
episode
such,

the

European Cup.

That

success produced

from Fitt which have taken on a mythical dimension and the

is often cited as an example of the real Gerry Fitt. As
Glasgow Celtic were and are
it deserves some attention.
11

traditionally supported by Scottish Catholics;

11

Glasgow Rangers on

the other hand are traditionally supported by Scottish Protestants this support extends to Northern
cleavage.

A crowd of fifteen

largest parades ever seen
Celtic's victory.

Ireland with the same religious
thousand took part in one of the

in the Falls Road district to celebrate

Fitt was invited to the revelry and addressed the

crowd on May 29:
As I stand on this platform and witness such a vast concourse, I
am more than ever convinced that the ordinary people of West
Belfast are prepared to take a stand in defence of all the ideals
which have been their way of life for so long. 1966 has indeed
proved to be a year of great significance to Falls, Central, Dock
and many other areas. We have beaten our opponents in politics,
sports and in every other field they dare to confront us and I
have no doubt that this will be the continuing trend in the years
to come. 38
In certain circles in Belfast today it is commonly assumed that
Fitt's remarks were a direct
Rangers,

reference to a Celtic victory over

a Catholic victory over Protestantism.

The irony of this is

that in order to win the cup Celtic defeated Inter Milan of Catholic
Italy in the final.
fact that on May 31

The misconception may have occurred due to the
Rangers were defeated

in the second major

European soccer competition final, the European Cup Winners Cup, two
days after Fitt's bravado.
Nevertheless,
bluster.

An

Fitt

at

editorial

him. 39

Also

Unionist

Association

the time was severely criticised for his
in the

a resolution was
reading:

Belfast Telegraph disparaged
passed

by the

Belfast Young

"The remarks were deliberately
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intended to

incite bad community relations and this would appear to

be another illustration of Mr Fitt's hypocrisy." 40
Fitt was reported to be amused at the sectarian allegations:
When I said we had beaten our opponents I was referring to the
ordinary working class people who supported the Glasgow Celtic
football team and to those around who were listening to my remarks
- many of whom were supporters of mine in the West Belfast
election.
I insist I was not bringing religion into sport and I
repeat that at no time have I regarded myself as a representative
solely of Catholic people as opposed to Protestants. 41
For all
Fitt,

for

an

his

back peddling and prevarication it is clear that

instant at least, was taken up with the spirit of the

In this celebrated instant he again displayed a propensity

moment.

for emotional

outburst.

There seems little doubt that in this case,

he classified the opponents of Republican Socialism as those who were
not Catholics and those who did not support Glasgow Celtic.
not the first
wanted to
of the

He was

Northern Irish politician to tell the crowd what they

hear, yet this was the most blatant example of his playing
He was clearly at ease in the role of the

sectarian card.

"Green politician."
In June,

Other incidents confirm this.

Fitt spoke at a rally in Trafalgar Square, attended by

some British Labour M.P's.

The meeting proved to be another occasion

when there was controversy over what Fitt did or did not say.
accuser this

The

time was Prime Minister O'Neill who, at an Orange Order

function

in Cloughmills, alleged that Fitt had advocated a return to

violence

in Ulster politics.

constitutional
at

methods

fail,

He quoted

Fitt as

saying:

"If

the people of Northern Ireland who are

present the victims of this oppression are quite entitled to take

what means they can to end it."
Fitt

in

his own defence claimed that O'Neill had distorted the

meaning of his words:
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What I did say was, if the Northern Ireland government continues
its present policies of discrimination, gerrymandering and social
injustice, some members might in desperation resort to extreme
methods.
I believe that this is a risk which exists in the
unhealthy atmosphere of Northern Ireland and which persists in the
absence of any tangible evidence of bridge building activities by
the prime minister, about which he talks so much and does so
1i tt 1e. 42
It seems that the only certain conclusion that can be drawn from
the

episode

unambiguous.
open

that Fitt's rhetoric was not

The

indeterminate nature of Fitt's politics left him

to accusations of

ill-feeling
November,
with

is

between
O'Neill

unionists

in political

intrigue.

and nationalists continued.

The
In

said that both Fitt and Austin Currie were playing

Fitt took the opportunity to declare, "I have never at

fire.

any time

indulging

always totally

in my political career in Northern Ireland incited or will

incite anyone to violence."~

There

that he goaded people to violence.
politicians

before him,

force constitutional

is no evidence to suggest
Fitt,

like constitutional

utilised a perceived threat of violence to

change.

However, it can not be denied that he

must have been aware of the encouragement such speeches would have
given to more extreme nationalists.

A dispassionate assessment might

conclude that there was a contrast between the voice of moderation at
Westminster and his speeches outside the House.
The long
came

awaited Northern Ireland debate at Westminster finally

in October.

government
fourteen

Fitt's contribution showed how little the Labour

had changed conditions in Northern Ireland.
months

It had been

since the regions problems had last been debated by

parliament and Fitt had hoped dramatic changes would have taken place
within the

province.

It was with deep disappointment that he told

the House that no changes in Northern Ireland had taken place.
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Fitt proceeded to press
implemented

for

in Northern Ireland.

afforded to

Pakistanis,

Indians

should be applied to all

the Race Relations Act to be
He argued that the same protection
and other

immigrants

to Britain

United Kingdom citizens, including the

catholics of Northern Ireland.
Fitt again made
Britain and made
"That

is

all

it explicit that he did not require anything else.

we ask.

future disorder,
violence,

a plea for parity between Northern Ireland and

but

We do not ask for more."

claiming,

"As a pacifist,

He again forecast

I do not want to see

I do not want to see the people trampled under by the

jackboot Unionist Party." 44
Replying to
government was

Fitt's speech, Jenkins acknowledged that the Labour
"deeply concerned"

about the situation in Northern

He cautioned Stormont that Westminster would not interfere

Ireland.

in Ulster "provided" it was satisfied things were moving in the right
Despite the Home Secretary's

direction.

salutary warning, it is

evident from Fitt's utterances that the situation in Northern Ireland
remained

Fitt's goal to speed up the liberalisation of

unchanged.

the Stormont regime had not materialised.

He had secured a ready

hearing among Labour M.P's, ministers and backbenchers alike, and had
proved

himself an

although

his

defensive,
to Northern

presence at Westminster had put the unionists on the

the

parliamentary convention of non interference relating

Ireland remained

House Divided,
was

able orator and an astute political operator, but

intact.

Furthermore, in his book, 8

James Callaghan stresses how little public attention

paid to Northern

Ireland. 45

If the truth

be told,

the

Labour government stood "idly by."
Nevertheless,

Fitt

remained optimistic,

and

in his political
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review of 1967 written for the Irish News he concluded:
It is my sincere hope that on the next occasion when the people_of
these constituencies have an opportunity to elect representatives
they will ensure that the nationalist ideal will be given
expression in the corridors of power at Westminster.
on entering into the year 1968, I can only pledge myself to carry
on as I have been doing in the past and I am confident that the
New Year will bring further defeats for unionism in Northern
Ireland. 46
Although much of Fitt's wrath was vented on the unionist
administration
the South.

he was not adverse to criticising the government in

In these instances, his rhetoric was again often set in a

framework of nationalist resentment,

a component missing

in his

Westminster addresses.
In January 1968 he spoke at University College Galway's Literary
and Debating Society.
the Labour Movement
Republic's

He reiterated his wish for the integration of
in the North and the South and likened the

Fianna Fail

Party to the Unionist Party, calling them

"Siamese twins." 47
In October 1967, in a speech calling for stronger action to end
partition,

he attacked the Fianna Fail government's attitude to the

issue of the border.

Fitt told the United Ireland Association in

Manchester:
I wonder sometimes if the Southern government is prepared to
accept the responsibility of the reunification of Ireland. If
they are, they have not taken any very dramatic steps to achieve
this.
They could be much more forceful in demanding their right
to the six county territory. 48
Evidently Fitt envisaged that the Southern administration had a
catalytic role to play in the ending of partition.

In his address to

the Galway students, he argued that there were hundreds of thousands
of Northern
of a united

Irish

holding an uncompromising allegiance to the ideal

Ireland who looked in vain for support from successive
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Fitt's nationalism was
t s. 49
ern
governmen
th
·SOU
perceptible in the Republic than at Westminster.

undeniably more

In the same month, Fitt tabled an emergency resolution which was
adopted at a C.D.U.

conference in the Irish Club in London.

This

resolution called on those M.P's at Westminster who were sponsors of
the CD
· · U· to take "all possible action in the House of Commons to
question the legality of the existing convention." In his speech he
argued,

"Northern Ireland seemed to be the forgotten child of British

politics and the British Prime Minister is not prepared to risk a
constitutional

The

crisis over it."~

evidence of the

lack of vigour from

resolution was

further

Fitt's fellow socialists in

government.
Fitt's continued attacks on the
inevitable conflict with O'Neill.

unionists

brought him into

In a speech in Strabane, O'Neill

described Fitt as a political opportunist who could not go on being a
republican in Belfast and a socialist in London.
Mr Fitt is
changes its
much use of
the Tricolour

He said:

like that remarkable animal, the chameleon which
colours to suit its background. He did not recall
the term British subject when Mr Fitt marched behind
in Belfast to celebrate the 1916 Rebellion.

I believe that the political opportunists, although they may
win short term successes, generally fail in the long run, because
in due course people find them out.
One cannot forever be a
republican in Belfast and a socialist in London - a nationalist at
Stormont and a British subject at Westminster. Nor can one build
an enduring political career upon a great heap of irresponsible
criticism and denigration.
O'Neill's

speech compounds the critical allegations that were

made in this period against Fitt.

Fitt for his part retorted:

This speech will be recognised for what it is the sordid attempt
by a puny politician who is fighting for his political life. As I
have said before if the day ever dawns when the prime minister
congratulates me, I shall hastily re-examine my conscience to see
what I have done wrong.

r
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fitt then went on to reaffirm his allegiance to the Connolly ideal:
He (O'Neill) recognises that during my political career I. have
sought to unite and serve the working class people of this area,
irrespective of religion or political adherence, and so hasten the
day when all people of the six counties will find their true place
in the establishment of a Irish Socialist Republic for the 32
counties of this island. 51
In June, Fitt had a further opportunity to express his fealty to
the Connolly doctrine at a ceremony on the Falls Road honouring the
hundredth birthday of his hero.

Fitt addressed the crowd and said:

"They had gathered to commemorate the

birth

and death of one of

Ireland's greatest sons who bound himself to the cause of the working
class."

He argued that when Connolly died from the bullets of a

firing squad the oppressors of the people thought they had seen the
end of him and his ideals but they were wrong.
that young men would take
declared,

that

They did not foresee

up the banner that he laid down.

like Connolly,

he

Fitt,

believed that there could be no

peace in Ireland until a socialist republic existed.
The most revealing aspect of Fitt's address was the time span
envisaged for

the transformation of Ireland.

Fitt hoped that "as a

result of this week of remembrance they would dedicate themselves to
the task of establishing an

Irish socialist

republic within the

lifetime of the oldest member of the platform party."~
The dissimilarity between the content of this discourse and the
speeches at Westminster
evidence to
rights

in

is very apparent.

Thus, there is certainly

suggest that although Fitt may have demanded only civil
London,

he was

equally vociferous

in his demand for a

united Ireland in Belfast.
In retrospect,

Fitt maintains that the legitimate civil rights

campaign began on June 20 when Austin Currie began a squat in

r
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Dungannon to

highlight the discrimination

time he fully

supported Currie.

the situation

in

housing. 53

At the

He claimed that he regretted that

had escalated to such an extent but argued that Currie

had used every parliamentary vehicle to right the wrongs in the
area.

He

believed responsibility for the situation rested with the

Unionist Party.~
Three days

later a protest meeting was held in the town.

argued that the Unionist

Party had

Fitt

undergone a recent right-wing

fascist attempt to take over the administration:
We have been told that Captain O'Neill is a great Liberal - he is
a great Liberal but he certainly does not act as a great Liberal.
We have been told that he is the best of a bad bunch, that the
minority of Northern Ireland should not do anything to upset
Terence's plans. I say this. A lot of people try to impress upon
you that Paisley would walk over you with hobnail boots and
Captain O'Neill would walk over you with bedroom slippers. So far
as I am concerned nobody is going to walk over me whether they are
in their bare feet or not. 55
This was further evidence that Fitt was easily capable of filling the
role of the radical politician.
The Civil

Rights movement had begun and Fitt was determined to

be a part of it.

At Westminster, he continued to raise the Northern

Ireland question through the only vehicle available to him, question
time.
Fitt continually demanded that the British government take
responsibility for the problems of Northern Ireland.
acknowledged that
human
was

rights

Fitt had been very active in raising the issues of

and discrimination since he had entered the Commons, he

as steadfast in his reliance on Stormont putting its own house in

order as
Fitt:

Although Wilson

Fitt was in his appeal to the Imperial parliament.
"I

He told

think these matters must be left for discussion with the

government of Northern

Ireland.

The

Prime Minister of Northern
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Ireland and

his colleagues know we cannot continue indefinitely with

the present situation.

Something has to be done." 56

Yet nothing was done within Northern Ireland to appease minority
leaders.

Fitt responded with undisguised sabre-rattling.

Connolly commemoration meeting

At a James

in Derry in July, he announced his

intention to establish the Republican Labour Party in that city.
I am prepared to take my ideals and my philosophies out of Belfast
because by staying in the city I am only denigrating every
principle for which Connolly ever stood. When I come to Derry I
promise you I will change the system ... The day for talking has
gone, the day for action has arrived. If every individual here to
day goes home and re-dedicates himself to change the system as it
operates in Derry, then we will change the system as it operates
in the six counties and in the whole island of Ireland. If
constitutional methods do not bring social justice, if they do not
bring democracy to Northern Ireland then I am quite prepared to
go outside constitutional methods ... 57
The disparity between Fitt's remarks here and his moderate tone
in London

is patently obvious.

Fitt's move

McAteer predictably disapproved of

into Derry, plainly feeling that it would damage his own

party's

prominence

way to

seek the

in the city.

He remarked:

"It is a rather poor

unity which is preached to us on all sides.

It is

enough to make James Connolly turn in his grave."
Fitt remained unrepentant, and, although unwilling to attack the
integrity of the Nationalist Party, he argued that the Derry people
had not

been given the leadership to fight unionism to which they

were entitled.

He did

not want

his party to remain confined to

Belfast:
In the past we have been roundly attacked just for this. I am
sure on reflection Mr McAteer will realise that his gimmicky reply
to my Derry speech will be no answer to the problems which beset
that city
The decision was taken in line with the party's
policy to extend its sphere of influence and to propagate the
ideals and philosophy of James Connolly. 58
This episode was

indicative of the ever present divide in
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It also shows that Fitt did, at least on this

nationalist politics.

"unconstitutional"

advocate

occasion,
agitation.

It

methods

of

political

is not clear what he meant by "unconstitutional" but

the gathering would have considered it an exoneration for the use of
violence to achieve political aims.
On

August 24,

organized the first

1968,

the C.S.J.

big Civil

in County Tyrone.

Dungannon

at

discontent

Rights march

from Coal island to

The protest arose as a result of

discrimination

specifically political

backed by the N.I.C.R.A.

issues.

in

housing,

rather

than over

Nevertheless, it offended Paisley's

brand of Loyalism and he announced a counter-demonstration.

This led

to the Civil Rights march being banned from entering the town centre
- an attempt to restrict
support,

exhibiting,

it to Catholic areas.

yet again,

Fitt called for

a shift in emphasis away from his

moderate Westminster stance:
Ireland's history teaches us that unless the ordinary citizens are
prepared to fight on their own behalf victory will not be
achieved.
I now ask all those who have supported this campaign to
let our unionist opponents and the whole world see that the time
has arrived. 59
The march attracted 2,500 people and passed off without any
major trouble.
reported

Fitt was one of the speakers.

him saying:

The Irish News

"A fire has been lit tonight which will not go

out until Civil Rights have been established." 60
Bernadette Devlin,

who was

to attain a very high political

profile within a year, recalls a far more colourful account of Fitt's
contribution to the march.

It was her first encounter with him and

her account gives a valuable insight to his career:
first
foul

time

"It was the

in my life that I ever heard a politician in public use

language.

That

is my first memory of Gerry Fitt, he was
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blackguarding the police and just kept referring to them as those
black bastards." 61
The repercussions at Westminster were minimal in the wake of the
demonstration.

Fitt had a ten minute meeting with Wilson and he put

down a motion objecting to the banning of the march.

By the evening

he had acquired 59 signatures. 62

Despite the

of

August 28,

meeting

with

the

prime minister and the tabled motion,

the

consequences of the August march had not been sufficient to invoke
alarm at Westminster.

The situation was to be altered in October.

The demarcation line for politics in Northern Ireland to become
"fashionable" was October 5,
Rights march.
venue for the

Two days

1968,

the day of the seminal Civil

previously, in a speech in Blackpool, the

Labour Party Conference,

gathering of the C.D.U.

Fitt addressed

a large

He reiterated the requests which he had

petitioned for two and a half years:
I do not consider I am making any outlandish requests. All I am
asking for is that the same rights and privileges which are
enjoyed by the people in Doncaster should be afforded to the
people of Dungannon and Derry.
If you consider this is too much to ask then I must say in return
that the six counties should no longer be considered an integral
part of the U.K.
In

a reference to the

predicted that there would

forthcoming

Civil

Rights march,

be trouble from the R.U.C:

he

"I have no

doubt that once again we will be subjected to police intervention and
I am now in the process of inviting six of my Westminster colleagues
to attend this march

in what is allegedly an integral part of the

U.K."~
Londonderry was the obvious venue for the demonstration.
there that discrimination was

at

its most

It was

institutionalised and

r

.
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'i,

efficient,
rights

where

two

and placed

autumn of 1968,

thirds

of the people were denied basic civil

in the position of a persecuted majority.

In the

a collective consciousness altered the pattern of

events.
After the Apprentice Boys of Derry announced an annual parade on
October 5 over the same route as the Civil Rights march, William
Craig,

Minister of Home Affairs,

Catholic

areas,

on that date. 64
"It

act by the Minister.
peaceful

demonstration.

on it. "65
again

It seems

was banned than

developed

a stupid

a deliberate attempt to provoke a

by banning the march,

the

unionists

had

it.

To

avoid

For the march, Fitt brought three Labour

Blackpool

Home Secretary,

between

ignored

a nationalist parade, no Irish Tricolours were

backbenchers over from
his

it

except in

This is the only interpretation that can put

by the N.I.C.R.A.

and

parades,

Fitt considered

if the government had

characterisation as

Wilson

all

It is likely that more people attended because it

blundered.

permitted

is

banned

Fitt

who had a brief to report back to
James Callaghan.

An alliance had

and young radicals in Northern Ireland which

was to prove a short-lived but potent combination.
Despite
protest

as

N.I.C.R.A.

efforts,

the authorities

perceived the

a nationalist conspiracy, a smoke screen for the I.R.A.

The marchers were

prevented

constables,

Fitt was

breach the

R.U.C.

baton charge on

from entering the city by a barrier of

at the front of the march and as it tried to

cordon

he was batoned.

There followed a vicious

the demonstrators with over seventy injured - the

police were quite simply guilty of indiscriminate violence.
The
television

events

in

not only

Londonderry were relayed

in

in

but throughout the

Ireland

and

Britain,

newspapers

and
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world.

Fitt had previously established a close contact with Mary

Holland,

a journalist for the Sunday Observer.

with the
front

A photograph of him

injury he sustained, a head wound, was consequently on the

page of the following day's edition.

British

M.P.

democracy was
captured
impossible,

the
and

carry features

The appearance of a

being attacked for protesting against abuses of
a forceful

image.

The fact that television had

moment meant that any official
in the aftermath all

whitewashing was

forms of the media began to

on the problems of Northern

Ireland.

It was not

unreasonable to infer that if Fitt had not been beaten this would not
have happened.

He described the moment to the Irish News:

As I approached the police cordon at the top of Duke Street, a
crowd of police ran over and attacked me. They didn't seem to be
attacking anyone else and this is proved conclusively by the film.
While I was completely surrounded by police one of them hit me on
the head with his baton. I fell to the ground and tried to put my
hand up to protect myself. I was hit again. I was then dragged
away and thrown into the police van. 66
Bernadette Devlin,

also on the march, took a slightly different

view of the incident:
This was the Gerry Fitt I came to know. Gerry stuck his head
under a police baton. There was never any doubt about that. He
never denied it.
It was a measure of the man. I'm not saying
that to criticise him. The police attack was devastating. Gerry
Fitt made a very astute political decision that if the press were
going to be intrested in it, there would have to be an interesting
head, so Gerry stuck his in the way and got sliced - proceeded to
bandage it up very ostentatiously and give interviews outside the
City Hall.
In between interviews he would come into the bar and
take the bandage off and have a few drinks and go out again when
he was called upon. 67
In retrospect,

Fitt himself does not deny that he utilised the

political opportunity that presented itself:
I knew long before that they were going to beat me up. I wasn't
going to retaliate.
I wasn't going to throw stones. I got pins
and needles and I felt the blood running down. I thought to
myself 1 I'm going to let that blood run because the cameras are
there.b8
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The most significant repercussions of the Londonderry march
occurred at Westminster where the Labour government was greatly
embarrassed by the damaging
Wilson as

was

Rose quizzed

to what he now intended to do about the R.U.C.

resented this
R.U.C.

international publicity.

Willie Orr

and asked the prime minister if he was aware that the

being disparaged.

Wilson was curt in his reply:

"Up to

now we have had perhaps to rely on the statement of himself and
others

on

these

matters.

Since then we have had British

television." 69
Although parliamentary procedure had not been the vehicle Fitt's
message to the government had finally been received.

In November,

he clarified his position, or at least his Westminster position, when
he told the Commons:

"I say that the present situation is in no way

aimed at the achievement of an

Irish Republic.

The question of

partition does not enter into the demand of Civil Rights." 70
In November,
politics.
proportional
referendum.

Fitt was again criticised for the duality of his

He had criticised Fianna Fail for its attempt to replace
representation with a a new electoral
Neil

system via a

Blaney the T.D. for Donegal, also accused Fitt of

being a chameleon:
He is something of a chameleon who rings his colours up and down
as it suits his purpose.
He criticises the Taoiseach for
referring to partition and says this has strengthened the Unionist
case and could be very injurious to the Civil Rights movement. I
question Mr Fitt's motives in regard to the nationalist population
of Derry city for he no sooner got himself batoned in Derry than
he was off over the border to use this incident in a most
despicable
and
dishonest
way
in
relation
to the
referendum. 71
The contradiction in Fitt's politics is reflected in his reply:
Over a great number of years I have been appalled at the deafening
silence that has emanated from Fianna Fail sources in relation to
the situation in Northern Ireland. I do know from quite authentic
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sources in the Republic that Fianna Fail supporters had been
advised not to associate themselves with the Civil Rights
movement in Northern Ireland. And now at this rather late stage,
after the overwhelming defeat in the referendum, Fianna Fail now
proclaim themselves as the great Republican Party of Ireland. I
think their past inactivity in this matter is sufficient to
condemn them out of hand. 72
Fitt therefore criticised Taoiseach Lynch for associating Civil
Rights with anti-partitionism yet also criticised Lynch's Fianna Fail
Party for not being republican enough and for not involving itself in
the Civil Rights struggle.
Whatever
politics,

the

contradictions and

inconsistencies

there can be no doubt that he was hugely popular with the

minority community after the Londonderry rally.
dramatic

in Fitt's

His direct and

involvement was arguably his finest moment in politics.

Yet

the episode also marked the juncture when events began to subsume the
The batoning of Gerry Fitt had at last convinced the

individual.

Labour government to take notice.

Fitt was an important mouthpiece

of a minority becoming increasingly conscious of their position.
When

Fitt was elected

community

with

politically.
climate.

in

1966 to Westminster, the Catholic

low expectations were generally unsophisticated
October 5,

1968 radically altered the political

The formation of a new student group at Queen's University,

The Peoples Democracy

(P.O.),

a radical leftist group that by and

large adhered to Connollyite republicanism, was the most important
manifestation.
The ruthless
meant that Civil

rout of the marchers by the R.U.C. in Londonderry
Rights

became

increasingly concerned with the

security machinery of the Northern Ireland state.
altered Protestant understanding of the
N.I.C.R.A.

issues

Londonderry also
involved. 73

The

could not be discredited as republican and the R.U.C. had
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been unable to intimidate it off the streets.

O'Neill endeavoured to

mollify it, but once the organization began to press for reform~, the
contradictions
Civil

in the state began to surface, and led to his demise.

Rights exposed the

within the

inherent discrimination and sectarianism
and

infrastructure of the state;

its opposition to

equality demands eventually led to the re-emergence of the I.R.A. in
the summer of 1969.

Fitt, like all constitutional nationalists, was

unprepared for the sequence of events sparked by the Londonderry
march.

As seen in Chapter I, political indicators suggested further

stabilising of the Northern entity rather than its erosion.
In

November

of 1968,

O'Neill

announced a reform package

conceeding some of the Civil Rights demands.

However, the principle

of "One Man One Vote" was not among them and the movement would not
be placated without it.
On December 9,
increasing tension

O'Neill

made a further attempt to defuse the

by making a television appeal for support.

maintained that Northern

Ireland stood "on the brink of chaos" and

called for an end to the growing civil dosorder.
Rights organizers that
heard.

"Your voice has

generally welcomed,
statement as

protest.

O'Neill told Civil

been heard,

and clearly

Your duty now is to play your part in taking the heat out of

the situation before blood

it was

He

is shed." 74

While the speech was

there was disappointment that an

auspicious

regards "One Man, One Vote" was not forthcoming.

thought,

This,

would have cleared the streets of Civil Rights

O'Neill was hindered by opposition within his party to the

extension of universal

franchise to local government elections - a

point not lost on Fitt:
Mr O'Neill

has appealed to the Civil Rights marchers to desist
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from further activity on the streets, and yet he had it within his
power to ensure that this would take place by granting the
elementary principle of One Man One Vote. I think this -proves
that Mr O'Neill is shackled to a reactionary Unionist Party and
while this situation remains the Civil Rights association must
remain in existence and continue their demands for concrete
reforms. 75
Although
N. I.C .RA
. ·

O'Neill's
responded

appeal
to

it

Fitt followed

demonstrations.

truce" with the government.
"quiet man"

was somewhat melodramatic,
with

the

one month's moratorium on

suit when he announced a "Christmas
He said that he was going to be the

of Ulster politics, and had decided to cease his attack

on both the government and O'Neill, to allow them the opportunity to
implement O'Neill's programme of reforms. 76
The P.O.,

however,

was unimpressed with O'Neill's television

address and lack of substantial reform.

In an effort to break the

truce and relaunch the Civil Rights movement, a march from Belfast to
Londonderry was announced for January 1, 1969.
well

aware that they would be harassed.

opposed this march,

at

various

Leaders of the N.I.C.R.A.

fearing that a strategy designed to provoke a

predictable reaction would
the event,

The organizers were

itself be construed as provocation.

In

about eighty marchers left Belfast and were duly molested
locations,

Burntollet Bridge.

the most serious

incident occurring at

It was there that an ambush had been planned, and

the marchers were brutually attacked by Loyalists, including off-duty
members of the 'B' Specials.

The marchers eventually made their way

to Londonderry city and were welcomed by a large crowd.
rioting broke out,

culminating in an unprecedented police attack on

the Catholic Bogside district of the city.
the R.U.C.
O'Neill

That night

Barricades were built and

kept out of the area for a week.

"Free Derry" was born.

predictably accused the P.O. of provocation and Fitt in his
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recent interview with Fergus Pyle, also maintains that the legitimate
Civil Rights campaign ended with the P.O. march.
The march was intended to show how rotten the Northern Ireland
state was, but everyone knew how rotten it was ... That whole
episode introduced sectarian thinking into the campaign.
Burntollet was a sectarian offer and a Protestant take up. It was
no way to demand Civil Rights. 77
The march was also a watershed in other respects.
many Catholics believed that peaceful
hopeless,

After it,

reform of the state was

since this march was, after all, completely legal.

It also

marked the point where Catholic areas rather than Civil Rights
marches were the focus of attack.
the year,

As violence escalated throughout

the leaders of the N.I.C.R.A. and conventional nationalist

leaders like Fitt began to lose what control

they had of the

situation.
It seems as
equivocal

if Fitt's attitude to the march was somewhat more

Eamonn Mccann recalls
out." 78

After the police attack in Londonderry,

at the time.

Fitt declaring "it's time to get the guns

Fitt told the

Irish News that he was prepared to lead

a deputation of the P.O.

to Harold Wilson. 79 On January 8, the

same paper reported Fitt saying that he
members

of

Protestants,

the

Peoples

Democracy,

and people of no religion.

knew many of the young

which

included Catholics,

He admired their idealism

and sense of justice and believed they epitomised a new generation
who were not prepared to live under the shackles which bound their
forebears. 80
He was also highly critical of the activities of the R.U.C. in
the Bogside after the march calling it a "three hour reign of
terror. "81

When

it was announced that the

inquiry was

to be
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undertaken

within the R.U.C.,

claiming it was

Fitt was again

highly critical,

a "charade and a white-washing exercise designed to

protect those members of the R.U.C. who violently abused innocent
people in Derry city. "82
Any gains O'Neill had made from his television address were lost
after his attack on the marchers and the mildness of his rebuke to
the

The demand for

assailants.

universal

suffrage

in local

government elections gained renewed impetus.
On January 11,

there was a another march, this time in the

border town of Newry.

Violence occurred after the government banned

a section of the route through the largely Catholic town.
claimed that the acts of violence in Newry were justified.

Fitt

The Irish

Press reported his address to the Labour Party conference in Dublin:
Some people had criticised violence in the Civil Rights movement
in the North, but the young people who had thrown stones and
burned police tenders in Newry were justified in doing so because
they had been walked on and oppressed for many years of
frustration. 83
This
methods"

is a clear cut example of Fitt endorsing "unconstitutional
of political

agitation.

It

is a further example of the

wavering that chracterized Fitt's political thinking and rhetoric.
Under increased pressure from within his party, O'Neill called
an election for February 24.

He was gambling on obtaining a mandate

by mustering up moderate Protestant and Catholic support.
defended Dock.

Fitt again

In his manifesto he alleged that there was collusion

between extremists

and the "so called Liberal unionists."

He argued

that the Dock Unionist Association was a Paisleyite cell:
Who selected my opponents? First, the Dock Unionist Association
which everyone knows is now a Paisleyite cell. And who was
Chairman at the selection meeting? None other than the very same
Paisleyite who opposed me for the Aldermanship of Dock in 1967 and
was overwhelmingly defeated by the combined votes of both the

r
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catholic and
area.

Protestant socially conscious working people in this

As was now normal,
overt republicanism.

Fitt's manifesto steered well clear from

Instead

it claimed that the unionists new

tactic was a pretence of being progressive:
No matter what my unionist opponent may claim to be, electors of
Dock knew that he is a unionist who therefore will be a Paisleyite
if the company suits him, or an O'Neill man if he is looking for
money from the "Moderate Ulster" businessmen. But he can be no
friend of the people of Dock. 84
As the election drew near, Fitt maintained that the people of
Dock had not

been fooled by the O'Neill euphoria, and would not be

prepared to sell

their heritage:

"Let our answer ring out loud and

clear so that the people of Northern Ireland will be in no doubt that
whatever

happens

elsewhere,

the

working class of this

area

steadfastly cling to the Connolly idealism." 85
The Belfast News Letter forecast a victory for Fitt, but with a
majority. 86

reduced

The prediction was

reasonable since one

might have expected that his Protestant support would have diminished
owing to his activities at Westminster and his political rhetoric in
Belfast.
an

However, the reverse occurred.

increased margin

Fitt won the election with

- the largest in the history of the division.

Fitt had built up a high degree of trust with the Protestant
community.
The results of the Stormont election on the nationalist side
were to have important repercussions.
was defeated by John Hume,

In Londonderry, Eddie McAteer

one of the Civil Rights leaders.

The

Nationalist

Party,

opposition,

was also defeated by opponents who stood on Civil Rights

tickets

which had by now given up its role as official

in South Armagh and mid-Londonderry.

It had been dilatory in
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;ts response to the new militancy, and suffered the consequences;
the 1970s it would cease to be a political force.

in

The P.D. won.9% of

the vote.
Fitt's long term party colleague, Harry Diamond, was defeated by
Paddy Devlin in the Falls.
had been active

Devlin was Chairman of the N.I.L.P. and

in the Civil Rights movement.

grave consequences for the Republican

Devlin's triumph had

Labour party and Diamond's

defeat would be instrumental in influencing Fitt's later decisions.
On the same day as the Burntollet march, it was announced that
Fitt and

Roddy Connolly, James Connolly's son, were to undertake an

extensive United States lecture tour,
American

Irish Heritage Association.

at the

invitation of the

The lectures were designed to

enlighten Americans about the situation in Northern Ireland and Civil
Rights.

Fitt claimed that it would not be his intention to disparage

Northern

Ireland.

Although he intended to castigate the unionists

for a lack of social justice, he maintained he was keen to clear up
American misconceptions.

"I will be telling them the truth.

That

there are many decent Protestant and Catholic people living in
harmony." 87

The

tour

was

to take

in several

U.S.

cities

including New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston and Los Angeles.
In March,

Fitt travelled to Dublin to obtain an Irish Passport

for his trip.

"I'm a 32 county Irishman and this is the one way of

proving

His

it."M

symbolic

gesture would later cause some

controversy.
Just as the tone and content of the speeches delivered at
Westminster contrasted with those made elsewhere, Fitt's U.S. tour
proved somewhat different from what he had told the press it would
be.

Despite his insistence that he would not smear Northern Ireland,
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ma de

fitt

he adlines

in the

Irish media for some unequivocal

The Belfast Telegraph reported him speaking at Los
statements.
Angeles comparing the Unionist Party with governments in South Africa
and the

U.S. South.

Ireland

are

He told U.S. newsmen that Catholics in Northern

treated

worse than negroes

in America. 89

Fitt's

scheming in the States provoked hostile reaction from unionists.
Mcivor, Unionist Party member for Larkfield, classified Fitt as

Basil

a "Pantomine Performer":
The world is his stage. He performs in Stormont, Westminster,
America, or wherever he happens to be. He is in the nature of an
entertainer whose act has recently been wearing very thin - so
thin he had to think up something really startling for his
American audience. 90
It was only after the violence of the summer of 1969 that U.S.
interest in Northern Ireland became really stimulated.
Fitt made some impression.

Nevertheless,

He was met by three mayors, was given a

standing ovation when he addressed the House of Representatives in
Massachusetts,

and was made an honourary citizen of Los Angeles.

attended a banquet
speakers,

He

in his honour where he was one of the principal

together with Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate in

the 1968 American election.

Fitt also met Edward Kennedy.

In all,

he made 47 major speeches and appeared on 17 radio programmes.
Fitt later denied that he had made the sweeping statement that
Catholics were treated worse in Northern Ireland than Negroes in the
U.S.

He explained:

I said that many Catholics in Derry are living in worse conditions
than many coloured people in the U.S.
That cannot be
contradicted.
I was talking specifically about housing and the
failure of the Unionist government to provide homes. I have told
American people the truth about the Civil Rights struggle in
Northern Ireland and I have said nothing in America that I have
not said at Westminster and Stormont. 91
On

April

9,

the Belfast News Letter reported Westminster
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Unionist M.P.

for

raise questions

Londonderry, Robin Chichester-Clark's attempts to

relating to Fitt's use of an Irish Passport with

James Callaghan.

In his letter to the Home Secretary he asked

whether this was

"within the obligation

imposed by the Oath of

Allegiance and within the letter and spirit of that Oath".
the News

Letter that "It seems

He told

a little odd that someone who is

constantly asking for British standards of behaviour at home should
acquire an un-British Passport to travel abroad." 92
Fitt,

for his

part,

claimed to be delighted that his tour was

receiving so much publicity "But
Passport." 93

Irish

Evidently

I make no apology for having an
Fitt's

nationalism

was

more

fervent than he recalls.
During a press conference in the U.S. Fitt was asked about his
attitude to the P.O.

He maintained that he was extremely pleased

about the spirit of justice that motivated these young students and
the most encouraging outlook for Northern Ireland politics was the
community spirit that had been engendered between the Catholic and
Protestant students at Queens. 94
On April

17,

mid-Ulster seat.
of the P.O.
return

from

there was a by-election for the Westminster
Bernadette Devlin was then a young student member

Her rhetoric was militant and anti-sectarian.
the U.S.

Fitt endorsed her:

symbolises the young generation

in Northern

On his

"Bernadette Devlin
Ireland who are not

prepared to tolerate the conditions under which their parents lived.
I am absolutely delighted that we have found a single candidate to
oppose the Unionist Party." 95
Devlin won the crucial by-election.
Party candidate,

Anna Forrest,

She defeated the Unionist

with the largest majority, 4,211,
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since the seat was created in 1950.

The poll was 91.7% and sh owed

that almost the entire minority community had mobilised behind the
Civil

Rights campaign.

Devlin was a pan-Catholic candidate and her

election marked the pinnacle of Catholic unity.

Thereafter, -this

cohesion would fragment and eventually disintegrate.
Devlin's entry to Westminster as the youngest M.P. since f>itt
also marked a watershed in Fitt's career.

I asked Devlin if she felt

she had somewhat eroded Fitt's authority and stature by her arr;val
in London.

She answered:

I never had much to do with him at Westminster simply because I
was too young to be sensitive to the fact that Gerry Fitt had
ploughed that furrow and I had bounced in as some kind of new
invention that had stolen his thunder ... It effected Gerry. His
nose was knocked out of joint. 96
Although Devlin stimulated the public imagination particularly
in Britain, she was not the only new emerging politician.
Austin Currie,

John Hume,

Ivan Cooper, Paddy Devlin and Paddy O'Hanlon had all

seen their involvement

in Civil

Rights

rewarded with electoral

success in February 1969 and consequent media exposure.
Fitt,

who had thrived in his role as the lone voice, was no"'6 if

not obscured,

somewhat less prominent.

provided

an

by

editorial

in

the

One indication of this is
Irish

News which

stated:

"Westminster M.P's have learned a lot about Northern Ireland fron Mr
Gerry Fitt,

they are going to learn a lot more and more vididly From

Miss Devlin." 97
Towards the end of April, the situation in Northern Ireland 'Was
becoming

increasingly

Londonderry and Belfast.
been

previously

relinquish

desperate,

with

serious

riots

in both

Members of the minority community who had

responsive

to

hopes of peaceful reform.

O'Neill's overtures,

began

to

In a further attempt to pacify
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them,

O'Neill

finally accepted the principle of "One Man One Vote."

The following day, April 23 James Chichester-Clark, Northern Ireland
Minister for Agriculture resigned from the government, he complained
about the timing of O'Neill's acceptance.
real

It is more likely that the

reason for his departure was speculation that he might become

prime minister if O'Neill was forced to resign.
On April

24 and 25,

bombs destroyed Belfast waterpipe lines.

The blasts were attributed to the I.R.A. and turned members of the
Unionist Party against O'Neill

and his

policy of conciliation.

Rather than attend a meeting of the Unionist Party's Standing
Committee,

which would have seen O'Neill lose a vote of confidence,

he resigned

(it was later argued that the U.V.F. was responsible for

planting the explosives,

a tactic designed both to incriminate the

I.R.A. and bring about the fall of O'Neill).
After O'Neill's departure,

Fitt

issued the following warning:

"The new prime minister must realise urgently that steps must be
taken to
him.

introduce reforms,

otherwise the same fate would befall

Repression was not an answer." 98
The selection of Chichester-Clark as

changed nothing.

the new prime minister

He was essentially in the same mould as O'Neill,

and was thus likewise susceptible to the more extreme elements in his
party - a point not lost on Fitt, who claimed:

"It is extremely

obvious that Mr Chichester-Clark will be a prisoner within the ranks
of his own party as was his predecessor and that his actions will be
dictated by his reactionaries in the party." 99
Despite the truth of Fitt's statement, Chichester-Clark did make
some effort to reduce tension.

He re-affirmed the government's newly

acquired pledge to "One Man One Vote" and ordered an amnesty for
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those convicted or charged with political offences.
these directives was

The timing of

unfortunate, as they came immediately prior to

the summer marching season.
In

an

attempt

to

reduce confrontation on the streets,

Chichester-Clark's administration

introduced a Public Order Bill to

prevent inflammatory counter-demonstrations taking place.

This move

was construed as repressive legislation by the opposition.

Fitt, who

had recently left hospital after being admitted for exhaustion, was
at

Stormont

prediction.

to

voice

his disapproval

and make a prophetic

He argued that the new legislation "will make violent

revolution

inevitable." 100

Order Bill

did nothing to prevent a series of riots and sectarian

Despite

its

intent,

the

Public

clashes throughout the month of July.
On July 25,
Belfast.

Fitt gave evidence to the Cameron Commission in

This Commission was instructed to trace the causes of the

violence of October 5, 1968 and to analyse the forces involved.
two and a half hour

interview,

In a

Fitt gave his version of why the

people had taken to the streets.
The chaos of July was
August.
flats

paltry compared with the incidents in

On August 2, 1969, an Orange march past the Catholic Unity
in Belfast and led to three days of rioting, and, as a result,

families

began to move from Protestant and Catholic areas where they

were in a minority.

Fitt urged the police to stem this tendency:

These evictions could snowball with disastrous results.
The
government and the police will have to take strong action to
protect threatened families. The court should impose the severest
penalties on people convicted of threatening families - Protestant
or Roman Catholic.
Fitt also announced that

in

his Dock constituency, a Housing

Action Committee was to be set up with the intention of protecting
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On the following day as Stormont
families and their homes.
seemed to be losing control, Chichester-Clark met with Callaghan.

Fitt predicted that the forthcoming week would be a testing time for
Northern

He recommended that Britain should assert its

Ireland.

authority and take full power under the Government of Ireland Act to
maintain law and order. 102
The

critical

instant proved to be August

12

- the date

commemorated by the Apprentice Boys of Derry, who hold an annual
celebration of the 1689 seige of the city.

At the end of July, Fitt

had drawn attention to what he had termed the "invasion" of Derry by
the Apprentice Boys and he warned of a series of confrontations, yet
again placing all responsibility for all eventualities on the British
government.

"We have now done all

we can to make the British

government fully aware of the present situation.
them. 11103
march,

The

government disregarded all

The rest is up to

pleas to ban the

and stone throwing quickly escalated into a full scale riot in

the Derry Bogside.

The Derry Defence Association encouraged by

Bernadette Devlin had constructed barricades which were manned with
petrol bombers . 104
The attack continued for twenty-four hours before the R.U.C.
fell
effort

back after failing
to

re-establish

mobilisation of the

'B'

to penetrate the Catholic ghetto.
authority
Specials,

the

In an

unionists ordered the

and what

became known as the

"Battle of the Bogs,.d"
e ensue d . By August 14, the prospect of Civil
War was a real possibility, and was given some brief stimulus by the
swaggering rhetoric from Jack Lynch, premier of the Irish Republic.
Lynch said:
It

is also evident that the Stormont government is no longer in
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control of
inevitable
successive
government
and perhaps

the situation.
Indeed the present situation is the
outcome of the policies pursued for decades by
Stormont governments.
It is clear that the Irish
can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured
worse. 105

The violence
British troops.

in Londonderry ended only with the intervention of
In the late afternoon of August 14, the army entered

the city center and undertook negotiations with the Derry Defence
Association.
the 'B'

The authorities agreed to withdraw both the R.U.C. and

Specials and not to

infringe on the Bogside.

Meanwhile,

violence had erupted again in Belfast.
Much of the Falls Road was burnt out, as were parts of other
Catholic streets.
Protestant.

There were six fatalities - five Catholics and one

Barricades were erected in Catholic areas and arms were

moved up from the Republic,

Paddy Devlin being prominent in the

negotiations

As

introduced

for the arms.
troops

which

in

Londonderry,

James Callaghan

succeeded in defusing the situation.

Callaghan confirms that Fitt was very instrumental in this decision.
He recalls:
Gerry Fitt telephoned again and said that only British troops
could restore calm in Belfast.
There was no doubt that his
apprehensions were genuine but I could not forebear to remind him
that Lynch had said that British troops would be unwelcome. What
was his opinion? Fitt was emphatic that the Catholic minority in
Belfast would not take that view. Only British Troops could save
them from the wrath of the Protestants and he urged that they
should be brought in at once. 106
On August 18,

opposition politicians called a press conference

to give their version of what was happening in Northern Ireland.
Fitt alleged that the unionist version of what had occurred in
Belfast was
lies."

a "verbal

avalanche of misrepresentation and downright

He went on to categorically deny that the I.R.A. had inspired

the rioting in an attempt to subvert the constitution:

r
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The I.R.A. had no part to play in the campaign, and any
republicans evident in the course of the confrontation were armed
onlY with sticks, stones and perhaps petrol bombs. They had to
take a stand to defend their lives and the lives of their wives
and children.
on the contrary, he maintained it was 'B' Specials who fired the
first shot, supported by the U.V.F. and extreme unionists.
candid appeal

He made a

for direct rule from Westminster "so that we may all

have a chance of social

justice for the rest of our lives. 111 ITT

Two days later, Wilson set up a commission under Lord Hunt to enquire
into the structure of the R.U.C. and the 'B' Specials.

Fitt welcomed

the gesture feeling that this inquiry would "clear the air. 11108
A week later,

Callaghan came to Belfast and outlined his plans

for a prescription of social

and government reform which he felt

would normalise the situation.

Fitt also accompanied him on a tour

of the riot areas

in Belfast where the Home Secretary received a

genial welcome from the inhabitants.
It
I.R.A.

is uniformally acknowledged that in the summer of 1969, the
as

Ireland.

a military force was almost non-existent
The organization was

rural

in Northern

rather than urban, and any

activists they had were submerged into the Civil Rights movement.
Nevertheless,
men

were

at the time the I.R.A. claimed that twenty of its

involved

in defending the Catholic enclaves. 109 This

was resented by more moderate leaders as

it added weight to the

unionist myth that the riots had been sparked off by the I.R.A.
As events developed the I.R.A. was reborn, aided by insensitive
British security measures and the rise of the U.V.F.
movement split,

with the traditional republican

breaking

the socialist

from

11

0fficials 11 •

11

In December the

Provisional 11 I.R.A.

It was

to be the

"Provisionals" who would embark on the most sustained military

r

130
campaign in the history of Northern Ireland.
The events of August
For example,

1969 had some significant consequences.

the violent confrontation of that month instilled a

greater political
urban areas.

consciousness among the working class Catholics in

It had also proved conclusively that the unionist

administration was unable to absorb or resist the new social forces
which had emerged.
constitutional
Fitt,

The intervention of the army had opened up the

position,

and most

importantly

the diminishing role of leading

in connection with

individuals was

further

reduced, particularly in Belfast.
Despite
intact.

the efforts of Callaghan,

As

Loyalists demanded an end to the no-go Catholic areas,

Fitt issued a peace appeal:
prime minister's call
call

on all

or action,

the barricades remained

"I have no hesitation in supporting the

for peace particularly over the weekend.

I

those who support me politically to do nothing, by word
which could possibly inflame the already very dangerous

situation."

There was

no indication now that Fitt wished to flirt

with "unconstitutional methods."
Despite
September 11,

Fitt's plea, and those of others, rioting continued.
Fitt,

Labour Stormont M.P.

On

Paddy Devlin and Paddy Kennedy, the Republican
for Belfast Central, together with members of

the Belfast Citizens Defence Committee, went to London for talks with
Callaghan and agreed to take the barricades down.

In a joint

statement Fitt said:
We have been given guarantees which we have accepted as strong
enough to give adequate protection to all those behind the
barricades. We recognise the dangerous situation which exists and
we fully recognise the distress and tra~edy, particularly to many
innocent people over the last few weeks. 11
On the same day as Fitt and other local

politicians had
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seemingly re-asserted their influence as elected representatives, the
Cameron Commission reported

its findings.

injustices of the Northern

Ireland governmental system, and, in so

doing,

It clearly indicateq the

endorsed the demands of the Civil

Rights movement.

The

behaviour of the R.U.C. and the 'B' Specials also came under severe
criticism,

as did

Fitt,

although

it was admitted that the police

assault he suffered was without justification.

The report concluded

that:
Mr Fitt sought publicity for himself and his political views, and
must clearly have envisaged the possibility of a violent clash
with the police as providing the publicity he so ardently sought.
His conduct in our judgement was reckless and wholly irresponsible
in a person occupying his public position. 112
Fitt's reaction was unrepentant:
I make no apology for my action on that day. On the contrary, I
am glad I have lived to see the day when the oppressed people of
Northern Ireland finall~ got off their knees to throw off the yoke
of unionist oppression. 1 3
The nationalist community could have felt little apprehension
about the Cameron charge.

Paul

Rose felt it necessary to defend

Fitt, however:
I have known Mr Fitt for five years and while like all politicians
he may seek publicity, this can hardly be a criticism. There are
times when his speeches may have been emotive, but I know of no
occasion on which he has ever been inflammatory and it was not his
fault that the police set upon him as a target in full view of
millions of television viewers at the beginning of the current
disturbances. 114
Despite the
community,

irrelevancy of the charge for the nationalist

and the remonstrations of Rose,

the Cameron verdict

certainly would have damaged Fitt's credibility at Westminster.
On October 10,
that the R.U.C.

the Hunt Report was published.

It recommended

should be disarmed and that the 'B' Specials should

be replaced by a part-time military force under the control of the
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General

Officer Commanding

document was that policing
policing

in Great Britain.

in Northern Ireland.
in Northern

The keynote of the

Ireland became akin

to

Fitt considered that the recommendations

were acceptable to the whole community and a further vindication of
the demands of the Civil Rights movement. 115
However,
announced

his welcome of the new reforms altered when it was

in November that the new force would be called the "Ulster

Defence Regiment"
offensive.

(U.D.R.).

He found the word "Ulster" in the title

It presumably offended his nationalist sentiment:

I, in company with a large number of Labour supporters, take
offence at the description of the new forces arrogating to itself
(Ulster Defence).
This is seen at Westminster as an attempt to
give official recognition to the term "Ulster" as it is understood
by the Unionist Party. 116
Fitt was
was unsuitable.

not

the only politician who felt that this new title
Bernadette Devlin proposed an amendment that the

name be changed to the "Local Territorial Forces (Northern Ireland)"
but it was defeated by 163 votes to 36.
On December 3, opposition members at Stormont decided to form a
parliamentary alliance

in the hope that a united body would exercise

a greater impact on the discussions and decisions taken at Stormont.
A number of shadow appointments were designated.

Fitt was allocated

the role of shadow "Home Affairs", his contacts at the Home Office
making him the obvious choice.

This measure was the beginning of a

long process which eventually saw the creation of a new opposition
party.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY
Although
Gerry
of

still

essentially an old style street politician~ the

Fitt who emerged in the 1970s was somewhat different from that
the

1960s.

In

Westminster,

Fitt

politician.

His

the earlier decade

posed

involvement

and the conclusions drawn
overt examples

-

actions

parliamentary manoeuvres.
moderation,
on his

the

as

and was

particularly outside

perceived

as

a militant

in the Londonderry Civil Rights march

by the Cameron Commission, are the most
prompted by the lack of success through
In the 1970s, however, he was a voice of

violence of the summer of 1969 having had its impact

thinking.

As the decade progressed, this change of position

brought him into

increased conflict with more radical nationalists.

First,

his

own Republican

re-emerged

He was

essentially an

nationalist.

However,

rhetoric exhibited
consistently

P.I.R.A.
result,

his

in

the

anti-unionist

any flirtation

P.O.

and the

and
with

by

implication a

non-constitutional

the 1960s was not evident in the 1970s.

condemned all
In

and

the

Fitt did not relinquish his aspiration for Irish unity.

still

emanated.

then

Nevertheless, this chapter will show that in the

I.R.A.

early 1970s,

Labour Party,

forms

of violence

from wherever

Fitt
it

process, he became an implacable opponent of the

he showed tremendous courage
home on the Antrim Road

increasingly like a fortress

in

in this action.
Belfast

As a

began to look

owing to the danger of paramilitary

attack from both sides of the religious divide. 1
This

chapter will

also show that although the references to

James Connolly are conspicuous

by their near absence, Fitt never
138
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stopped

in

his endeavour to prove himself a non sectarian socialist

politician.

He

became leader of the Social Democratic and Labour

Party (S.D.L.P.).

The party was an amalgamation of disparate groups

within the Catholic community, its unifying thread being its minority
The S.D.L.P.

status.

terminated old style nationalist politics.

Every constituency created modern
s.D.L.P.

ideology and
It was

members.

political organizations.

In the

policy followed the recruitment of individual

a party constructed from the top down.

Fitt's claims about the

Despite

socialist credentials of the party, he was

unable to convince Protestants to join it.

He made attempts to bring

about discussions with the representatives of the Protestant working
class,

but they proved futile. 2

established

himself

as

Protestants as well
S.D.L.P.
political

In short, although he may have

a socialist politician who represented

as Catholics,

he was unable as leader of the

to attract the corporate Protestant community.
parties

in Northern

Ireland,

As with all

the S.D.L.P's policies and

membership were a direct result of its position on the border.
Fitt viewed the prospects for
pessimism.

He expected confrontation

implemented. 3
the draconian

1970 with

On

February

5,

reaction and argued that this was

impression on

Fitt was conciliatory in his
not the time

for protest. 4

since the summer of 1969 had clearly made an

Fitt.

following month,

unless reforms were quickly

Chichester-Clark re-introduced

Public Order Bill.

The street clashes

a high degree of

when

He maintained his conciliatory posture in the
at Westminster he paid tribute to the role

Played by the army in Northern Ireland:

"The whole community on both

Sides of the political fence, owes a debt of gratitude to the British
army for its action over a number of months." 5
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Fitt's attitude was
uncompromising P.O.
Portadown,

bound to lead him into conflict with the

At the end of March, P.O. held a meeting in

a mainly Protestant town,

which led to a clash with

Fitt condemned the former at Stormont for inciting

Loyalists.

trouble and the P.O.

in turn issued a statement in response to his

allegations:
Have you Mr Fitt, abandoned the position you held in October 1968
when you defied law and order in the name of social justice. Do
your reported comments on the Portadown meeting mean that you must
now believe that law and order must precede social justice? ...
Do you uphold the moral right of Orange Fascists to stone any
meeting they disagree with?
The Irish News asked Fitt to comment on the statement.

He said:

After listening to the questions posed by the P.O., I am more than
ever of the opinion that they are a group of infallible
nincompoops intent on giving themselves an aura of importance
which they do not deserve. The circumstances of the Portadown
fracas as reported in the press would intimate to all and sundry
that certain members of the P.O. are intent on creating the
greatest possible frictions and then scurrying to their own
habitats, which is normally at a safe distance from the trouble
they have created.
Fitt's comments are ironic when we recall that previously he had
been

involved

in demonstrations in which he hoped that police would

attack protestors.

There was a high degree of double standards in

his new position.
Fitt's response to the Portadown
reason why he held P.O. in so low regard

incident provides another
resentment of people with

a formal education encroaching upon his area of competence.
I don't have to take lessons from the P.O. on matters of social
justice, a battle which I have been fighting before many of them
had passed their 11 plus. The series of questions which they have
posed on this occasion will be treated by me with the contempt
they deserve. 6
The beginning of April
Catholics

saw the first major clash between

and the British army.

In the Belfast district of
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Ballymurphy there were several days of rioting sparked by an Orange
parade that passed nearby.

As

in August 1969, there were forced

evictions - this time Protestant families were

uprooted.

Fitt

declared that he could not condone or forgive those responsible for
intimidating people from their homes "Protestants had his sympathy
and support as much as Catholics." 7
Three days

later he travelled to London to seek emergency talks

on the situation with James Callaghan and the British Secretary of
Defence,

Denis Healey.

He maintained:

"Unless the situation is

resolved many thousands of innocent people,

both

Protestant and

Catholic, are faced with misery and despair." 8
At Westminster,

Fitt still clung to his belief that the Labour

government would make the unionists toe the line.

He feared the

consequences of a Labour defeat at election time and thus pleaded for
the immediate introduction of the post August reforms.

"There is a

fear in Northern Ireland that if, unfortunately this government were
to be defeated at the next general election, and a Tory government
were elected,
Party. 119

the new government would not pressurise the Unionist
At

this

point

of

his career Fitt was totally

committed to the British Labour Party.

He consequently became a

virulent anti-Tory since he believed that they were intent on a
policy of coercion in Northern Ireland.
Wilson called the general election of which Fitt feared for the
following June.

The Republican Labour Party unanimously chose Fitt

to stand again

in West Belfast, (his selection hardly coming as a

surprise).

Accepting his nomination, Fitt described his opponent,

Brian McRoberts, as one of the most reactionary candidates to contest
West Be 1fast.

Fitt proclaimed "A tense atmosphere exists in which
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right wing unionism is attempting to stultify the reforms which have
been won at great cost." 10
Further evidence of Fitt's commitment and faith in the Labour
government can be seen
colleagues

in his taking time to support his socialist

in Britain during the election.

in support of Gerald Kaufmann.
again,

In Manchester, he spoke

Referring to the reform programme

Fitt expressed his belief that it needed the protection of a

further electoral mandate for Labour and his fear that if one was not
forthcoming,

then a serious escalation of the "present tensions"

would be the outcome. 11

Encouraged by opinion polls, Fitt was

confident of a Labour victory which would enable those

in the

Connolly tradition of Labour supporters to undo the half century of
unionist
closer,

and Tory neglect. 12

mis-rule

the nationalist/republican content of his rhetoric became

increasingly
nationalist

"Never was

strident.

of every shade,

allegiance of the moment,
their

voices

Westminster. "13
moderate,

As the election drew

but

and

it

more urgent for every

and every republican whatever his

and every true labour man to ensure that

the

peoples

interests

are

heard

at

Fitt attacked his opponent for posing as a
in reality accepting the unqualified support of Mr

Paisley and his "cohorts." 14
As

in previous campaigns, Fitt had to balance his republican and

labour associations;

McRoberts, on the other hand, predictably based

his campaign on the benefits of Northern Ireland being an integral
part of the United Kingdom.

There was some debate as to how the

population shifts caused by the August 1969 violence would effect the
result.

There was also speculation that voters would not cross the

Peace-line which divided the constituency for fear of intimidation in
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The uncertainty of the election meant that Fitt

a "hostile"

area.

would still

have to woo the Protestant element to retain the support

he had secured in 1966.
against

him,

activities as

with

His Civil Rights record would possibly work

Protestants

equating his

synonymous with nationalism.

headline-grabbing

On the other hand, his

pro-Labour Party attitude at Westminster was to his advantage.
From one of his campaign platforms on election day,

Fitt

displayed the latest edition of the Protestant Telegraph which he
described as the:
Most scurrilous anti-Catholic rag ever to be published in
Ireland.
But I am honoured to be named in this sheet as one of
the rebels who Paisley says must not be returned to Westminster.
This obscene publication comes out on the side of my unionist
opponent, Mr McRoberts. 15
Regardless of the support of the Protestant Telegraph Fitt
successfully defended his Westminster seat.
to McRoberts 27,451.

Indeed

it seemed as

He polled 30,649 votes
if he had managed to

transform a marginal seat into a safe anti-unionist constituency.
Fitt was not the only "rebel" candidate to be returned to
Westminster.

Bernadette Devlin retained mid Ulster and Frank McManus

a Unity candidate won the Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat.
general

But the

election also saw the return of the Conservative Party to

power in Britain,

a development Fitt viewed with a great deal of

apprehension.
After his

victory,

Fitt claimed that the result proved that

Protestants had voted for him, still he reasserted his position on
the national question:
To these people I say I accept your support as a working class
representative and I will in the future, as in the past, endeavour
to serve all my constituents.
But there can be no doubt about
where I stand on the national question and those who supported me
at the polls must be under no doubt that I believe in the eventual
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reunification of my country with the establishment of a socialist
government for all the people of Ireland. 16
on the weekend of July 3 and 5 the so-called "Rape of the Falls"
occurred and the Northern Ireland problem began to take the form of a
colonial

After the army carried out an armed search in

conflict.

Balkan Street,

they clashed with the I.R.A.

The army then placed

(illegally as

it transpired) the inhabitants of the lower Falls Road

under curfew.

During the curfew five people were killed and sixty

five,

including fifteen members of the British army were injured.

The result was a deterioration in army/Catholic community relations
which benefited the Official
Telegraph

Belfast

that

and Provisional I.R.A.
found

he

the

Fitt told the

situation

"heart

breaking." 17
On July 6,
the

new

Fitt and Paddy Devlin left for London to protest to

British Home Secretary,

Reginald Maudling,

about the

brutality of the British army, particularly Scottish troops, over the
weekend.

Accounts of the episode differ but Catholic politicians

were very critical.
brutal

Devlin suggested it was "the most savage and

attack ever made on citizens in any country in the world."

Fitt called for a public inquiry and warned that "Unless steps are
taken to have such an
flames." 18

inquiry the whole place would go up in

During that meeting

Fitt argued that the weekend's

events showed that the Conservative government was prepared to
support the Unionist Party at all costs.

Maudling refused to discuss

the role of the army but assured Fitt that the Conservatives were
committed to follow the reform policy of the Labour Party. 19
On July 8, Fitt made it clear that Maudling's remonstrations on
Tory commitment to the reform programme were not accepted.

He argued
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that there had
Northern

been a decided change in policies and attitudes in

Ireland with the Conservatives supporting the Unionist. Party
·
d
b ,ase

in a very

way. 21

Evidently Fitt felt that return of the

conservatives to power had changed the whole complexion of politics
in Northern

Ireland.

His allegations containing much truth.

The

conservative Party and the Unionist Party had strong and close
links.

Unionist demands for a military solution would have found

sympathetic ears

from certain Tory circles.

Nevertheless,

the

violence continued.
On August 11, R.U.C. Constables Donaldson and Millar were killed
by a booby-trap bomb in Crossmaglen, South Armagh.
responsibility,

Nobody claimed

but the culprits were presumably one of the two

I.R.A. organizations.

Fitt was unequivocal in his condemnation:

I condemn with all my heart those responsible for the dastardly
crime.
I am filled with horror and contempt that there are still
within this community such persons who have so little regard for
human life.
I appeal to all sections of the community to do
everything possible to ensure that those ~uilty of this crime are
brought to justice as speedily as possible. 1
Ironically on the same day as those assassinations, both Fitt
and Paddy Devlin were at the funeral
Steele,
military
publicity

of old I.R.A. leader Jimmy

who had been jailed in the 1930s and 1940s for republican
activity,
up

and was responsible for

to his death. 22

This funeral

tradition of firing shots over the coffin.

Provisional

I.R.A.

incorporated the

In a statement recalling

the death of the two policemen, Brian Faulkner noted that both Devlin
and Fitt had witnessed this event and charged:
Security Forces

"No one outside the

is entitled to hold arms at this time.

They have a

responsibility to name the men."
Fitt candidly maintained that he did not see the incident:

"I
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was at the end of a cortege of nearly 4,000 people and I neither
heard nor saw shots being fired."

He considered Faulkner's statement

as a "shabby attempt to focus attention away from the problems within
his own party." 23

At this point Fitt still

felt able to show

some deference to the republican dead.
The combination of a desire to wrest the initiative away from
the

Provisionals,

and

a wish to facilitate

the Conservative

government's request for a single identifiable nationalist political
party with which

it could bargain,

finally produced the "Social

Democratic and Labour Party" (S.D.L.P.) on August 21.
This new group consisted of six opposition M.P's:
Paddy O'Hanlon and
Devlin

Ivan Cooper

(previously Independents);

(elected as a member of the N.I.L.P.);

Nationalist)

and Fitt.

John Hume,
Paddy

Austin Currie (a

Rumpf and Hepburn explain the formation of

the caucus thus:
People's Democracy never looked like taking the lead in Ulster
Catholic politics, and of course never set out to do precisely
that.
The Nationalist Party, with its President no longer in
Parliament after 1969, proved unable to reassert its leadership.
Thus there developed in 1969-70 a growing demand for a "United
Opposition" at Stormont under the leadership of those M.P's who
had been active in Civil Rights. It sought to be a genuine left
of centre Civil Rights and Trade Union opposition, but when the
N.I.L.P. pulled in its horns at the end of 1969 it was left simply
as a demand for unity among M.P's representing Catholic
seats. 24
Fitt's high profile at Westminster and during the Civil Rights
era made him an obvious candidate for the new party.

Both he and

Devlin

insisted on the inclusion of the term "Labour" in the party's

title,

as a condition for their participation and, as they saw it,

that of the Belfast working class. 25
S.D.L.P.

leadership was also a crucial

issue.

mentioned as a possible leader and said on August 18, 1970:

Fitt was
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I have not sought any personal political advancement but I am
fully convinced that real leadership must be given to the
minority, and it is with this ideal in mind that I am prepared to
engage in further discussions with my party colleagues in an
effort to do all in our power to give expression to the real
hopes, fears and aspirations of those opposed to unionism. 26
On that same day,

the

Irish News reported Devlin, Hume and

Currie endorsing Fitt as leader.

Hume said:

"I have worked for the

creation of a left of centre democratically organised movement.

If

that can be created then Gerry Fitt is acceptable to me as leader."
As for Currie,
person

with

acceptability

he said "I have no doubt that Gerry Fitt is the one
the
to

necessary
lead

such

experience,
a

ability

grouping." 27

and general
The

Belfast

Telegraph commented on the question of the leadership:
The choice of a leader has always been a source of potential
disagreement.
This time the name of Mr Gerry Fitt has been
mentioned.
There is no doubt that he is an able politician. But
the opposition benches have accommodated individuals with strong
characters and it is at least questionable if such individuality
can be successfully moulded into a team with sufficient discipline
to withstand all the pressures of old loyalties and ideological
stands. 28
The above editorial
optimistic

S.D.L.P.

exhibited considerable foresight.
statements

contrast

with

comments

Early
of

retrospective regret from the main protaganists.
On August 21, having accepted the leadership, Fitt presided over
the party's first

press conference and announced the intention to

provide a socialist alternative to unionism. 29
his party had support throughout Northern Ireland.

He claimed that
Fitt clarified

its position that the unity of Ireland could only be achieved through
consent:
Violence will not unite the people in Ireland - will not do away
with the border in Ireland. There is only one way in which this
country can be united, and that is by a massive process of
education, by a massive attempt by this new party to go out and
instill confidence into those who were formerly our political
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opponents or did not take any part in politics whatsoever. 30
Fitt had now abandoned a tendency to use the threat of vi9lent
scenarios as a political weapon.

In the 1970s, he rejected all forms

of violence as being inimical to progress in Northern Ireland.
The optimism and professionalism that the S.D.L.P. exhibited at
its

inaugural

press

conference,

hid personal

and

differences that did not auger well for the future.

ideological

In retrospect,

Fitt claims that he was disinclined to join the party at all:
We were all together in our opposition to the unionists and lots
of people began to talk about having one party. I was all too
well aware of the differences between Belfast and rural politics.
I was very reluctant to do it. I did not need a party but the
others did because they could not go on being just Civil Righters.
Paddy Devlin was a key figure. If he had not won the election of
1969 and Harry Diamond had been re-elected we would have had our
Republican Labour Party and there would not be an S.D.L.P. 31
He

also maintains that Austin Currie was

instrumental

in

persuading him to join the party - a decision which in retrospect he
considers 11 disastrous. 1132 Currie commented:
He is right. I take some responsibility for him joining and being
leader.
I was determined the new party should come into
existence.
I recognised the differences between Belfast politics
and the country politics and I felt that Gerry's participation in
it was essential and there was only one way Gerry would
participate and he certainly was not going to accept the
leadership of John Hume. He effectively became leader on R.T.E.
radio as a result of an interview. 33
Fitt accepted the leadership on the air

in response to an

interviewer's questions when he heard that both Currie and Hume had
nominated him, a further example of his political opportunism.
In reality, Fitt and Hume were the only realistic candidates for
the leadership.
Fitt replied:
because

When asked if he would have accepted Hume as leader,
"There was no way they could have had any other leader

I was the

key figure.

I was the M.P. for West Belfast.
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There was no way

I would have been in the party unless I was the

lea der. n34
Paddy Devlin contends that Fitt's leadership was the product of
an "anti-Hume move." 35 Hume, himself claims he was uncertain:
I don't know because I didn't care who was leader. I genuinely
wanted a political party formed and I didn't care who led it as
long as it was a democratic political party. I was approached and
told that if I agreed to Fitt becoming leader he would join the
party. I agreed. No problem. 36
In the event,
up of the party,

Hume became deputy leader.
and the fact

that

Considering the make

it emerged as primarily a

nationalist party rather than a socialist party, it was perhaps Hume
rather than

Fitt who was the natural leader.

Hume himself thought

so:
Gerry never made any contribution to debate within the party, to
philosophy, to policy documents, to strategy.
They were all
written by me.
Gerry was a figurehead. His strengths were his
personality.
He is very personable, a man of great humour. He
gets on with everybody in that sense but he had no direction. No
plan for solving the problem.
He was a reactor.
He was
anti-unionist basically. He emerged from a situation where he was
a street fighter, fighting against somebody. It was Rangers and
Celtic. He was a Celtic man that won. 37
Hume's contention has some validity.

We have seen that Fitt was

very much an individualist and as such would not have been easy with
the yoke of a political party.
trusted his own instinct.
indeed a political theorist.
instinctive
academic
strategy.

opposition
approach

He wanted to do his own thing and he
He was not an organizational man nor

Fitt was a political personality.

This

of unionism contrasts sharply with the

of Hume with his concern for policies and

Indeed the quotations from Hume and Fitt capture perfectly

the differences between Belfast politics and the rest of nationalist
Ulster.

Fitt for his part maintains that he suspected the life of

the new party would not be long:
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I never thought it would last. It has lasted nominally but it is
still not a Belfast Party.
Belfast has been swamped by the
nationalists.
It has not changed the issues. The S.D.L .. P. in
Belfast is irrelevant.
They don't win elections and they will
never win West Belfast. The differences that were there then, are
there now. 38
There

is a clear disagreement between Fitt and Hume as regards

the present political
that Fitt was
west Belfast

situation

bringing all

Hume had assumed

his Republican Labour councillors from

into the new party.

and according to Hume:

in West Belfast.

He did not.

He only brought one

"that division between the ones he left

behind and the S.D.L.P. was a division that caused alienation between
West Belfast and the rest of us, which led to the West Belfast of
today. "39
Hume's

belief

totally unfounded.
from amicable.

regarding Republican

Labour councillors was

Fitt's parting from his former colleagues was far
On August 24,

it was reported that both Fitt and

Senator Paddy Wilson were expelled from the Republican Labour Party.
The decision was taken by a vote of 52 to 1.
the party was read
M.P.

A statement issued by

by Patrick Kennedy (Republican Labour Stormont

for Belfast Central), who had refused to join the S.D.L.P.

This

stressed that the two had effectively expelled themselves by joining
another political organization, and also, that Fitt had been given no
mandate from either the party or his constituents, to form a new
organization.
not once
republican

Referring to the S.D.L.P., the statement noted "that

in the party's statement of aims had the words socialist or
been used."

The statement also rejected the S.D.L.P's

stance on the constitutional position.

"No one section of the Irish

people has the right to take a decision for that one section only
Without

the

nation

as a whole being consulted." 40

At the
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inaugural

press conference of the S.D.L.P.,

Fitt had given the

impression that the Republican Labour Party supported him.
"As I see it,

He said

the representatives here have a mandate from their

constituencies,

whether the Unionist Party or anyone else recognises
we are the opposition
"41
The statement read by

the fact,

Kennedy undeniably indicated that he had not the support of his
party.

It seems on this occasion, that Fitt had failed to cajole his

colleagues to come around to his way of thinking.
Therefore,
difficulties.
political

only days after its formation the S.D.L.P. was in
A new party whose leader was rejected by his erstwhile

supporters suddenly looked much

less credible.

The new

grouping may have met a need, but it was seen as a "green" Labour
party and therefore sectarian.
For its part,
political

force

the Republican Labour Party ceased to exist as a

by 1973, its disintegration certainly in part, being

a product of Fitt's absence.
constituency workers felt

He now argues that his

former

that the S.D.L.P. was too similar to the

Nationalist

Party and thus joined Official
socialist inclined republicans. 42

Sinn Fein the more

By October 1970 there were some progressive developments for the
S.D.L.P.
press

In Belfast, its new party headquarters was opened.

conference Fitt declared that since the party had been

launched,

1,300 applications

branches set up

for membership had been received, and

in 14 of the Northern Ireland constituencies.

"head-without a tail"
October,

At the

The

bearing of the S.D.L.P. was also remedied in

when the N.D.P. disbanded and defected en masse to the new

party.44 Ian McAllister interprets the S.D.L.P's inheritance:
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The most easily traceable legacy of the N.D.P. was in terms of
political
organisation.
It is clear that the S.D.L.P.
constitution was modelled closely on that of the N.D.P. As the
s.D.L.P. was formed at the parliamentary level down, rather than
vice versa,
the experience of the old N.D.P. members in
constituency organisation and co-ordination proved invaluable in
giving the new party a residue of support and ability in the
country while setting up their constituency organisation. The
considerable contribution of the N.D.P. towards contemporary
minority political
opposition in Northern Ireland is an
acknowledged if neglected fact. 45
The N.D.P. clearly exercised a strong influence within the newly
established S.D.L.P.
of

The fact that Fitt and the N.D.P. had a history

acrimony made his position as leader somewhat

Nevertheless,

Fitt led the S.D.L.P.

British Minister,

Richard Sharples,

Office in November,

incongruous.

in their first talks with a
Minister of State, at the Home

where he conveyed the party's view on the

Northern Ireland situation. 46
The year 1971 began with renewed rioting
Ballymurphy area of Belfast.
I.R.A.

in the Catholic

It seems that neither the army nor the

controlled the district and youths were intent on stoning what

they considered a foreign

army of occupation.

Fitt asked the

Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balniel, to withdraw the troops
for

a period claiming that their presence

heightening

tension

in Ballymurphy was

in the area and could lead to

increased

violence. 47
The riots led to renewed unionist calls for the re-introduction
of internment, which had been effective during the I.R.A. campaign of
the 1950s and 1960s.
against

Fitt held a meeting with Maudling to argue

its re-implementation,

telling the Belfast Telegraph that

"the due processes of the law could be
trouble makers
law."

invoked to weed out any

in the community without recourse to this draconian

It seems that he considered the unrest, at this point, to be
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the work of a hooligan element.

Maudling, for his part, undertook to

give serious thought to Fitt's assessment of the possible reacti9n to
internmen t . 48
The unionist demand for internment gained increased momentum in
February,

when the

offensive strategy.

I.R.A.

Fitt told Stormont, "this city is sitting on the
Two days later the British army suffered

edge of a volcano."~
its first

moved from a defensive to a decidedly

fatality when Gunner Robert Curtis was shot by the I.R.A.

The I.R.A. in turn also lost activists killed on that same day.

Fitt

appealed for calm:
The deaths of three Irishmen and a young British soldier in
Belfast must surely testify to the futility of violence in the
attainment of political or national objectives. To the death toll
must be added the total sum of misery, fear and distress in every
home in the city. 50
On the British television programme "This Week" Fitt was asked
if he was condemning the actions of the Provisionals,
answered:

"I condemn the actions of anyone in Northern Ireland who

at any time,

in any way,

violence did escalate,

tries to escalate violence." 51

heart

had been

The

and at the end of the month two more members

of the R.U.C. were assassinated in Belfast.
"The

and he

Fitt told Callaghan that

knocked out of me."~

He was clearly

becoming disillusioned and must have been aware that the situation
was getting out of the control of elected representatives.
The
disapproval

prominent
of the

members of the S.D.L.P.
I.R.A.

also voiced their

Hume appealed to members of the Catholic

community not to join violent organizations.

At Stormont he claimed:

They do not defend your homes.
They are leading you to
self-destruction.
They cannot right your wrongs by creating
greater wrongs
If I feel that their methods will unite this
island under their leadership then I want nothing to do with such
an Ireland or with such people ... 53
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Despite these appeals,

the violence intensified.

On March 10,

three young Scottish troops were lured to their death against the
background of a bombing campaign that was gaining further momentum.
Disorder resulted

in

increased pressure from right-wingers in the

Unionist Party for the resignation of Chichester-Clark, who it was
felt was not doing enough to improve security.
predicted

civil

hardliners. 54

war

if

Chichester-Clark

On March 19, Fitt

was ousted by the

The following day the prime minister was forced

to resign.
The new prime minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, was
considered a hardliner.
the reform program:

At Stormont, Fitt demanded that he implement

"To many thousands of people through the length

and breadth of Northern
absolutely nothing.

Ireland these reforms at the time mean

We have to see the legislation transformed into

fact." 55
Fitt emphasised his point and predicted with some accuracy that
Faulkner might be the last prime minister of Northern Ireland when he
told the Belfast Telegraph:
This victory of Mr Faulkner's could turn out to be a pyrrhic
victory.
Unless he makes it quite clear to this community in the
early days of his administration that he is prepared to forge on
with the reform programme announced in 1969 and furthermore to
enlarge it with progress so that social justice will be freely
available to everyone in Northern Ireland then Mr Faulkner will
find that he will go down in history as the last prime minister of
Northern Ireland. 56
Faulkner was keen to incorporate the S.D.L.P. into the political
system at a nominal

level

and proposed a committee system to work

alongside the Stormont Cabinet.
as the S.D.L.P.

This overture was essentially hollow

would have no executive or legislative power but it

was greeted with a favourable

response from Fitt and the S.D.L.P.
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It was a start at least.

On July 7, they took part in what was to

have been a series of all-party discussions,
perished.

but optimism soon

On July 8, two Catholics were killed (by the British army)

in separate

incidents

in Londonderry.

The result was a marked

increase in S.D.L.P. militancy, and the first rift in the party.
The Catholics killed

in

Londonderry were Desmond Beattie and

The army claimed that they were gunmen and bombers

Seamus Cusack.

but evidence refuted this.

The S.D.L.P. issued an ultimatum to the

British government demanding an independent inquiry within a week, or
they would pull
proposed an

out of Stormont indefinitely.

The statement also

"Alternative Assembly" and the move was clearly inspired

by Hume:
The Party heard a full and detailed report from Mr Hume on his
investigations into the deaths. We are completely satisfied that
Mr Hume's call for an inquiry into the circumstances of the deaths
is fully justified and will reveal that the statements of the
British army and the Stormont P.M. are untrue. We now reiterate
our demand for an impartial inquiry ...
If our demand is not met by Thursday next - exactly a week after
the deaths of the two young men we will withdraw immediately from
parliament and will take the necessary steps to set up an
Alternative Assembly ... 57
Fitt was

in

London at the time of the incident and was not

notified of Hume's action.
"Derry

thing"~

(further

He now says that he considered it a
indicating

the

suspicion

between

Belfast politics and the rest of the province) and Austin Currie
confirms

that

At the time,

Fitt voiced opposition to this militant move. 59
he went along with the majority but not without having

further talks with Maudling in an attempt to avert the boycott.
Before Fitt met the Home Secretary he said:
I am not prepared to accept the army investigation. They should
welcome a public, impartial inquiry because we are absolutely
convinced that the evidence would prove conclusively that the two
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men who lost their lives in Derry were in now~ connected with
the throwing of nail bombs or the use of firearms. 6
The Home Secretary sided with the military and rejected ·Fitt' s
appeal, saying "It is an army matter." 61
On July 15, Fitt led his colleagues out of Stormont and the rest
of the opposition,
followed

suit.

with the exception of the lone N.I.L.P. member,

The S.D.L.P. claimed the break was total.

Fitt told

a Belfast news conference that by withdrawing from Stormont "we wi 11
bring home to the world the reality of the Northern Ireland situation
which

is that Stormont is and always

unionism."

has

been the voice of

He assured the conference that, contrary to rumour, there

was complete unanimity in the party on its decision.
In reply to a suggestion that the S.D.L.P.
revolutionary position,

Fitt said

violence and our move

is certainly not

"We do not support the gunmen or
intended to lead to the

position of the gunmen being strengthened." 62
between

constitutional

was taking a

The relationship

and revolutionary nationalists was often

questioned by the media.
In August, Fitt was asked by a correspondent of the London Times
if he and the S.D.L.P. were being coerced by the I.R.A ..

He replied:

Since the day I entered politics I have never been prepared to let
myself be subjected to pressure from any extremist organisation,
be it the I.R.A., the Ulster Volunteer Force or anything else. I
would rather resign both my seats than be the voice of, or accept
the dictates of, any extremist organisation in Northern Ireland.
He was also asked if he was in any way personally afraid of the
LR.A.:

I am a married man and we have five daughters. I truly love each
and every one of my family. I have talked the whole matter over
with my wife and my daughters and we have frankly discussed the
possibility of me losing my life under certain circumstances. I
would have no regrets if I lost my life as a result of standing by
the principles I believe in. 63

157

As leader of the S.D.L.P., Fitt constantly made it clear that he
was

opposed

Meanwhile,

to all

the

I.R.A.

types of violence,

from whatever source.

continued its bombing campaign.

The pressure

to apply internment became greater and on August 9, the raids began.
By that evening,

342 men had been picked up, all but two from the

Catholic community.

One of the two non-Catholics belonged to P.D.,
Rumour quickly circulated that the

the other was pro-republican.
internees were being ill-treated.

Coogan noted that "Internment did

not crush the Provos but unleashed them."M
doubt that
attempt

it was an

There can be no

ill-advised policy decision and failed as an

to reassert the authority of the Stormont parliament.

Nevertheless,

internment continued.

Fitt retrospectively explained

his attitude to internment:
I always had a rather confused attitude about internment. Some of
the people in the New Lodge Road (a Catholic area of Belfast) I
would have interned them myself.
They were a bunch of bad
bastards. There were others that should not have been interned at
all but there was no way you could differentiate or identify
them.
I was always qualifying my condemnation of internment.
That was no good to the I.R.A.
They wanted outright
condemnation.
The others in the S.D.L.P. were anti-internment.
Particularly the rural areas.
Paddy Devlin was on the Falls he
had no choice.
I stood up to the Provos, that is why I have a
bodyguard now. 65
There seems little evidence of Fitt qualifying his condemnation
of internment.
memory.

What

His recollection is perhaps an example of selective
is certain, however, is that the mood of the Catholic

community after internment was more belligerent.

The S.D.L.P. had no

alternative but to increase its militant position and again pledge
itself not to return to Stormont, nor co-operate with the Westminster
or

Belfast governments until

internment was terminated.

reported his protest to Maudling:

Fitt

"I said it had been introduced as

a short term solution with the intention of propping up the Faulkner
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government but it had been an appalling failure up to the moment."
He also demanded the recall of the Westminster parliament from its
summer recess because of the gravity of the situation in Northern
Ireland. 66
An example of how far removed Fitt had become from his former
colleagues

in the Republican Labour Party was indicated by the fact

that at a widely publicised press conference, Paddy Kennedy shared a
pl at form

the

with

Northern

Divisional

Commander

of

the

P.I.R.A. 67
In

an

attempt

to end internment,

the S.D.L.P.

and the

Nationalist Party orchestrated a campaign of civil disobedience.
They called for a complete refusal of all payments of rent and rates
to public authorities until

the last

Fitt claimed that the strikes was

internee had been released.

"an attempt to bring down the

system in a non-violent way. "68
On August 24,

Fitt left Dublin for the United States on a trip

to include cities with large Irish-American communities - New York,
Boston and Chicago.

He told journalists the reason for the tour:

I want to tell the people what has really been going on in
Northern Ireland since internment and about shocking brutality by
the British army.
We want to try and get America to exert some
diplomatic influence on Britain and the wrong headed policies
pursued by the obstinate pig-headed Mr Heath and the Tory
government in Westminster. 69
While
General
alleging

in the States, Fitt had talks with U Thant, the Secretary

of the United Nations.
acts

of brutality by British troops committed under

internment regulations
meeting,

He gave Thant copies of statements

in Belfast and other centres.

After the

Fitt told reporters that he did not think the U.N. could

take any drastic action because Northern Ireland was a part of the
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United Kingdom and high politics were involved. 70
Fitt reverted to a more nationalist posture in Boston and. urged
Irish-Americans there to express their views on the situation in
Northern

Ireland to their representatives

in Congress.

"Congress

could then make the feelings of the people known to prime minister
Edward Heath."

He went on:

I also have no doubt the American delegation to the United Nations
could make their feelings known to the British delegation. The
war in Northern Ireland must end now without the shedding of
another drop of blood, but there can be no peace until there is
only one government.
Fitt also proposed that parliament should be suspended and a
Commission set up in its place to represent all the people of Ireland
equally.

He said the transition to the Commission might take years,

but would result

in a "united

Ireland." 71

Fitt found it easy

to be a nationalist in the United States.
Meanwhile back in Northern

Ireland internment had produced a

tremendous escalation of violence.

At the end of August, a British

armoured car was ambushed near the border and one soldier was
killed.

When he returned from the United States, Fitt said "This is

just another unfortunate and tragic sequence of events since the
British army became so involved
instruction

of

the

Unionist Party." 72

explosions and 35 deaths
months.

As

Farrell

in acting on behalf of and at the

said,

August had seen 100

- one more than

in the previous seven

"by any standards internment had been a

disaster. 1173
In September,

Fitt was admitted to a Dublin hospital

treatment of a slipped disc.
Irish

While bedridden,

exclusive

interview to the

Political

thoughts at this juncture.

for

he granted an

Independent that revealed his
He predicted an end to
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the border by the mid 1980s and the reunification of Ireland within
His words

15 years.

seem to

indicate that Catholic political

agitation was designed to end partition.
in Northern

"In view of present events

Ireland this might seem like a long time to wait, but

when you consider that it has taken 400 years to create the present
situation,

I do not think it

adds further fuel

is too long." 74

to the charge that despite some of his rhetoric

Fitt's politics were essentially anti-partionist.
a

united

This disclosure

His prediction for

Ireland within fifteen years was wildly optimistic.

London

and Dublin,

sectarian war,

on the other hand,

feared

an all-out

and were thus anxious to prompt the S.D.L.P. into

political

discussion.

Fine Gael

and the

The Belfast Telegraph reported that members of
Irish Labour Party visited Fitt in hospital to

persuade him to adopt a less rigid attitude to possible talks since
it was felt

that he may have been more flexible than his S.D.L.P.

colleagues. 75

Evidently

some

politicians

in

the Republic

considered Fitt more pragmatic than his partners.
Fitt was well
recall

to

enough to return to Westminster for a two-day

discuss the continuing crisis

in Northern

Ireland.

Maudling had proposed round table talks before the termination of
internment but the S.D.L.P. demanded the release of internees before
any discussion.
During the debate,

James Callaghan took the unusual step of

putting a question directly to Fitt.
was a solution to

Callaghan asked that if there

internment would the S.D.L.P., without giving up

its long term aspiration for a united Ireland, agree to participate
in government with unionists.

Fitt replied:
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Without hesitation, I can tell the House that if there is a
satisfactory solution of the problem of internment which at
present besets Northern Ireland the S.D.L.P. being the l~rgest
opposition party, would in company with other members who have
withdrawn from the Stormont government be willing and anxious
indeed to enter into negotiations to bring about a satisfactory
solution in Northern Ireland. 76
Callaghan's question proved academic since the Conservatives
were content to persist with internment, yet the discourse shows the
dilemma of the S.D.L.P. at the time.
while internment existed,

If they had agreed to negotiate

they would have represented no one, yet

they were committed to constitutional government.
The P.I.R.A.,

for its part, maintained the bombing strategy and

the death toll continued to rise.

Fitt meanwhile continued his total

condemnation of the bombers:
They had managed to eliminate from their thinking one million of
their Protestant fellow-countrymen when they claimed that their
struggle was solely against the British army. That they can
ignore the political opposition to a united Ireland on the part of
one million fellow Irishmen must be beyond the comprehension of
all sane people.
If I am to be true to my political principles,
then when I condemn the political use of British bayonets in
Northern Ireland, I must also condemn the political use of an
I. R. A. bomb . 77
The S.D.L.P.

held

its first annual conference in Dungiven, on

the week-end of October 23 and 24.

The party re-affirmed its

commitment to the campaign of civil disobedience, passive resistance
and abstention from Stormont in an effort to end internment and
change the system of government.
"reform,

re-conciliation

and

Fitt outlined the policy of

re-unification."

He also urged

Protestants to join the party and called for accommodating gestures
from the government of the Republic.
the

11

I would say those sections of

Constitution which offend the Protestant conscience should

immediately be taken out of the Constitution."
Protestants accepted his

He argued that if

invitation to join the S.D.L.P., he had no
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doubt that the gunmen and explosions would stop.

He also maintained

that there was no ambiguity about the S.D.L.P.
party." 78

socialist

Fitt may well

"They were a

have been sincere

in his

claims but there was no doubt that his party was founded on the
catholic vote and that Fitt and his colleagues represented themselves
as the only people who could speak and negotiate for the minority.
In short,

a party which claims to speak for the minority is a

Catholic party,
majority

is

just as a party which claims to speak for the

a Protestant party.

socialist rhetoric was

futile.

In these circumstances Fitt's
In any case it could be argued that

protestations

about

workers,

it could be argued,

who,

deferential

socialism were likely to scare Protestant
are the most reactionary and

working class in the developed world.

unionist N.I.L.P.

got nowhere with them.

Even the basically

Fitt can be criticised for

being incredibly naive.
The John Hume-inspired "Alternative Assembly" met on October 26,
its formation
consensus.

being evidence of the total breakdown of political
Hume set the tone of the gathering by quoting Edward

Carson's words
not."~
opposition

It

"we do not care twopence whether

its treason or

is significant that Fitt missed the opening of the

"Parliament,"

since he was arguably the least militant of

the leading figures in the S.D.L.P., and possibly wished to distance
himself from the proceedings.

Hume apologised for his absence,

saying that he was attending a funeral. 80

The Assembly held

only one other meeting.
Paul

Bew and Henry Patterson explain the condition of the

S.D.L.P. at the turn of the year:
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The continuation of internment and detention, the dense army
presence and the incapacity of the state to control sectarian
assassinations combined to produce rather conditional support for
the S.D.L.P. amongst the Catholics. The effect of the post-68
mobilisations had been to create a whole range of local defence
groups, community associations and smaller leftish and republican
groups which, together with the Provisionals, increasingly
criticised the S.D.L.P. and argued that it would shortly be
absorbed and co-opted. 81
The year ended on a particularly bad note for Fitt.
4,

fifteen

people died in an explosion at a Catholic pub on the New

Lodge Road.

He said "I am personally so shocked that I cannot think

clearly what next week will
funerals

On December

from

my

hold.

All I know is there will be 14

constituency and that

is

all

I can think

of. n82
There were 174 fatalities in 1971 - 115 civilians, 43 members of
the British army, 19 I.R.A. activists, 11 members of the R.U.C. and 5
members of the U.D.R.
On January 30,
paratroopers

in

1972 proved to be an even bloodier year.
1972 thirteen men were

Londonderry's

occurred during an

illegal

shot dead by British

"Bloody Sunday."

The shootings

march organized by the Civil Rights

Association to protest against

internment.

The army claimed that

they had been fired upon first, but nationalist and Catholic Ireland
rejected this,

and a wave of intense anger swept the country.

Fitt

fulminated:
It must now be evident to all that the British army in Northern
Ireland has now taken on all the trappings of an army of
occupation determined to use their superior military might to keep
in power a corrupt and discredited government that has gained the
odium of the world. 83
At Westminster,

Bernadette Devlin claimed "The government may

well

have lit a fire in Ireland, the flames of which may not die out

until

the last vestige of British rule has gone from that country."
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Fitt spoke subsequently, endorsing Devlin's sentiments and demanding
the suspension of Stormont and the withdrawal of the British.army.
His speech was charged with emotion:
Until last Sunday I regarded myself as a man of moderation. I
have consistently condemned violence. I have condemned every life
that was unnecessarily taken, every shot that was fired and every
explosion that has taken place. But I am consistent with my own
conscience, with the fact that I was born and reared, and will be
until the day I die, an Irishman. If I condemn the violence of
anyone in Northern Ireland I must condemn the violence of the
British army that was meted out to the Irish people in the city of
Derry last Sunday. 84
Fitt's emotion was reflected in the Republic, where the British
Embassy in Dublin was burned to the ground during a national day of
mourning on February 2.
In the following week Fitt attended a Newry Civil Rights march
along with thousands of other protesters.

He addressed the crowd and

claimed that the march represented a total rejection of Stormont.
also claimed the demonstration was an
majority

of

He

indication that the vast

those opposed to unionist government supported a

non-violent movement:
Newry has indeed reason to be proud tonight.
It will be
remembered that the first violence of the Civil Rights movement
unfortunately and tragically took place in Newry in January, 1969
(an action that was justified by Fitt) and it was only right that
this historic town should have availed itself of this opportunity
before the eyes of the world to prove its solidarity and support
for non-violent action in its endeavour to rid itself forever of
the injustices perpetrated under unionism and so ably by the Tory
administration at Westminster. 85
After

'Bloody Sunday'

and the Newry march, the whole minority

community was united in its opposition to Stormont.
Edward Heath appealed to the Northern minority representatives
to re-think and agree to peace talks without pre-conditions but Fitt
rejected this request:

"I find the whole matter rather confusing.

On the one hand Mr Heath is asking for talks while at the same time
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we are being told in Newry from a helicopter that we are all going to
jail for six months." 86
Meanwhile,

the violence continued.

1.R.A.

bombed

killing

six civilians and an

Northern

On February 22, the Official

Paratroopers Headquarters

at Aldershot,

England,

Three days later,

army chaplain.

Ireland Minister of State and Home Affairs, John Taylor, was

seriously wounded in a Official I.R.A. assassination attempt.
On March 4, two women were killed and 136 people were injured by
a

bomb

in

considered

the crowded Abercorn restaurant
it the most

serious

in

Belfast.

Fitt

tragedy since the outbreak of the

"This barbaric act will have repercussions on the Irish

'Troubles':

people through the world

for generations to come, and will have

sullied the name of the Irish race." 87
As

a consequence of the civil disobedience campaign, Fitt had

not attended Belfast Corporation and was thus due to be expelled.
However,

the

relinquish

seat.

Fitt was too entrenched to

his hold in the Dock Ward without a fight.

made a token
his

anti-unionist streak in

He therefore

appearance at the City Hall which enabled him to keep
This displeased his S.D.L.P.

colleagues

and the

Andersonstown P.O. severely criticised Fitt for his decision:
This action should come as no surprise to anyone who has watched
Mr Fitt's cheap political manouvering throughout the present
struggle.
While the people have been demanding the unconditional
release of all internees and political prisoners and a no to the
Special Powers Act, Fitt has attempted to wriggle out of his "no
talks" dilemma by demanding that the internees be released or
charged.
The peoples demand still stands we have no intention of
watering them down to allow Fitt and co to crawl to Maudling's
sell out table.
The people have withdrawn consent from Stormont and rejected the
corrupt sectarian structures which are necessary to keep it
standing.
Fitt by continuing to hold on to his Council seat, and
attending however briefly - a council meeting has shown that he
has not withdrawn from the system he is merely hibernating until
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Maudling can fix him up a seat in the Cabinet. 88
Fitt's old colleagues

in the Republican Labour Party. also

chastised him for his decision to appear at City Hall. 89
When the other Dock seat fell vacant due to S.D.L.P. abstention,
the prospect of a unionist taking over was again too much for Fitt.
He announced that his wife, Ann would contest the seat, although if
victorious

she would,

like her husband, boycott Council meetings.

Redevelopment and slum clearance had changed the religious demography
of the Dock Ward to such an extent so that by 1972 Catholics were a 2
to 1 majority.

The only hope of the other candidate, David Robb of

the Constitution Party depended on enough S.D.L.P. voters deciding to
boycott the election.

In her election address, Ann Fitt argued that

her husband would fail

in his duty to the Dock residents if he did

not provide an opportunity for them to decide whether they were
prepared to allow "sectarian bigots" to return to the area where they
had been previously "totally and firmly rejected." 90
comfortable victory.

She had a

Robb lost his deposit.

The City Hall episodes are further evidence that Fitt's politics
were based on personality.

S.D.L.P. colleagues, Paddy Devlin, John

Hume and Austin Currie all

suggested to the author that Fitt had

little organizational
also

ability and

indeed no interest in it.

indicated that he provided little

strategy.

input

They

into policy and

We have already noted that Fitt himself readily admits

that he was not the ideal party leader.

Fitt was still content to

rely on his own political instincts.
After Bloody Sunday,

Edward Heath was coming under increasing

pressure to adopt some sort of initiative in Northern Ireland as the
province proceeded to drift towards total anarchy.

Fitt was one of
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the more vocal complainers: "It is disgraceful, all their plans seem
to be in the Sea of Tranquility." 91

In retrospect,

it seems

likely that Heath had already decided to close Stormont at this
juncture.
On March 20,
brought the total
thus

a no-warning bomb killed six in Belfast.
number of deaths in 1972 to 76;

far died since the

introduction of internment.

'Troubles'

began,

On March 22,

This

282 people had

and 219 since the
Faulkner met Heath in

London and was told that Westminster was going to take all security
powers away from Stormont.

Right wing pressure within the Unionist

Party would not allow Faulkner to relinquish control of security.
seemed that his position was untenable.

It

Fitt commented that any

announcement of the resignation of the Stormont government would
cause no regret

in the minority community:

"This was the only

possible step for the Conservative government to take and one hopes
now that they will be prepared to use all their resources should any
attempt be made to give a re-birth to unionism by a show of force by
unionist extremists." 91
On March 24,
resigning,

Heath announced that the Faulkner government was

that Westminster was suspending the Stormont parliament,

and that William Whitelaw was to be the new Secretary of State for
Northern
troops,

Ireland.

Two and a half years after the entrance of British

direct rule had arrived.

Of the task ahead, Fitt said, "Our

sole motivation in this endeavour will be what is good for the people
of Northern Ireland." 93

Fitt recalls the fall of Stormont:

Some people said that we should have stayed in Stormont and
reformed it.
Others said, and I think I was one, that you could
not reform Stormont because the unionists were so deeply
entrenched in there.
Looking back, in retrospect, it may have
been better not to call for the abolition of Stormont but reform
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it from within. 94
Fitt's view has certainly changed.

On the day the resignation

was announced he told the Belfast Telegraph:

"I have always regarded

Stormont since its inception in 1930 throughout the long years of its
history as being an absolute disaster for the communities in Northern
Ireland and for the people of Ireland as a whole." 95
Fitt's basic position after direct rule was still nationalist,
although for the first time there is an indication that there is some
dilution of the sentiment.
take a long time to emerge.

He admitted that a united Ireland might
He spoke at Westminster on March 28:

We should be realistic and recognise that we are always going to
have the Irish problem with us until the day when Ireland is
reunited.
No one can say when that will be, whether it will be 5,
10, 15, 20 or 30 years hence. Some day it will happen. Some day
it must come. No one can say when or how it will be brought about
Therefore, if we are to take steps now effectively to
preclude the achievement of that ideal at any time in the future,
we are only stirring up trouble for ourselves in the years to
come. 96
As
profound

Farrell

points out,

the advent of direct rule also had a

impact on minority politics:

"the suspension of Stormont

had fragmented the almost total solidarity of the Catholic population
produced by

internment and reinforced

by Bloody Sunday. 1197 Fi tt

and the S.D.L.P. led the body committed to compromise - a point noted
by the editorial of the Belfast Telegraph:
It may stick in many a Protestant throat to admit it, but the most
effective instrument for peace in the Catholic community now is
the S.D.L.P., and M.P's like Mr Hume and Mr Fitt are fully
accepting their responsibilities.
They are confident they have
popular support for their plea to give peace a chance and the
people must show it in every way they can. 98
Fitt did
success.

indeed call for the cessation of violence, but without

Sporadic outbursts of shootings and bombings occurred

throughout the province,

and on April 15, British paratroopers shot
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dead Joe Mccann.
was

The somewhat ambivalent position of the S.D.L.P.

indicated by the fact that both Paddy Devlin and Paddy O'Hanlon

attended his funeral. 99

However,

by the end of May, Fitt and

the S.D.L.P. had recognised that they were in direct competition with
the

I.R.A.

clear.

11

Fitt said:

In this situation, the position is now

We are opposed to the men of violence and we will fight them

at each and every opportunity that is given to us. 11100
On May 28,

an

I.R.A.

bomb exploded prematurely in the Short

Strand area of Belfast, killing 8 people.
Official

I.R.A.

reaction to

ordered an

its

indefinite ceasefire after unfavourable

killing of Ranger William Best (a Catholic) while

visiting his family
Officials'

On the following day, the

in Londonderry.

Fitt was pleased by the

cessation of hostilities and hoped the Provisionals would

follow suit. 101
The

Provisionals

did

indeed come under some considerable

pressure to follow the example of the Officials.

Consequently, they

offered to meet Whitelaw - an offer which their Commander in Chief,
Sean MacStiofan,
movement's

said,

desire

to

was a "further expression of the republican
secure

a lasting peace. 111 ~

Whitelaw

quickly dismissed this overture, saying that he "could not respond to
ultimatums

from terrorists who are causing suffering to innocent

civilians

in Northern

The S.D.L.P.

Ireland and shooting British troops. 111 ro

had considered the Provisional's offer to be a "sincere

attempt to produce an atmosphere for a peaceful settlement of the
North's problems and representative of their willingness to engage in
peaceful

and

political

activities. 11104

Meanwhile,

Fitt had

been the main sponsor of a motion at Westminster urging Whitelaw to
review the case of prisoners claiming political

status.

Thirty
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Labour M.P's,

along with Bernadette Devlin and Frank McManus, had

signed the motion.
At this juncture the republican movement had no effective
leadership.

political

Sinn Fein was very much

Provis i ona1

subordinate to the

I .R.A. so John Hume and Paddy Devlin effectively

fil 1ed the vacuum.

Hume and Devlin orchestrated a week's secret

between

diplomacy

Whitelaw

and the leaders of the

The negotiations ended with Whitelaw conceding
status"

"special category

This meant that they would be

to paramilitary prisoners.

housed separately from habitual

I. R.A. 10s

prisoners,

and ensured that they

could wear their own clothes, have more frequent visits and an end to
penal

work.

In short, the I.R.A. were granted a measure of political

authenticity which

implied that the organization were not merely

gangsters and thugs.

Fitt's machinations at Westminster show that he

was in favour of the move.
strike

The talks ended a republican hunger

which was reaching a critical

stage,

and prompted the

Provisionals to announce a ceasefire for June 27, calling for a
reciprocal response from the British.
This truce proved to be very fragile and ended on July 9, after
a clash in the Lenadoon area of Belfast.

Fitt, speaking from London,

said

"almost to the brink of

that

despair. 11106

he

had
His

been
gloom

saddened
would

have

been

accentuated

by

developments in the Protestant community.
In September,

1971 the Ulster Defence Association

started operations.
vigilante
paramilitary

groups and

(U.D.A.)

It began as a co-ordinating body for Loyalist
it quickly became the largest Protestant

organization.

Fitt argued that

it was not only

republican forces which were determined to defeat Whitelaw's efforts,
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that fear

and frustration existed in the minority community because

of intimidation by the U.D.A.

He also acknowledged that Catholics as

a result may be weaned back into at least giving passive support to
the I.R.A.

because they felt the need of some form of protection.

Fitt continued to attack internment
interned,

"while internees are still

it still will create a running sore throughout the minority

community

in

Northern

Ireland." 107

Nevertheless,

remained and the Provisional's campaign continued.

internment
On July 21, 9

people were killed when 22 bombs were set off in Belfast's "Bloody
Friday."
Catholics continued to feel
U.D.A.
after

the Protestant backlash as the

continued its campaign of sectarian assassination.

The day

"Bloody Friday" saw the discovery of a Catholic couple's bodies

in North Belfast,

tortured and shot by the U.D.A.

On July 27, the

hooded body of Francis McStravik, a Catholic, was found in Belfast's
Sandy Row.

He had been shot through the head.

Fitt launched a

strong protest to Whitelaw against what he called the apparent
inability and unwillingness of the security forces to track down the
perpetrators of the series of foul murders in Belfast. 108
Whitelaw responded on July 31, in "Operation Motorman" when the
army moved
4.30am.

into both Catholic and

"No-Go"

areas at

He was determined to move against the Provisionals, who for

their part,

did not resist,

open combat.
down

Protestant

The Protestant community assisted the army in taking

their barricades,

republican

being unwilling to engage the army in

"No-Go" areas.

claiming that they were a response to
West Belfast saw the beginning of a period

of military occupation.
On August 7, after dialogue with the Republic's government, Fitt
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and the S.D.L.P.

held their first meeting with Whitelaw.

They

demanded an end to internment, arms searches in Protestant areas and
an easing of army pressure on the inhabitants of minority districts.
Whitelaw responded by releasing 47

internees and promising to let

Heath know the views of the party . 109
The fact

that the S.D.L.P. met Whitelaw while internment still

operated drew criticism from militants.
Citizen

Unfree Citizen claimed,

discontent

of

the

The P.O. weekly paper Free

"They are out to channel

the

Northern minority away from the dangerous

revol uti onari es and back into the Parliamentary system. 11110

On

August 22, nine people were killed in a Newry Customs Office bombing.
The S.D.L.P.

continued undaunted.

In September, they published

a policy document which called for joint

Irish sovereignty over

Northern

Ireland, and for a British declaration in favour of eventual

unity.

Whitelaw for his part, set out proposals for the creation of

special

tribunals to deal

with internees.

Fitt felt that they did

not go far enough and refused to end the boycott on talks, or attend
a Conference in Darlington to discuss political initiatives.

He was

adamant:
I am not prepared to sit at a Conference table when my
constituents are held in internment without trial, when they are
being held as political hostages.
While people are interned
without trial the S.D.L.P. feel unable to engage in any meaningful
discussion with the government. 111
The attitude of the S.D.L.P.

was suddenly altered following

government publication on October 30 of a Green Paper on the future
of Northern

Ireland.

Although this document re-affirmed that there

could be no change in constitutional terms without majority consent
from within Northern Ireland, it did recognise an Irish dimension:
A settlement must also recognise Northern

Ireland's position
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within Ireland as a whole
It is therefore clearly desirable
that any new arrangements for Northern Ireland should, whilst
meeting the wishes of Northern I rel and and Great Britain, b_e so
far as Rossible, acceptable to and accepted by the Republic of
Ireland. 1 2
The prospect of Irish unification proved sufficient bait to lure
the S.D.L.P.
annual

back to participation in Northern politics.

party conference, a substantial policy change was adopted, and

the decision taken to enter into discussions with Whitelaw.
party

At their

Thus the

brought to an end its policy of not negotiating while

internment lasted.
the S.D.L.P.
place.

to make

In his address Fitt said:

"Now is the time for

its voice heard in any talks that are taking

If the British government think they can issue a White Paper

based on the charade that took place in Darlington then they can have
another

think. "113

Apparently the

internees were no longer

"political hostages."
In an attempt to dilute the implications of the Green Paper, the
British government held a referendum on the border on March 8, 1973.
All

anti-unionist groups,

boycott.

including the S.D.L.P.,

Fitt was blunt "Take no part in it."

called for a

He claimed:

This is the only election in which the result was pre-determined
over 50 years ago at the setting up of this state, when borders
were deliberately drawn to give a permanent majority to a
Protestant ascendancy in the North . . . . In these circumstances we
will not allow ourselves to be used by the forces of reaction, and
we urge all those who have opposed and have been oppressed by
unionism not to participate in this election. 114
The boycott had been effective and Fitt was correct in his
analysis,
Catholics

"It had merely shown that there were more Protestants than
and

more

unionists

than

nationalists

in Northern

Ireland." 115 The survey had proven nothing that was not already
known.
After reassuring the unionist population with this referendum,
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the British government published a White Paper on March 20, outlining
its new proposals for the governing of Northern Ireland.

A new

Executive was to be responsible to a new single Chamber Assembly.
This Assembly was to be elected by Proportional Representation and
the

innovation of this new political
The

coalition.

referendums were
constitutional

initiative was compulsory

Irish dimension was also recognised.

Periodic

introduced to test opinion on Northern Ireland's

status

in relation to the U.K.

There were also institutional

and the Republic.

arrangements for consultation and

co-operation between Belfast and Dublin. The scheme was embodied in
the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of August 1973.
Fitt and the S.D.L.P. were cautious in their response to the new
Fitt told a press conference that they recognised that

proposals.

the Paper's proposals could represent an advance of position in some
areas,

while in others, "we must express both our reservation and our

disappointments."

The S.D.L.P. felt that the Irish dimension was not

sufficiently meaningful. Fitt endorsed this:
We asked for a strong all Ireland institution with clearly defined
powers. We did not get it. Instead what we got is something that
we asked for one year ago - a formula for quadrapartite talks
involving representatives from both sides in the North and South
and Britain.
At such talks we will continue to press our views as to the nature
of any all-Ireland institution, and we believe that these views
will become increasingly more meaningful to those who have opposed
us.
The S.D.L.P. did decide however, to contest elections to the new
Assembly . 116
329

to

5.

reservations. 117

The White Paper was approved at Westminster by
Fitt
He

abstained,
and

the

a reflection of his party's
S.D.L.P.

evidently were not

satisfied over the failure to clarify British attitudes to a Council
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of Ireland,
proposals,

yet they were sufficiently happy with some of the
hence

Provisionals,
proposals.
11,

their

on

the

agreement to contest elections.
other hand,

The

rejected the White Paper's

There was no let up in the military campaign and on April

a British soldier was shot in the Bogside area of Londonderry,

which brought the total number of deaths since August 1969 to 769.
The unionists also were unimpressed with the proposals.
Craig formed

the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, (V.U.P.P.) and

resolved to fight the Assembly elections
Unionist

Democratic
document. 118
formed

William

Party

(D.U.P.)

in alliance with the

in

opposition

to

the

The Alliance Party a non sectarian unionist party

in 1970, was the only group to fully endorse Westminster's

plans.
Although

Fitt

Provisionals,
Provisional

was clearly an

implacable opponent of the

it should be noted that he thought its political wing,
Sinn Fein,

ought to be allowed to contest the election.

He argued that every political party should be permitted to contest
elections

in

order

to

ascertain

the

feelings

of

the

electorate. 119
A dress rehersal for the Assembly elections was provided on May
30,

by the first local government elections for six years.

characteristically positive.
more confident entering
experience. "120

"I am superbly confident.

Fitt was

I was never

into an electoral battle in all my years of

He

announced that he too would be seeking

election as a Local

Councillor for the newly designated area 'G'.

Area

'G'

included Dock,

strong loyalist areas.
the elections.

plus strongly republican areas and equally
The P.D. and Provisionals decided to boycott

Fitt and the S.D.L.P. remained unrepentant.

On the
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day of the poll Fitt argued:
This is the first opportunity that the people of Northern Ireland
have had of using one man one vote to undo the damage of the
unionists in six county local government, and they are being asked
to abstain and boycott the use of a reform which was won after so
much suffering by the ordinary people. I believe it is completely
irresponsible and if acted upon will only ensure that the Unionist
Party will once again be in a position to establish their
sectarian policies. We, the people of this area would be brought
back again to the position we were in before 1969. 121
The poll
enclaves.

turned out to be high except in hardcore republican

The S.D.L.P. wiped out all other anti-unionist groups, and

Fitt was elected on the first count.
Party and the Republican

The N.I.L.P., the Alliance

Labour Party all

polled badly.

Fitt's

success however, was soon tarnished.
On June 26, S.D.L.P. Senator Paddy Wilson and Irene Andrews were
stabbed to death in Belfast by the Ulster Freedom Fighters (U.F.F.).,
a name used by the U.D.A. as a flag of convenience.

These deaths

brought the mortality total to 835 since the "Troubles" began.
Fitt and Wilson were close friends, Wilson having been Fitt's
only colleague in the Republican
S.D.L.P.
"It is
young,

Labour Party to join him in the

Fitt showed admirable restraint and appealed for peace:
imperative that we should all try to be calm.

I know that

misguided people might be tempted into taking some form of

retaliatory action.

In God's name, don't.

There has been enough,

and more than enough of killing." 122
Two days

later the elections for the new Northern Ireland

Assembly took place,
Provisionals and

with Fitt contesting North Belfast.

P.D again urged a boycott.

The

Fitton the other hand,

called on electors of all religious persuasions to vote wisely in the
interests of peace. 123
His appeal was answered with another high poll and he topped the
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North Belfast ballot being elected in in the first count with 8,264
first preference votes.

His nearest challenge was Johnny McQuade of

the Democratic Unionist

Loyalist Coaliation.

He polled 5,148 first

preference votes and was elected on the eleventh count.
The S.D.L.P.

gained 19 seats.

Paddy Devlin, Hume, Cooper,

Currie and O'Hanlon were also elected on the first count.
gained 22% of the total
official

poll,

The party

and had established itself as the

representatives of the Northern minority.

In short, the

moderates had secured a victory over the militants.
On the unionist side, the reverse occurred.

The moderates, led

by Brian Faulkner, had accepted the White Paper with hesitancy.

They

received 29% of the poll, whereas the anti-White Paper unionists, the
Vanguard Unionist Loyalist Coalition led by William Craig, and the
Democratic Unionists led by Paisley, secured 31%.
gained

12%,

only

the

Alliance

Party

The middle ground

doing

worse

than

expected. 124
Fitt

had considered the Assembly as nothing more than a

conference table,

although he did believe that it represented an

opportunity for spokesmen from both the Protestant and Catholic
working classes to establish links:
It is the working class of both religions who have suffered so
disastrously in the past four years of turmoil and tragedy and it
will be the immediate task of the Social Democratic and Labour
Party to have discussions with the Protestant representatives who
can speak with an authentic voice on behalf of the
community. 125
His thoughts proved naive.
broke up

in pandemonium,

The first meeting of the Assembly

with the speaker forced to suspend the

sitting due to Loyalist disruption.
Despite

the

Assembly setback,

Whitelaw proceeded to have
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separate talks with the parties who had voiced nominal approval of
the White Paper - namely the Faulkner Unionists, the S.D.L.P. and the
Alliance Party.

At the end of the month, the S.D.L.P. issued an

invitation to the other two to engage in power sharing talks.
October 5, it was agreed in principle to form an Executive.
claimed:

"Steady progress has been made.

On

Whitelaw

There has been certainly a

determination on all sides to seek to resolve contentious matters in
a spirit of good will. "126
concession

The S.D.L.P.

had made an important

- there could be no change in the status of Northern

Ireland until the next border poll in ten years time.
On November 22, Whitelaw announced the formation of an Executive
Designate with eleven members - six unionists, four S.D.L.P and one
Alliance.

Brian Faulkner was to be Chief Executive, with Fitt his

deputy.

It was also announced that there would be a tripartite

conference involving London, Belfast and Dublin to negotiate details
of

a

Council

satisfied. "127

of Ireland.
Fitt

and

pleased with the outcome,
were not.

Fitt declared:
the

"We are highly

S.D.L.P. may well

have been

but radical nationalists and republicans

The Provisionals considered Fitt and the S.D.L.P. as

arch-collaborators and made it clear that they intended to pursue and
intensify the armed struggle.

A statement from Provisional Sinn Fein

contained a threat to both Fitt and Hume - "We hope they understand
the consequences of their treachery. "128
At Westminster,
bitter exchange,
absolute

with

Fitt and Bernadette Devlin were involved in a
Fitt maintaining that Devlin was "a total and

irrelevancy in Northern

Ireland." 129

Devlin countered

in a statement to the Irish News:
Too many people have died

in the past four years to allow the
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fight to be left in the hands of their orphans. Ireland's history
is full of Gerry Fitt's who, however well-intentioned, called a
halt at the eleventh hour and were hailed as heroes by a p_eop le
who realised their mistake too late.
It cannot be allowed to
happen again.
There are those of us who are not prepared to see
it again and that in the eyes of the S.D.L.P. is a crime. 130
Although opposition and pessimism were not universal, opposition
to power-sharing from militants
well

for the future.

in both communities did not auger

An editorial in the Belfast Telegraph expressed

some hope:
Thanks to Gerry Fitt the tough-talking in-fighter has graduated to
the big league.
He and his party have not made the mistake of
getting themselves cornered.
They have left their options open
and their sights on community peace. They have opted for politics
rather than confrontation which is a new direction for Irish
national i sm. 131
The

Telegraph was correct,

the S.D.L.P.

was committed to

This policy of working within the Northern Ireland

compromise.

context left Fitt and the party hierarchy open to criticism of
collaboration,

with the issue of negotiations while internment still

operated provoking the most disparagement.
that

The S.D.L.P. had insisted

its co-operation with any Westminster initiative would not be

forthcoming

until

internment was ended but was persuaded from that

position by the prospect of power-sharing.
with

the

establishment of normal

internment would disappear.
elements

politics,

The party argued that
the necessity for

This clearly did not satisfy some

in the Catholic community who considered it an insult to see

Gerry Fitt prepared to work alongside Brian Faulkner, the architect
of internment.
The Catholic population in Fitt's West Belfast constituency had
suffered a great deal under the Conservative government's "get tough"
policy.

House raids, internment and the Diplock courts had succeeded

in alienating the population from the British. 132

Fitt voiced

r
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opposition,

but with constituents raised on an education of England's

treachery to
Tans,

Ireland

gallows,

- plantations,

deportation

oppression,

the

damage

gaols, Black a_nd
had already been
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done Although the Provisional I.R.A. with some justification, claimed
that it was they who had finally forced the demise of Stormont and
not the S.D.L.P. "middle class collaboration", events such as "Bloody
Friday"

and a general

support except
P.I.R.A.

and

war-weariness

lost the movement

in the republican urban ghettos.
P.O.

a lot of

The fact that the

boycott of the Assembly elections failed showed

that the minority community had given

Fitt a mandate to lead the

S.D.L.P. in talks aimed at power-sharing within Northern Ireland.
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CHAPTER V
POLITICAL INITIATIVES
Chapter
underwent

argues that Gerry Fitt's nationalist position

V

a discernable

transition during

the mid 1970s.

This

transition was influenced by the political processes initiated by the
Fitt felt

British government.
southern

political

an attempt at

internal

practice however,
strong

involvement

it was desirable to subordinate
in the administrtion of the North to

accommodation with

Ulster unionists.

In

Fitt succumbed to party pressure insisting on a
The

Irish dimension.

implication, therefore, is that Fitt

himself was not a very forceful or even an important character in the
political

dialogue,

other people and

he simply went along with policies decided on by
he just acted as

a kind of party spokesman and

figurehead.
Whilst expressing hope
S.D.L.P.

for the

future

at

the third annual

conference in December 1973, Fitt still evidently considered

himself a nationalist politician:
I never believed that I would see a day as this when there is such
hope, when unionists and republicans, Protestants and Catholics,
representatives of Orange and Green are prepared to sit down and
discuss their differences to find areas in which it may be even
more difficult to find agreement. 1

He

stated that no one section of the community could claim

victory over the other, "We are not claiming total victory.
have been

kicked

inflict the

for

far too long, for too many years, to want to

same treatment on our fellow countrymen."

proclaimed that the S.D.L.P.
claim to

No, we

was

a socialist party with an equal

Protestant and Catholic support.

He explained the party

rationale in pursuing a policy of power sharing and asked:
187

Fitt again

188
What should we have done? Should we have waited and not talked
until we had achieved total victory? And should Brian Faulkner
not have talked until he had achieved total victory? If this had
been done, the result would have been that the gunmen would have
won and there would have been more death and destruction. There
would have been no prospect of peace and reconciliation in this
community.
The motion confirming the S.D.L.P's deal

with the Faulkner

unionists and the Alliance Party was carried by 235 votes to 22.

On

the rent strike, the party leadership got endorsement by 182 votes to
22 for

a motion giving local

leaders the freedom to call off the

strike. 2
The conference was
existence.

the most successful

in the party's brief

It also showed, according to Fortnight:

Why Gerry Fitt has remained firmly in control of the top job. His
speech - and the much reported promise of an inexhaustible supply
of new men to take over if the men of violence should strike him
down - lifted the Conference on to a new level with a vision of a
job to be done and no other way of doing it. This was the stuff
of leadership. 3
Events were to prove that this estimation of Fitt's leadership
was a very superficial one.
At the Sunningdale conference,
S.D.L.P.,

the Alliance Party,

which began on December 6, the

the Faulkner unionists and both the

Dublin and London governments met to finalise an agreement on the
Council

of Ireland, without which the S.D.L.P. would not participate

in the Executive.

Ominously, on that same day in the Ulster Hall in

Belfast,

600 delegates from Unionist Party constituency associations,

Vanguard,

the D.U.P. and the Orange Order, voted to form a new United

Ulster Unionist Council (U.U.U.C.) to provide a common leadership.
On December 2,
Secretary
Employment,

Whitelaw was transferred from his

of State for Northern
where Heath thought

post as

Ireland to the Department of
his talents would be better used
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in dealing with the miners' strike in Britain.

Fitt was disappointed

with Whitelaw's move from the Northern Ireland scene only four days
before such crucial

talks:

"One would have thought that he should

have been allowed to remain throughout the course of the tripartite
in an effort to bring that to a successful conclusion." 4

talks

Francis Pym was Whitelaw's successor.
In

retrospect,

Fitt

minimalises

the

importance of the

"I, myself don't think Sunningdale itself was necessary

conference:

because Whitelaw got us together in Stormont with Brian Faulkner.
in fact,

agreed on the Executive at Stormont.

We

That was all agreed

without ever going to Sunningdale." 5
Fitt clearly plays down the importance of the Council of Ireland
In contrast,

concept.
Northern

Ireland

Paddy Devlin

Executive,

in his book, The Fall of the

clearly indicates the S.D.L.P. approach

at Sunningdale:
The general approach of the S.D.L.P. to the talks was to get
all-Ireland institutions established which, with adequate
safeguards, would produce the dynamic that could lead ultimately
to an agreed single state for Ireland. 6
Devlin,

Hume and Currie all maintain that Fitt did not play an

important role at Sunningdale since it appears that negotiation was
not one of his

political

largely a spectator;
because as
at

far

take part
Council

He, himself admits to being

"I did not take part in any of the discussions

as I was concerned the discussion had been concluded

Stormont. "7

negotiating,

strengths.

Although

Fitt

had

little

prowess

at

it seems extraordinary that a party leader would not
in discussions concerning such a crucial issue as the

of Ireland.

This was an abrogation of responsibility.

His

assertion that there was no necessity for Sunningdale is absurd when

r

190

one considers the importance of the institutionalized Irish dimension
to his party and party supporters.
The Sunningdale conference lasted three days and a Council of
Ireland was finally agreed upon.

It was to have Executive Powers, in

return for which the Republic would recognise the constitutional
position of Northern Ireland.

The Republic's government also agreed

to take action against "fugitive offenders." The Council was to have
two tiers.

The Executive tier would comprise 14 Ministers, seven

each from the Assembly and the Republic's government.

This body

would deal with tourism, agriculture, transport and electricity on an
all-Ireland basis.

The second tier, the Consultative Assembly, would

comprise 30 members each from Dail Eireann and the Northern Ireland
Assembly,

its role being advisory.

government agreed that

For its part,

the British

if a majority of Northern Ireland citizens

ever indicated a wish to become part of a united Ireland, that wish
would be upheld.

On security matters, a joint Law Commission was to

be created to look at the issue of extradition and the possibility of
an all-Ireland Court was to be
police

(the S.D.L.P.

investigated.

The future of the

wanted a link between the Gardai and R.U.C.

under the auspices of the Council) and internment were not resolved
(This undermined S.D.L.P. participation in the Executive). The whole
arrangement was to be ratified in the new year.
The leaders of the parties
optimistic front.

involved projected a united and

Faulkner said, "The agreement heralds a new dawn

not just for Northern

Ireland but for the whole of Ireland." 8

Oliver Napier of the Alliance Party declared, "This is a very proud
day",

and

achieved." 9

Fitt

maintained,

"All

our

objectives have been

On the same day as these utterances were reported,
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December

a new Ulster Army Council,

1,

paramilitary organisations,

composed of Loyalist

declared their intention to oppos.e any

process towards a Council of Ireland.
The Sunningdale Agreement
nationalist

sentiment
that

concluded

alike

it

was

itself was dexterous - unionist and
could
"a

claim victory. 10

masterpiece

of

Farrell

balance

and

ambiguity." 11
Fitt was confident that a new era had dawned and that the power
sharing concept had sufficient support to be successful.

He declared

"I can see very clearly a hope that has never been seen before in
Northern

lreland." 12

It was the political

high point for Fitt

and the S.D.L.P.
On January 1,
took up duty.
Commerce,

Health and Social

Constitution

the Northern Ireland Executive officially

Fitt was Deputy Chief Minister, Hume was Minister for

Currie,

of Northern

1974,

Minister for Housing and Paddy Devlin Minister for
Security.

Each promised, "I will uphold the laws

Ireland and conscientiously fulfil my duties under the
Act

in the

interest of Northern

Ireland and

its

people." 13 Fitt had no qualms about taking the oath:
I am happy with the oath which I have sworn before the Lord Chief
Justice.
It is one I can take in all conscience and all honesty
because I have taken the oath to serve all the people of Northern
Ireland.
I know that I can speak for all my colleagues that they
are activated by the same emotion. I believe we are entering into
a new era, and it will not be easy. There will be many people who
will spare no efforts to bring the administration to an end. But
being born in Northern Ireland and living all my life in the city
of Belfast, I am confident that the Executive speaks for the
overwhelming majority of the people.
They want this
administration to succeed. 14
Despite Fitt's optimism,

within four days there were ominous

signs for the future of the Executive.
On January 4,

the Ulster Unionist Council rejected the Council
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Before Sunningdale,

of Ireland.

Faulkner had survived with a ten

vote victory for power sharing, a clear indication of vulnerability.
on this occasion, he was defeated by eighty votes.

While expressing

no surprise at the result, Fitt remained positive, claiming that if
the Executive were to function
governing

for six months and be seen to be

in the interest of all, there would be massive support for

it even in the Unionist Council. 15
On January 7,

Faulkner resigned as Unionist Party leader.

considered it the only honourable course

in the face of what was

of no confidence. 16

vote

He

Fitt commented,

essentially

a

believe Mr.

Faulkner realised that he would find

"I

it extremely

difficult to drive the more backwood sections of the Unionist Party
into

the

century." 17

twentieth

that he was as confident as

Faulkner's memoirs

indicate

Fitt in the Executive's potential to

convince both communities of the benefit of power sharing.
resignation,

however,

His

divorced him from the Unionist Party machine

and which had important repercussions in the following month.
The Executive soon suffered a further set-back when a former
Irish

Minister,

Kevin

Boland,

challenged the legality of the

Republic's declaration of recognition of Northern Ireland's status
written

into the Sunningdale Agreement, thus putting that government

in an awkward position.

However,

the

Irish government argued

successfully that it had not agreed that any part of Ireland belonged
to the United Kingdom.
jure'

arrangement.

It had been a 'de facto' rather than an 'de

The legal proceedings were highly publicised and

the judgement was a major blow to the Faulkner unionists, whose
design

in selling the Council

of Ireland concept to the majority

community depended on the Republic's

recognition of the status of
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Northern Ireland.
In early February,

Fitt made the S.D.L.P. position clear..

He

was asked

in the Assembly whether if the Southern government did not

carry out

its obligations and there was no Council of Ireland, would

he and the S.D.L.P. still participate in the Executive.

He replied:

No, as I see it that would be a betrayal of the whole Sunningdale
Agreement.
The Agreement was reached on the basis that there
would be a Power-Sharing Executive, that there would be a Council
of Ireland and that the Southern government would take up a
certain stand in relation to them. 18
Fitt was emphatic and unequivocal in his answer.
we must assume that he was,

At this point

like his colleagues, in favour of a

Council of Ireland.
Despite such problems,
initial resistance.

the Executive strove to counter the

Faulkner noted:

Early in February a reception for industrialists was held in the
Ulster Office in London. It struck me very forcibly how much more
effective our sales story was made for the 250 or so powerful men
who came along by the simple fact that Gerry Fitt and I were
standing side by side at the door to welcome them, and showing the
same concern for jobs and living standards in the province we now
governed. 19
Adverse
however.

developments

In Britain, the miners' strike crippled the economy.

remained steadfast against
approval

for the Executive partners continued

for his position.

Heath

it and decided to seek the electorate's
Pym,

Whitelaw, Faulkner and Fitt all

cautioned him on the detrimental effect of a general election upon
the Executive.

Paddy Devlin explains:

We knew that we would not be able to compound our position as a
Power-Sharing entity unless we had an extended run: Two months in
office could demonstrate potential but not practical results in
our favour.
Potential results would never be realised in the
white heat engendered by a tribal election. 20
The election was called for February 28.
fight

The U.U.U.C. were to

the election as a single party, which was in sharp contrast to

r
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I.

the Executive parties, who made no electoral pact.
Fitt had

to again defend

his West Belfast seat.

· He was

challenged by McQuade of the U.U.U.C., Brady of the Republican Clubs,
Boyd of the N.I.L.P. and Price standing as an Independent.
Albert Price was the father of Dolores and Marian Price, two
sisters who were members of the Provisionals and had been convicted
of bombings

in Britain. At the time, the two were on hunger strike

in Brixton Prison
their sentences.
Republican

in an attempt to be sent back to Ireland to serve
Paddy Kennedy, who was to have gone forward for the

Labour Party, announced that he had withdrawn:

standing down and
the same.

I am now

I now call on all anti-unionist candidates to do

The issue in West Belfast must be the plight of the Irish
prisoners. 1121

political

The S.D.L.P.

ignored such sentiment

and confirmed that they intended to contest all
Fitt declared,

seats.

11

12 Westminster

"Now we have created a system to end this

conflict and through which people will learn to live together rather
than die together. 1122
Fitt

recalls

"vicious." 23

this

Republicans

election battle as
printed

election

being particularly
handbills

which

showed a picture of Fitt superimposed on a Union Jack, with the words
"Vote

Fitt

for the West and support your Republican-Unionist

candidate." 24

This being evidence of how some people felt Fitt

had betrayed his original political ideals.
Since the 1970 Westminster election which Fitt had won with a
majority of 3,198, the West Belfast electorate had increased by 6,000
to 70,000 due to an extention of the boundary into South Antrim,
taking

in Catholic Andersonstown.

decisive split

McQuade's only chance lay in a

in the nationalist vote.

Fitt's weakness was the
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internment

issue,

and

both Brady and the P.I.R.A. - backed Price

hoped to capitalise on this.
observers

The Irish News reported that political

in the constituency were giving

retaining the seat. 25
he would be the
Parliament. 26

Fitt a 50/50 chance of

On the eve of the poll he declared that

"true voice of moderation" in the next Westminster

Fitt was no longer inclined to be perceived as a

radical.
Fitt retained his seat, but with a reduced majority.
19,554 votes.
Boyd 1,989.

He polled

McQuade polled 17,374, Price 5,612, Brady 3,088 and
Price's vote showed that there was a nucleus of support

for the Provisionals.
Although

Fitt was victorious in the election, as was the British

Labour Party,

the rest of the results were disastrous for the

Executive parties.

The U.U.U.C.

took eleven of the twelve seats,

with Fitt being the only anti-unionist candidate to survive.
U.U.U.C.,

with

the control

The

of the unionist election machine that

Faulkner had relinquished on his resignation, had secured 51% of the
vote.

Thus having procured more than half the total votes cast, they

correctly claimed that the result was a vote of "no confidence" in
the new administration.
the vote,

and no seats.

The Faulkner unionists obtained only 13% of
The S.D.L.P. actually increased its vote

from June 1973 by 24,000, but as a result of the U.U.U.C. decision to
put up a single candidate against the divided Executive parties,
three

U.U.U.C.

majority

candidates were elected despite a pro-Executive

in their constituencies.

and Frank McManus

This resulted in Bernadette Devlin

being defeated in mid-Ulster and Fermanagh South

Tyrone respectively.
The

February 1974 election had put the Sunningdale package and
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the concept of power-sharing to the test of public opinion before the
Executive

had time to

communal

prove itself.

As a consequence, traditional

polarization was reflected in the results.

"Dublin is just

a Sunningdale away" proved to be an influential slogan.
The
improve

Executive continued

in the hope that its performance would

its chances of survival.

Merlyn Rees was the new Secretary

of State,

but his position was weakened by the fact that the Labour

Party had

formed a government on a minority vote.

to be happy about

successor. 27

Pym's

Fitt was reported

Rees stated categorically

that Sunningdale was to be implemented as agreed. 28
In the wake of the election results a "Senior Member" of the
S.D.L.P. felt it necessary to state the party position:
The S.D.L.P. would be most unhappy if it was attempted to put new
conditions into the Sunningdale package before final notification
because of an unfortunate set of electoral statistics which were
totally freak .... there is no question of allowing hysteria to
blow us off course.
To allow this could lead to the loss of a
landbase.
It would be fatal for an~ political party to allow
themselves to be placed in that position. 9
It

is probable that the resolve expressed by this S.D.L.P.

spokesman was

not evident in Fitt, although his persistent faith in

Westminster remained:
that the

11

"Many people in Northern Ireland may believe

voices of the U.U.U.C.

coalition will

cause great

consternation at Westminster but I can assure them that all the major
British political
i S • H3Q

parties

But did they?

and Northern

belief in

British government's

Ireland Secretary's of State

(especially Labour) is

difficult to excuse.
willingness to
stance could
or lack of

are well aware of what the true position
Fitt's

During

his career he exhibited increasing

be dictated to and even fobbed off, long after such a
be justified.

The reasons for this could be weariness

imagination on Fitt's part.

It is also likely that Fitt
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underwent a process of "embourgeoisement" within the comfortable
confines of Westminster with all its attendant mutual back-slapping.
The unionists

in the Executive felt it necessary to respond to

the Protestant fears

as

reflected

wanted to re-appraise the Council

in the election results.

They

of Ireland, in view of the fact

that the Republic's government had not delivered on

its pledge

regarding constitutional recognition and extradition.
The reaction within the S.D.L.P.

was varied.

In retrospect,

Fitt claims that he tried to play down the importance of the Council
in

order

to

prevent

the

Faulkner's memoirs confirm this:

collapse

of

the

Executive. 31

"It always seemed to me that Gerry

Fitt did not really care if there was a Council of Ireland or not,
but had to go along with it because his party was insisting." 32
Faulkner's notion confirms two points regarding Fitt.

First,

Fitt recognized that the Irish dimension represented an insuperable
obstacle to power sharing in the north.

Second, Faulkner shows that

Fitt was merely a figurehead rather than a leader orchestrating party
policy.

Fitt was a commentator on the political scene rather than a

key actor in it.
There were rifts
one

of the

internment

instigators of the rent and

in 1971,

arrears must

in the S.D.L.P. in April, when Austin Currie,

be paid

rates

strike against

but now in charge of housing, said that all
in full, and non-payers would be levied 25p a

week and could have payments deducted from their social security
benefits. 33
to

this

internment,

Paddy Devlin was
measure.

the most ardent in his opposition

After fruitless discussions with Rees on

he handed in his resignation from the Executive.

He was

persuaded to remain, however, until the outcome of the Ulster Workers
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council (U.W.C.) strike, then three days old, was known. 34
After the February election, opponents of the Executive b~came
increasingly
organization

vocal.

In March,

the U.W.C.

was

formed.

This

had close connections with Loyalist paramilitary groups,

particularly the U.D.A.,
Vanguard leader,

and Loyalist politicians,

William Craig.

Executive committee.

Both were co-opted on to the

The U.W.C.

Assembly and new elections.

most notably

demanded the dissolution of the

In early May it announced that it would

lead a full-scale constitutional stoppage throughout Northern Ireland
in

protest

of

the

Executive,

if

a motion requesting the

re-negotiation of the constitutional arrangements was not accepted.
On May 14,
Agreement.

the Northern

Ireland Assembly endorsed the Sunningdale

The U.W.C. then announced that the strike was to proceed.

Few workers joined the strike on its first day.
the U.W.C.

barricades went up,

greatly increased.

the numbers of striking workers

On May 17, tension was heightened by three car

bombs which killed 33 civilians in Dublin and Monaghan.
considered

that

However, when

The S.D.L.P.

support for the strike stemmed from Loyalist

paramilitary intimidation and urged Rees to order the dismantling of
the barricades.

By May 19, the electricity supplies for the province

began to dwindle.

Rees responded by declaring a State of Emergency

to protect all essential services.
The Executive was responsible for the government of Northern
Ireland,

but

streets.

it had no power to enforce

authority on the

Thus, its members were keen on the use of the army to break

the strike.

Faulkner's position would have been more difficult than

the S.D.L.P's on this
favour

its

of

issue,

military action. 35

but his memoirs show that he was in
The U.W.C.

began to gain the
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upper hand in Northern Ireland and on May 21, Len Murray, the General
secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, led a group of 200
people on a "back to work" march.

It was an unmitigated failure.

Pressure within the Executive became severe.
pressed the S.D.L.P.

The unionists

for a watering-down of the Council of Ireland,

and on May 22 S.D.L.P.

members met to discuss the situation.

The

leadership accepted that the party would have to agree to Faulkner's
proposals

for the Council

to be

introduced

in two phases.

The

Executive members voted with the leadership, but were defeated by 8
votes to 11.

Brian Faulkner recalls the episode:

The S.D.L.P. Executive members had a meeting of their back
benchers to secure final approval, but when they came back they
were more disappointed that I had ever seen them. "I'm sorry"
said Gerry Fitt.
"We can't get them to agree". It seemed as if
the Executive was about to break up on this issue, as neither
Alliance nor ourselves were prepared to go back on what had been
agreed.
I got up from the Executive table and said "well, if
that's the case I am afraid it means the end of the Executive. I
am going into the Assembly to announce the resignation of the
Executive because of the failure to agree on the re-negotiation of
the Council of Ireland. I was at the door when Gerry Fitt stopped
me.
"Give us another half an hour and we will try again Brian",
he said. 36
Fitt contacted Orme and told him of the vote.

Orme then

addressed the S.D.L.P. Assembly group and told them that there would
be strong action against the strike and an end to internment.

In the

second vote, the earlier decision was reversed and the compromise was
carried by 12 votes to 5.

Faulkner also recalls:

It was about an hour later that Fitt and his colleagues returned
looking more cheerful.
"We had another vote and a majority have
agreed" he said.
I went straight to the Assembly and announced
the new proposals. It later transpired that Orme had been rushed
up from Stormont Castle to address the S.D.L.P. backbenchers, and
had played a major part in changing their attitude. 37
Despite
materialised.

Orme's promise no major initiative from the army
In a televised broadcast, Prime Minister Wilson did
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castigate the Loyalists

for "sponging" on British democracy, but he

did not promise any action.

As disruption became more widespread,

the Executive became increasingly desperate.
On May 23,

Fitt,

Faulkner and Napier travelled to London to

plead with Wilson to use troops and on May 24, Fitt in an impassioned
speech

in the House of Commons, spoke of:

" ... A band of unelected

people,

people who have never had a single vote cast for them in the

ballot

box,

Workers,
that

people who misname themselves the Loyalist Ulster

are holding the entire community to ransom."

it was

Fitt claimed

not an industrial strike, as it was not about wages and

conditions of employment.
British troops

Furthermore,

he demanded

the use of

to ensure that the essentials of life would be made

available to everyone in Northern Ireland.

His concluding words have

a familiar ring:
I believe that the British government must accept their
responsibilities.
I regret that it has to be a socialist party
that must face the position, but knowing the men who compose the
government, and having known Labour backbenchers for some years, I
feel
that the government will show the courage that they
undoubtedly have. 38
On May 27,
petrol

stations,

of the strike.
he refused.

the army was

finally used to take over selected

but that measure was too late to halt the momentum
Faulkner urged Rees to negotiate with the U.W.C., but

On May 28, Faulkner, fully aware that the consent needed

for the perpetuation of the Executive had been lost, resigned and
with

the

collapsed.
achieved

resignation

of the unionist members,

the Executive

On the thirteenth day of the strike the U.W.C. had
its

Party did not

immediate aim. 39
resign,

The S.D.L.P.

and the Alliance

but were dismissed the next day.

For a day,

therefore, Gerry Fitt was acting Chief Minister for Northern Ireland.
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Despite the
Fitt was

important differences of outlook in the Executive,

very confident about this new institution's prospects.

As

late as March 18, after the disastrous election results of February,
he claimed:
The new Executive was given a job to do. Its members have got
their heads down and got on with it. It has plenty on its plate.
Legislation under way or in the pipeline ranges over the whole
spectrum of life in the Province. More and more, the Executive is
being seen to speak and act for the real Northern Ireland. Its
success is clearly causing dismay to the men of violence. 40
Fitt's optimism proved wrong,
fall

of the Executive. 41

and he was visibly upset at the

Many reasons can be put forward for

the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement and power-sharing, though in
retrospect

Fitt

is

adamant that the Council

component responsible.

of Ireland was the

He feels bitter about what he considers to be

militant nationalism by certain members of the S.D.L.P., and argues:
I never believed that you would ever have a power-sharing
Executive.
As far as I was concerned I didn't want anything
else.
But the nationalists outside of Belfast insisted on a
Council of Ireland. I disagreed, fearing it would antagonise the
Protestants.
There was nothing in the Council of Ireland
proposals which was a danger to the unionists but it was
symbolic. They said it is the thin edge of the wedge. It was the
Council of Ireland proposal that killed power-sharing. 42
Faulkner's memoirs do

imply that Fitt's nationalism was less

"green" than some of his colleagues - power-sharing was thus a
watershed

in

Fitt's career.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, his

rhetoric had always retained a nationalist aspiration, but by 1974 he
became more of a gradualist.
reflections were
thoughts.

The two are not incompatable and Fitt's

indeed pragmatic.

However, they remained private

If he really had any convictions he should surely have

articulated them.
nationalism in

If Faulkner's reminiscence

is correct, Fitt's

1974 was essentially a concession to party dictates.

Privately his politics had changed.

Publicly they had not.
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In the
faith
down

period of the

Executive, Fitt once more displayed his

in Westminster and his socialist colleagues, but was again let
by them.

Rees' promise that Sunningdale would be ratified did

not materialise.

Orme's promise to the S.D.L.P. that the Northern

Ireland Office would act strongly against the
materialise.

strikers did not

Wilson's speech to the Loyalists was ineffective.

Devlin considered

it as

simply "useless"

and

Executive was dependent on Westminster for
Labour government did
"undoubtedly had."

not

Paddy

"pathetic".~ The

its survival but the

show any signs of the courage that it

Fitt's confidence was unwarranted.

In sharp contrast to Fitt, two of the principal unionist leaders
dismiss

the

idea that the Council of Ireland was the cause of the

Executive's collapse.

In

a letter written on February 18, 1976, a

few weeks

before his death

"certainly

I was

Council

of

in a riding accident, Faulkner wrote,

convinced all

along that the outcry against a

Ireland was only a useful

opposition was

to

sharing of power."«

is the admission of William Craig.
widely thought,

to the Council

- the real

Perhaps more surprising

His objection was not, as was

but to

considered a "denial of democracy."

red-herring

power-sharing,

which

he

He adds, "I was always prepared

to have a relationship with the Irish Republic provided that their
relationship with us was correct.
of

Ireland

was

what

And those who say that the Council

tipped

the

strike

off

are talking

nonsense." 45
John Hume, likewise, does not agree with Fitt's assertion of the
detrimental
did not

effect of the Council.

He argued:

"It was that people

like to see the likes of us sitting in charge of government

departments

and they did not like to see Fitt as the virtual Deputy

203

Prime Minister of Northern

Ireland.

That's what it was and that's

what they said at the time." 46
Republicans were as delighted with the fall of the Executive as
were the U.W.C.

They had constantly condemned

both it and the

sunningdale Agreement and maintained that Fitt and the S.D.L.P. had
"sold out" in the unification struggle.
failed

The fact that the experiment

in the face of Loyalist intransigence and British inactivity,

gave credibility to the republican sentiment that it was yet another
example of the collaborators'

faith

in

British politicians being

rewarded with repercussions which trampled the aspirations of the
minority community.
The post-Executive period would
S.D.L.P.

be a difficult one for the

Not only would it have to endure the gloating of militant

Loyalists

and

republicans,

but the

party also need to perform

effectively despite the apparent differences within
Council

of

Ireland concept.

it over the

Picking up the pieces would be no easy

task.
Although disappointed by the disintegration of the Executive,
Fitt did
process

not despair.
had

begun

On May 29, he claimed that the power-sharing

in Northern Ireland and it could not be stopped -

it had merely received a severe temporary set back. 47
No

immediate alternative policy existed other than a return to

direct rule which all
private reservations,
relinquish

peaceful

Despite

Fitt made it clear that the S.D.L.P. would not

its political 'raison d'etre' around the maintenance of a

minority presence
Republic:

the parties agreed was no solution.

in government and a formalised

link with the

"The Catholic community must be allowed to aspire to the
re-unification of

Ireland

by consent.

If the Catholic
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community

was

to

be asked to

become unionists

as

such

then

power-sharing wouldn't be possible." 48
A political

impasse had

been reached,

since the Protestant
The Official

community

had

Unionists,

now under the leadership of Harry West, presented a plan

for

already rejected such proposals.

majority-rule

in

a Stormont government with

opposition participation

the offer of

in parliamentary committees.

The proposals

were strongly attacked by Faulkner and his new Unionist Party and by
Fitt, who said:
It is in fact an attempt to resurrect the old Stormont and
ascendency government which existed before direct rule, and as
such, would not be acceptable and would be completely rejected by
the minority in Northern Ireland.
In doing so they would have
support from the democratic world.
If this is the final position of the Official Unionist Party, then
one can only predict serious political difficulties in the
future.~
Fitt was
nationalism
to fill

aware of a possible drift away from constitutional

in the political vacuum that now existed.

In an attempt

this vacuum, Rees declared that a new Northern Ireland Bill

would make the Secretary of State responsible for government in the
province.

The Bill would provide for a Constitutional Convention to

be elected

"to consider what provisions

Northern

Ireland

acceptance
assurances
of

British

dimension,

would

for

the government of

be likely to command most widespread

throughout the community." 50

The White

Paper gave

on power-sharing but the S.D.L.P. were no longer convinced
resolve.

Although the

Paper mentioned the

Irish

it did not suggest that it would have to be acceptable to

the Republic's government.

The document also failed to recognise the

long-term aspiration of the minority for

unity.

As Barry White

points out, "Without a strong commitment to power-sharing or an Irish
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dimension,

the Convention would be seen as a calculated insult to the

s.D.L.P. and a surrender to Protestant intransigence." 51
Fitt's

reaction

at Westminster to the

new Bill

reflected

s.D.L.P. pessimism with the new proposal:
I believe that the introduction of the White Paper and the Bill
today represent an abject and total surrender to those forces in
Northern Ireland which set about using every endeavour to bring to
an end the system of government that we had under the Sunningdale
Agreement.
That is the way in which this measure is being
interpreted in Northern Ireland. 52
Unimpressed with developments in Northern Ireland, many S.D.L.P.
members

adopted

a tougher line.

Eddie McGrady, Assembly member for

South Down had already urged the British government to announce their
intent

to

withdraw

from

the

province, 53

implications of the White Paper became
Logue,

Assembly representative for

treasurer and John Duffy,

the

and

known

after

the

Paddy Devlin, Hugh

Londonderry, Paddy Duffy, party

party's general secretary, all made

scathing attacks on Rees and the British government. 54
On July 20,
U.W.C.

strike,

the U.D.A. who had provided the muscle behind the

resigned from the Council.

Its chairman, Andy Tyrie,

invited representatives of the Catholic community to take part in
talks.

He said:

think we would
across

"The S.D.L.P. are elected representatives and I

be quite prepared to speak to them.

the views of ordinary Catholics.

response

and

our attitude

They can put

We think we will get a good

is that we cannot go on

fighting

forever." 55
Fitt was

keen on talks, his socialist orientation always making

him open to Protestant overtures.

On August 1, discussions took

place but the meeting proved unsuccessful.

The U.D.A. spokesman

declared that there would be no discussions until the S.D.L.P. gave
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up its aspiration to a united Ireland.

For his part Fitt claimed:

The tone and content of the U.D.A. statement certainly does not
reflect in any way the meeting which had taken place. I can only
presume that there are elements within the U.D.A. who are
determined to pre-empt any useful discussions and to make certain
that no useful dialogue can take place. I realise that there are
many thousands of people throughout Northern Ireland who feel
disappointed that nothing constructive has emerged from this
meeting, and I can only reiterate that the S.D.L.P. while clinging
tenaciously to its policies, will make every endeavour to unite
both communities in Northern Ireland. 56
We can now question

how "tenaciously" Fitt clung to S.D.L.P.

policy but the same cannot be said for Hume.

On August 8, he joined

some of his S.D.L.P. colleagues in attacking the British and taking a
more militant line.
British

faced

He told a party meeting in Londonderry that the

a clear choice "confrontation with violence or

withdrawal." 57
At the end of the month a six-man delegation flew to London for
talks with Labour, Conservative and Liberal Party leaders, to express
their feelings

about the lack of firm direction and the continuing

internment issue.

Fitt was among the group. 58

The S.D.L.P. followed the trip with a conference to review party
strategy.

Taking part were the 19 Assembly members and the party

Executive.

The conference also

forthcoming

elections

Constitutional Convention.

intended to plan policy for the

to Westminster and the Northern

Ireland

Fitt said:

We have said that the British government must spell out what it
will accept from the political parties in Northern Ireland and
what it will not accept. Otherwise people will be asked to vote
at the Convention elections without being sure what they are
voting for.~
Increasingly disillusioned S.D.L.P.

members were not helped by

the attitude of the government in the Republic.
power-sharing,

After the failure of

the Dublin administration showed a distinct proclivity
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to disengage from the Northern Ireland problem.
Liam Cosgrave said:

On June 13, Premier

"They (citizens of the Republic) are expressing

more and more the idea that unity or close association with a people
so deeply imbued with violence and

its effects is not what they

want." 60 The S.D.L.P. was isolated and left to its fate.
In September,
Prior to this,

another S.D.L.P.

delegation met Harold Wilson.

Fitt remarked: "The situation in the North from the

minority point of view, is showing daily deterioration mainly due to
military bias against the Catholic population.
an end to this." 61

He was

There will have to be

pleased with the outcome of the

meeting:
It was a most satisfactory meeting - one of the frankest the
S.D.L.P. has had with the British prime minister. Every aspect of
the political situation in the North was discussed, including
internment, the role of the British army, the role of the police
and in particular what afpeared to be unclear attitudes expressed
by the British government.
Without

justification,

the S.D.L.P.

was

now convinced of

Britain's commitment to power-sharing and an Irish dimension.
entered the October election with this in mind.

It

Fitt was asked by

the Belfast News Letter what he felt was the most important issue in
the election, and replied:
Northern

"The acceptance by the whole community in

Ireland that there must be partnership in government and the

recognition of the legitimate aspirations of this divided community,
consequent upon this a complete rejection of violence."~
Fitt was opposed in West Belfast by Johnny McQuade (the nominee
of Paisley's D.U.P.,

standing on the United Ulster Coalition ticket

and who came second to Fitt

in February),

Kitty O'Kane, of the

Republican Clubs, Sam Gibson, Chairman of the U.V.F's political wing,
the Volunteer Political

Party (V.P.P.)

and a Communist, Patrick
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Kerins.
In the previous April,
Fein and the U.V.F.

Rees had removed both Provisional Sinn

from the list of proscribed organizations and

although the U.V.F. decided to contest the election, Provisional Sinn
Fein declined.

Republican criticism of the S.D.L.P.

came from

O'Kane:
The S.D.L.P. talk about the power-sharing Executive as if it were
a golden age and have made its restoration their main political
aim. The power-sharing Executive was in essence a Tory government
bribe to the middle class S.D.L.P. leadership, which helped them
accept Brian Faulkner as their leader in return for whatever
patronage and prestige they might get out of it. 64
O'Kane's criticism did not prevent people voting for Fitt.
retained his

seat despite a 5% drop
He

February.
the split

in turn out as compared to

increased his majority to over 5,000 votes, aided by

in the unionist camp.

deposit.

He

O'Kane unexpectedly lost her

Fitt's victory was also enhanced by the fact that there was

no Provisional-backed candidate.
In each of the 12 seats in Ulster the U.U.U.C. put up a single
candidate and had 10 M.P's returned.

By securing 58% of the vote

they consolidated their post-Executive position.
Fermanagh
S.D.L.P.

South Tyrone seat.
and McManus

They lost the

Prior to the October poll, the

(the former M.P.

for that area) had reached

agreement on a compromise nationalist candidate - Frank Maguire.
Maguire had

been active in the republican movement and was interned

for two years in the late 1950s.

The fact that the S.D.L.P. secured

such an agreement indicated a shift of emphasis and a decidedly more
nationalist posture.

Maguire's victory showed that the anti-unionist

population of the area preferred any nationalist to a unionist.
the 1980s,

In

this reality would again be demonstrated but in a more
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dramatic fashion.
The S.D.L.P.

itself managed to retain the 22% share of the vote

it had achieved in February, and its total vote only dropped by 4,000
despite the

fact

that

it only contested 9 out of the 12 seats.

In

Britain, the Labour Party increased its majority.
In Northern

Ireland the October election did little more than

re-confirm what the
the U.U.U.C.

February election had already proven.

Although

had one less seat, they increased their vote by 40,000.

Faulkner's Unionist Party only obtained 20,754 votes - a mere 3%.

On

the basis of the October result, the U.U.U.C. would win an outright
majority

in the Convention elections.

The middle ground which had

created power-sharing and Sunningdale had gone - Northern Ireland had
reverted

back to sectarian politics.

After the election

Fitt

remarked:
I hope the Loyalists do not see the vote as a mandate to say there
will be no partnership between the communities. I hope they will
use their position to try to take whatever steps they can to
recognise that there are two communities and that both must work
together if there is to be any future for this province. 65
There was

little confidence within the S.D.L.P., however, that

this hope would materialise.
October also saw an increase in sectarian attacks on Catholics
from the Ulster Protestant Action Force, with 10 killed in a month.
Fitt,

speaking in advance of a meeting with Wilson in which he was to

ask for emergency measures to

halt the murders said, "People are

being murdered going to and from their work ...

We are now at the

stage where members of the public are afraid to be on the streets of
Belfast."

He maintained that he would plead on behalf of all the

decent people of Northern Ireland, Catholic and Protestant:
I am not

being selective.

All these killings have got to stop
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otherwise there is no hope for Northern Ireland. There must be
fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters who know the identify of
these murderers and are harbouring them. Surely, they can see
that only they, the community, can reject them and stop Northern
Ireland bleeding to death. 66
Rees

appealed,

"I

am calling once again on all responsible

leaders of every section of opinion to give practical support to the
R.U.C.

in their fight

against criminal

violence." 67

Although

not specified, Rees' appeal would have been directed primarily at the
s.D.L.P.

Fitt and his colleagues did not respond.

As the

P.I.R.A.

assassinations,

campaign continued

the pressure

in

tandem with Loyalist

increased for the S.D.L.P.

active support to the police.

to lend

Hume had shaped a policy advocating

that nationalists must have a role in government before the S.D.L.P.
would fully endorse the R.U.C. 68 At the end of October he still
insisted that the R.U.C. were not acceptable to his party, although
he felt

it necessary to tell

difference

of

opinion

suggests that there

between

the

Irish News
himself

and

that there was no
Fitt. 69

probably was some disagreement.

been leader but Hume was pulling the strings.

This

Fitt may have

On the following day,

the S.D.L.P. Assembly Party reaffirmed the party's stance. 70
In November the S.D.L.P's Executive committee endorsed the stand
taken on policing by the party's assemblymen.
position

known

through

public statements

Fitt did not make his

to the press.

I would

suggest he was again conforming to party dictates.
Despite the S.D.L.P.
endeared itself to

stance on the police issue, it had not

republicans.

For example, when it was announced

that both party and public representatives were to visit the Maze
Prison,

which

mid-October,

had

been the location of some severe rioting in

republican inmates told them to "stay away.

You are not

r
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welcome."
Fitt was singled out for particular criticism:
leader,

"The party

Gerry Fitt has never visited the camp and therefore knows

nothing of the conditions even though he claims to be the all-time
expert,

when speaking

in parliament.

This is pure hypocrisy and

should be recognised as such." 71
In parliament, however, Fitt was receiving plaudits from British
politicians

for

a

speech

which was considered moderate and

He actually accepted a watering down of the Irish

courageous.
dimension:

I concede that the Irish dimension that we envisage may not
initially or in the short term have anything approaching what we
had under the Sunningdale Agreement - a Council of Ireland. I
shall continue to work for such an establishment. If people in
Northern Ireland learn to live together, it will be essential for
some means to be found to enable the Northern Ireland majority,
both Catholic and Protestant, to communicate with the rest of the
people in the small island of Ireland.
Fitt also made a claim which was contrary to fact, "I have never
in this House or in Northern Ireland - nor has any member of my party
condemned the R.U.C.

in total

was straying from S.D.L.P. policy.
considerable

consternation

as being unacceptable."n Fitt
Such speeches would have caused

amongst

his

colleagues.

The

responsibilities of leading a democratic party did not sit easily
with Fitt.

Individualism was fine and workable in the circumstances

he found himself in the 1960s, but the 1970s had produced different,
and in many ways more complex circumstances.

A street politician was

no longer required.
The P.I.R.A.
strike.

had been far from idle since the end of the U.W.C.

It had witnessed the re-election of the Labour government,

Which the P.I.R.A.

felt had surrendered to force during the strike.
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In an attempt to compel
Ireland,

the Provisionals embarked on a campaign of violence in
In July,

England.

many seriously,
October,

the British to finally disengage from

a woman was killed and 36 people were injured,

by a no-warning bomb in the Tower of London.

In

5 people were killed and 54 injured when no-warning bombs

exploded at two pubs
Woolwich,

in Guildford.

In early November, a bomb in

outside London, killed two more.

Finally, on November 21,

two bombs in Birmingham killed 21 and injured a further 182.
their denials,
nationalist

there was an upsurge of anti-Provisional feeling in

areas

As a result,

Despite

Ireland due to this carnage. 73

in Northern

the Provisional

leadership was receptive to a peace

initiative launched by a group of Protestant clergymen led by the Rev
William Arlow, Secretary of the Irish Council of Churches.
A few leading republicans met the churchmen on December 10, 1974
at Smyth's village hotel

in Feakle, County Clare.

The republican

group made it clear that they were prepared to discuss a cessation of
violence and contacts were made immediately after this meeting with
the Northern
signalled
day,

Ireland Office.

On December 19, the Labour government

its willingness to proceed with talks and on the following

the P.I.R.A. council announced that it would suspend operations

over an

II day period between December 22 and January 2.

Fitt

greeted the ceasefire:
I welcome this announcement. Under any circumstances it is to be
welcomed if it means there will be even a temporary respite from
the murders and the bombings in the terrorist campaign.
I
fervently hope and pray that it will be continued and that we will
see an end to this campaign which we have witnessed for the past
five years. 74
1974 thus ended with some optimism.
On January 2,

1975 the Provisionals announced that they would
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extend their Christmas ceasefire by 14 days.

Fitt warned:

If after the period of ceasefire, ... anyone in the P.I.R.A. was
insane enough to order the resumption of hostilities· then
thousands of lives would be lost in a period of violence much
worse than anything experienced up to the present. In such a
situation the I.R.A. would have no support. 75
The Provisional's extension had been the result of indications
from the Northern
proposals

Ireland Office that they would consider their

- an end to internment in the near future and a withdrawal

of British troops to barracks - if the ceasefire was extended for a
further two weeks.

The British innuendo, however, was not endorsed

by any tangible gesture and the truce was allowed to lapse.
been correct

in predicting a negative reaction in nationalist areas

to the resumption of the campaign.
marches

Fitt had

This was reflected by peace

in Belfast and Dublin on January 19 and further such

gatherings

in Londonderry and Newry at the end of the month.

consequence,

As a

contact was re-established between the Provisionals and

the British government.
Rees was
political
that

intent on trying to draw the Provisionals into the

process and on February 5 in the House of Commons he said

if they ceased offensive operations, the army would be gradually

reduced to peacetime levels and eventually withdrawn to barracks.
also

suggested

considered
Ireland. 77
an

that

internment could be phased out. 76

it the most
On

Rees

important speech he had made on Northern

February 10,

indefinite ceasefire.

He

the Provisional

On February 11,

army council began
Rees

announced that

"incident centres" were to be set up in various parts of the
province,

ostensibly to monitor the ceasefire.

The centers, were set

up in existing Provisional Sinn Fein Offices where possible, and were
supplied with telex machines and telephones

- compliments of the
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Northern

Ireland Office.

The prestige of the republican movement, as

expressed by the Provisionals, had been greatly enhanced.
While

these developments evolved,

dismayed by the apparent preferential
In mid-January,

Provisionals.
peace

negotiations

between

looked on,

treatment offered to the

Fitt had spoken out against direct
the

Provisionals and the British

"That would prove that people could bomb their way to

government:

Conference Table." 78

the

the S.D.L.P.

It is

ironic that

in the previous

August Fitt had talked with the U.D.A. whose association with the
U.V.F.

was well

known.

He made a distinction between republican

paramilitaries and loyalist counterparts.
The establishment of the "incident centres" created further
tension between the S.D.L.P. and Rees.

At Westminster, Fitt asked:

Will he give, through me, to my constituents an understanding that
in any talk about policing or law and order in the areas
concerned, the elected representatives will be listened to before
the Provisional Sinn Fein spokesman? 79
He told a Belfast Telegraph reporter:
On the one hand, the government is saying that it is designed to
prevent a breakdown of the ceasefire, but the I.R.A. on the other
hand, are claiming that it gives them further recognition. This
is something which will have to be clarified by the government.
Elected representatives on either side - whether they be unionist
or S.D.L.P. - would certainly object to any influence given to
parliamentary organisations which have been rejected at the ballot
box. 80
Rees'

apparent placation of the Provisionals stemmed from a

desire to create a stable environment for the Convention elections.
Hume

had

re-affirmed the S.D.L.P.

position at the party

conference in January:
The central element in our philosophy is that the evils of our
society derive from the divisions which can be resolved in one of
two ways - by one side trying to dominate the other, or as we do,
by abandoning the path of conflict and trying the road that has
never really been tried, the way of partnership. It is simple,
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clear, sensible and constructive and is the essential principle of
our whole analysis. We would be abandoning our total approach if
we abandoned the Irish dimension.
Fitt made his customary appeal to Protestants "who may have had
fears

and differences with the S.D.L.P.", to have the courage to take

the possibly dangerous course of joining "this socialist party and
helping to evolve
party,

its policy."

I would not

be

its

He added, "If this was a Catholic

leader.

It is a socialist party." 81

Fitt's grip of reality must be questioned.
suggest the S.D.L.P.
had one

was not a Catholic party was the fact that it

Protestant founding member, Ivan Cooper.

to the

The media referred

"mainly Catholic S.D.L.P." but the party would have been hard

pressed to produce substantial
essence,
in

The only evidence to

or any Protestant membership.

In

the S.D.L.P. represented, in a practical sense, the majority

the Catholic community who disapproved of the

campaign.

Provisionals

Fitt refused to acknowledge that Protestants would not

vote or join the S.D.L.P. because they knew that if they did, this
would

not

be

orientation,

interpreted

as

indicative of their socialist

but of their support for a united Ireland.

As a result,

the Protestant community steered well clear of the S.D.L.P., ensuring
that the party remained a Catholic sectarian party.
After the October 1974 parliamentary election results,

the

S.D.L.P.

did not approach the Convention election with much hope of

success.

The conference had voted for a strong Irish dimension as a

pre-requisite for the return of the S.D.L.P. to Executive government
and this was

reflected in the party manifesto "Speak with Strength"

formulated for the Convention elections.

It stated:

There is an Irish dimension to the problem. There is a British
dimension to the problem. Any solution must take account of both.
The principles on which our solution is based take account of both
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dimensions,
as well as the most important Northern Ireland
dimension itself, and do in fact command the most widespread
acceptance among the people of these islands. 82
.
Fitt displayed some optimism, "If I thought the Convention was
going to break down

in a couple of weeks we would not be fighting

Such optimism was misplaced for the U.U.U.C.

this election."~

manifesto was virtually the antithesis of the S.O.L.P's - calling for
majority rule and no interference in Northern Ireland's affairs from
Dublin.

Provisional

Sinn Fein called on nationalist voters to

boycott the election arguing that the Convention experiment was
futile.
Provisional
Andersonstown

Sinn Fein claimed that 53% of the people of
would

boycott

the Convention election but Fitt

dismissed this claim:
I think Sinn Fein are inclined to take themselves much too
seriously;
certainly more seriously than anyone else is prepared
to take them in either the North or West Belfast constituencies.
It is absolutely laughable that the poll which they allege they
have conducted should have shown that 53 per cent of the people in
Andersonstown were not prepared to vote. I would like to know who
these people are as I understand from my colleagues that our own
canvass returns indicate overwhelming support and that the
S.O.L.P. can win four seats. 84
At this juncture, Fitt was clearly confident of his position and
that of the S.D.L.P. in Belfast.
assurance,

Ten days after this expression of

the Irish News reported that Gerry Adams, a former Brigade

commander in the P.I.R.A.
Belfast seat,

who would eventually contest Fitt's West

was given a three year sentence for attempting to

escape from Long Kesh in July, 1974.
As the election grew nearer, Fitt told the Belfast Telegraph:
There can be no running away from our obligations in this election
- the whole future of this country depends on it. There is no
such thing as a no vote for that will be a vote for Loyalist
ascendancy and for domination politics to continue. That can only
lead to a continuation of bitterness and dissension. 85
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Provisional

Sinn

Fein continued

its attacks on the S.D.L.P.,

claiming:
Parties like the S.D.L.P. which crawl to this conference table
will be indulging in masochistic ritual self-humiliation
There is nothing for the Catholic people of the six counties in
the proposed Convention and the S.D.L.P. knows it. They have gone
one step too far, and have left the electorate behind.B 6
The election results

showed that the boycott had failed to win

many converts from the S.D.L.P.
only 4,000 less than the high
result
But

in

the

The party received 156,000 votes,
in 1973.

This drop, however, did

loss of two seats from the nineteen in the Assembly.

the S.D.L.P.

could claim that it had maintained its political

mandate and Fitt topped the poll in North Belfast.
The U.U.U.C.

had 46 members elected to the Convention, thus

having a substantial

majority over the opposition.

After the

election Fitt remarked, "If we do not find the solution this time, we
could find the world watching a lot of dead people here."B 7
On May 8, 1975 the Northern Ireland Convention members began the
job of finding
Rees'

an acceptable political future for Northern Ireland.

hope was that they could devise a system of government which

would have the most widespread
opening address,

acceptance in the country.

In his

Fitt once more established the S.D.L.P's commitment

to an Irish dimension:
again I must say that however evocative, emotional or
frustrating the term may be, there is an Irish dimension to
Northern Ireland and its problems. We all live on this island and
if we are ever to eradicate violence from these shores it must be
done in co-operation with all those governments and authorities
who have the power to do so. From that one viewpoint alone, I
would suggest that there is a clearly defined Irish dimension.
This is not the time to go into all the contentious issues that
will be discussed later at the Convention but I think it is right
to put on record my feeling at this time.BB
It

is difficult to ascertain to what extent these "feelings"
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were his own, or those of his party.

What is certain is that such a

stance bode badly for the Convention's prospects of success .. If as
could be expected,

Fitt was merely mouthing party dictates, he was

guilty of lack of conviction

u.u.u.c.

in his own political theories.

The

candidates were pledged to reject power-sharing in any shape

or form and they were emphatically against an Irish dimension.

As

the Convention approached its summer recess, there were few signs of
progress

and

informal

inter-party talks

in August also proved

fruitless.
Meanwhile,

Fitt

had

been the lone voice at Westminster

complaining about British co-operation with the Provisionals.

He

maintained that such relations would give the P.I.R.A. respectability
in the urban ghettos. 89

He also kept up his incessant attacks

on the "men of violence."

Speaking at the inaugural meeting of the

new S.D.L.P. branch in South Antrim he said:
Make no mistake about it but the murdering gangs who are now
rampant have one ambition only - to wreck the Convention and thus
keep the community in turmoil. The wild men must be rejected both
by the politicians and by the people otherwise the future will be
very dark indeed. 90
Fitt was prompted to continue these criticisms because of
ceasefire problems for the republicans.

The ceasefire was only

formally with the army and the R.U.C., and the P.I.R.A. reserved the
right

to

protect

the

nationalist

community.

However,

the

organization could not always maintain complete discipline, and many
Provisionals who were unhappy with the cessation of hostilities
embarked on maverick missions, sectarian violence thus continued.

On

July 31, the U.V.F. members murdered three of the Miami Showband near
the border.
P.I.R.A.

On August 15, 5 people were killed and 40 injured in a

attack on a pub in the Shankill

Road

in Belfast.

On

219
September 1,

four

Protestants were killed outside their Orange Hall

in South Armagh.
It was

in this atmosphere that the talks between the S.D.L.P.

and U.U.U.C.

were taking place.

Such events were not at all

conducive to any concessions on power-sharing however,and the talks
collapsed.

The unionist majority pushed its own report through and

the S.D.L.P. effectively ceased to participate.

The Convention wound

up in early November with the unionist report of majority rule its
main proposal

but the British government refused to accept such a

hardline recommendation.

During the Convention's final debate Fitt

said that the institution had at least identified "those members who
were prepared to try and find

a solution and those who were

not. 1191 Indefinite direct rule loomed large.
While the Convention was now in almost total disarray, the truce
between the British and the Provisionals had become increasingly
meaningless and

it was clearly evident to all sides that the truce

had effectively ended.
announced that

"special

Rees made it official on November 4, when he
category status" was to cease. 92

The

British had decided to adopt the criminalisation approach to Northern
Ireland and the Provisionals were to be presented as thugs and
gangsters.

The process was completed on November 12, when Rees

announced that the Incident Centres were to be closed. 93
At the end of November,
conference.

the S.D.L.P.

held its fifth annual

Fitt claimed that nine of the ten unionist M.P's were

engaged in trying to bring about total integration of the North with
Britain.
political

It was a perturbed conference.

At previous conferences

initiatives beckoned, the Assembly election, the formation

of the power-sharing Executive and the Convention elections.

All had
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failed and there seemed no instrument available which the party could
use to

influence the British government.

however.

On December 5, internment ended.

had always been a thorn
undermined

its

There was one bright spot
Detention without trial

in the S.D.L.P's side, and consistently
Internment's

credibility.

termination

was

understandably welcomed by Fitt:
I am thankful that the evil scourge of internment has been brought
to an end.
From the very second of its inception, we recognised
the political disaster that it would be, antagonising as it did
the entire Catholic community.
Thousands and thousands of the
minority were alienated by the imposition of this scourge of their
fellow co-religionists.
People who, in normal circumstances,
would give no support whatsoever to any men of violence felt
themselves alienated from every political institution in Northern
Ireland. After four and a half years of personal tragedy to those
who were interned, and particularly their wives and families, we
have now come to the end of an era in our political
development. 95
At Westminster Fitt told Rees:

"Now that we have got rid of the

running sore of detention, I and my colleagues will do everything in
our power to involve the minority community in your attempt to reject
the gunmen there." 96
1976 continued in violent fashion, January being a particularly
turbulent month.

On the 4th,

Loyalists killed five Catholics in

South Armagh while on the following day Republicans shot dead ten
Protestants.

These victims had been on a bus and the only Catholic

present had been told to stand aside.

Fitt condemned both deeds:

There are no words in any language which could adequately express
the shock, revulsion and anger I feel at the barbaric crimes
committed in Co. Armagh.
I hope to God the people who know the
identity of these murderers will take the necessary steps to rid
them from our midst. I would also make an appeal to all those who
would listen to my voice not to think for a second of revenge.
This can only bring further tragedy. 97
Rees,
underway.

becoming

increasingly desperate, again tried to get talks

In mid-January he announced at Westminster that the
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convention was to be reconvened from February 3.
an

Irish News reporter if he felt

s.o.L.P. position.

Rees'

Fitt was asked by

move had bolstered the

He answered:

I would not want to say he has bolstered the S.D.L.P. position
because that might create antagonism. The Secretary of State had
however, reinforced the S.D.L.P. view that there would be no
return to a devolved government on the lines of the old Stormont
but that there would be a government which would embrace both
communities. 98
On the day planned for the U.U.U.C. - S.D.L.P. talks, Frank
Stagg,

an

I.R.A.

hunger-striker in a British prison died.

He had

gone on hunger-strike to demand special category status and a return
As a consequence, there was

to Ireland to serve his sentence.
considerable violence
just as

in West Belfast and other Catholic areas, and

in the previous August, the atmosphere was not conducive to

compromise.

On this same day, the S.D.L.P., perhaps fearing a loss

of support to more extreme republicans,
claiming that U.U.U.C.

withdrew from the talks

were not prepared to discuss power-sharing.

On March 5, the failure of the Convention was officially acknowledged
when Westminster formally dissolved it.
as to who had scuppered progress:
for the downfall
this

House,

the

Fitt was under no illusions

"The man personally responsible

of the Convention was none other than a Member of
hon.

Member

for

Antrim,

North,

Mr.

Ian

Paisley. "99
A strong
March 5,

indication of a collapsed middle ground came with the

1976 dissolution of the Convention;

for most people direct

rule was the second best solution.
The post-Executive period would have been a difficult time for
the S.D.L.P.

Despite individual party members voicing more militant

opinions and the S.D.L.P./McManus deal

over participation in the
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Fermanagh

- South Tyrone constituency, the S.D.L.P. did not radically

change its politics.
made

The fact that the British government had failed

it tempting to revert to republican orthodoxy and adopt a line

similar to the old Nationalist Party.

However, the S.D.L.P. was

committed to constitutionalism and thus compromise and agreed to
participate in the Convention.
In its eight month existence the Constitutional
accomplished nothing.
the

The S.D.L.P's twin aims of power-sharing and

Irish dimension had been rejected.

looked bleak and

Convention

The future of the party

it was outside all forums, with the exception of

their one M.P., Fitt, at Westminster.
Fitt's rhetoric had upheld the S.D.L.P's aspiration for an Irish
dimension.

If,

as could be expected, he was not as committed to it

as some of his colleagues,

his reservations were veiled.

It is

probable that he tried to dampen down S.D.L.P. nationalism.
The period after the Executive again saw the Labour Party
disappoint Fitt.
importance

Despite all his pleadings, Rees had belittled the

of

elected

Provisionals.
terminated,

When

representatives by bargaining with the
"special

category status" was eventually

it was too late, since the P.I.R.A. had gained further

credibility.

The ending of internment also came too late for the

S.D.L.P. to gain any benefit.
Fitt continued to urge Protestants to join the S.D.L.P., but his
unstinting claim that his was a socialist not a Catholic Party fell
on deaf ears.
Provisionals.

He was likewise unstinting in his attacks on the
In November 1975,

he claimed that the "Provos had

sullied the name of republicanism and had dragged the Irish Tricolour
and

the

Starry

Plough

into

the gutter. 11100

However,

the
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Provisionals

were a reality,

infancy,

they were waiting

s.D.L.P.

failures.

s.D.L.P.

in

the

and,

although

in their political

in the wings ready to capitalise on

It was significant that the two seats lost by the
Convention elections were

in the republican

strongholds of South Armagh and South Derry.
In May 1975, Fitt's leadership of the party was assured when he
re-elected. 101

was

Ciaren McKeown reported on the S.D.L.P's

fifth annual conference in November 1975:
Familiarity with their leaders has brought respect rather than
contempt. And Gerry Fitt, with that unique blend of humanity, wit
and native intelligence which is the secret of his political
flair, has no serious rivals for the leadership. There is, of
course, a residual faction of the more academic or formal, whose
instincts are for a more controllable leader, but he can usually
make them laugh too. Shortly after acknowledging an outstanding
ovation for an address in which he had them laughing and cheering
he was jokingly asked "so it looks as if you're going to stay in
the party for another while, Gerry? "Aye, as long as its going my
way", he replied.
There is more than a grain of truth in the
observation that if the time ever comes when he is totally happy
with the party, either he will be finished or the party
will. 102
McKeown's comment was prophetic.
S.D.L.P.
gains

was to change,
to

boast of.

In the years to come, the

and after six years, they had no tangible
The shift

in direction would see Fitt

increasingly isolated and eventually lead to his resignation.
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CHAPTER VI
ISOLATION AND RESIGNATION
On October 28,
have always

1975,

Fitt had told the Belfast Telegraph:

"I

identified myself with the Labour Party since I was

elected

I cannot foresee any situation in which I would lend my

support to the defeat of the present government." 1
By March

1979,

he had radically altered his position and was

prepared to allow a Conservative administration to gain power.
told the

same newspaper,

government
those

in

of

Fitt felt
was

certainly will not support the Labour

a vote of confidence.

Northern

My constituents interests and
"2

Ireland must be paramount

Clearly,

that circumstances had changed to such an extent that it

necessary

to

subordinate his

nationalist posture.
from the S.D.L.P.,
become

"I

He

The
in the

in his opinion,

socialist

inclination to a

irony of this is that Fitt was to resign
same period,

too nationalist.

on the basis that it had
This chapter will account

for this paradox.
Although the British Labour Party had improved its position in
the October,
overall
Fitt

1974,

majority
and

election by gaining eighteen seats, its

in the House of Commons was only three.

indeed

"Independents."

general

Frank

Maguire

It seemed that

were

considered

Therefore,
important

Fitt was intent on supporting the

socialist policies of the Labour Party as he had done since 1966.
week after the failure of the Convention he claimed:
the present

A

"However harsh

Labour government may have shown itself to be over the

expenditure cuts,

they are

infinitely preferable to a government

which might be led by Mrs. Thatcher 3 and her cohorts." 4
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When James Callaghan took over the premiership from Harold
Wilson

in

April

1976,

Fitt

retained

his

belief that the

administration would remain committed to finding an agreement between
both communities within the context of Northern Ireland. 5
By the end of April, however, he had changed his tune and told
the Labour Party Whips that his support in the lobbies could not be
taken for granted.
the

belief

that

He felt that the government was being lulled into
direct

rule

was

an

acceptable short-term

solution. 6
Fitt was

looking for some political assurances about Northern

Ireland policy from the new prime minister before renewing his
loyalty to Labour,
4,

and in the following week received them.

On May

he met Callaghan to discuss his concern about government policy.

During this meeting, he was apparently told that there was no change
in Labour policy and afterwards said:
Beforehand I was concerned that the government might have been
tempted to swallow the view put around by some unionist
politicians - particularly Mr Enoch Powell 7 - that nothing
should be done in Northern Ireland in the hope that total
integration would be acceptable as a solution. I am convinced
that it is not a solution and never will be. 8
At this juncture an abstention by Fitt would not be crucial but
the episode does show where his allegiance lay.

On this occasion,

his misgivings were mollified but, as we have seen, there was to be
another occasion in the future when this was not so.
While Fitt was occupied at Westminster, his S.D.L.P. colleagues
had ample time to dwell on their redundant political status and some
of them began to question fundamental party principles.
In
Ireland,

June,

Paddy Devlin argued for an

independent Northern

maintaining that the advantage would be to remove the
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British presence and thus the cause for republican paramilitary
violence.

"negotiated

The

independence"

idea would promote

reconciliation and "allow Northern Ireland to develop and prosper as
an

entity." 9

independent

Fitt

totally rejected negotiated

independence claiming only reconciliation between the majority and
minority communities
progress. 10

He

in the North offered the hope of real political
feared

Catholic

political

domination

by

Protestants.
Fitt

continued

to

clash

with

the

Tory opposition at

Westminster.

The Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland was

Airey Neave,

who was extremely critical of government policy in the

province.
policy

Neave advocated a military solution.
towards

"half-hearted",

guerilla

warfare

in

He criticised Labour

Northern

Ireland

as

and demanded that "They should go on the offensive,

and declare war on the terrorists now."

Fitt argued that any

military solution that would be sought in the event of a Tory
government coming into power would bring nothing but tragedy and
disaster to Northern Ireland. 11
Although

it had been the Conservatives who had abolished

Stormont and formulated the Sunningdale experiment, while successive
Labour administrations had frustrated
point,

avidly anti-Tory.

Fitt,

he was still, at this

His naive faith

in the Labour Party

persisted and his allegiance to socialism clouded his judgement in
relation to what Tory or Labour governments might or indeed did offer
Northern Ireland.
Despite Fitt's vociferous campaigning at Westminster against any
military solution,

there were elements in the nationalist community

who were increasingly turning against him.

This was largely a result
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of his criticism of the P.I.R.A.
anniversary of internment,

On August 9, the day of the fifth

Fitt was forced to hold an angry mob at

bay with a revolver after they had burst into his home.
wife,

Ann,

remained

and daughter Geraldine were treated for shock.
characteristically

throughout my political
1

He, his

might die,

intimidated.

have taken a stand

life I am opposed to violence in all forms.

my wife might die,
I

"I

defiant.

Fitt

will

go

but

I am not going to be

on saying what

I believe to be

right. "12
He described the ordeal in the Irish News:
I picked up my gun and went to the bedroom door and there they
were standing at the top of the stairs. I pointed the gun at them
and said:
Move, get down the stairs or you're dead. They began
backing off and I followed them down the stairs until I was
standing at the bottom holding them at bay in the hall ... If I
hadn't had a gun, I'm sure I would be dead now. I don't think
they would have shot me, but they would probably have kicked me to
death . 13
The following day he again attacked the Provisionals:
way the Provisional

I.R.A.

can be defeated

population standing together and rejecting them.

is

"The only

by the Catholic

The Catholic people

must make their voices heard against violence and intimidation ...
The I.R.A. will not be driving me out." 14
Reaction to the attack was predictably mixed.

Protestants,

though they were sympathetic with the Fitts', took issue with his
stand on the R.U.C.

Ulster, newspaper of the U.D.A. declared:

Yes, Mr Fitt we condemn this cowardly attack on your home by
republican scum.
But we also condemn the way you used the T.V.
and newspapers to go police bashing.
(Fitt had called for an
inquiry into why calls for help to the R.U.C. and army went
unheeded).
You cannot expect law and order in either Catholic or
Protestant areas if you do not fully support those who carry it
out.
The amount of Loyalists and Protestants behind the wire at
present proves that the police are doing their duty impartially
~ut as long as you advocate that the police will not be accepted
in Catholic areas you only leave the Catholic supporters at the
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mercy of republican scum who by force and intimidation regard
themselves as the rightful heroes of Irish destiny. 15
The Orange Standard,

in a tone of patrionising irony, deplored

the publicity for the incident in which no fatalities occurred.

In

contrast to the recent death of an R.U.C. constable killed by the
I.R.A.

that

elicited

flowers

no

from

Prime

Minister

Callaghan. 16
These publications contrasted sharply with English newspapers
which showered him with praise.

The Daily Mirror served once again

to reinforce unflattering stereotypes of the Irish by asking, quite
fatuously in retrospect:
What were the mob remembering this time? It could have been the
anniversary of the day King Billy's garter snapped. Or the day
Daniel O'Connell had his wisdom teeth removed.
It's all the same to the gangs who rampaged through Belfast on
Sunday night and the bully boys who forced their way into Mr
Fitt's home. 17
In a similar vein, The Sun suggested:
August is for holidays in the rest of Britain. In Ulster
the month of the terrorist and the hooligan. If there is
any hope for the battered province it can only come - in the
of the couraqeous Belfast M.P. Gerry Fitt - from standing
intimidation. 1~

it is
to be
words
up to

The tabloid press were not the only mediam to express admiration
of Fitt; The Guardian did likewise:
That Gerry Fitt lived to tell his story yesterday may well have
been due to his courage and to the gun which - reluctantly - he
has kept by his side, knowing how totally exposed he has been over
the past few years to the retribution of those who seek solutions
in Ireland wholly by terror and destruction. 19
The Tory Daily Mail devoted a whole page article to the incident
entitled

"The

defiant family

Fitt declare:

We will

not be

moved." 20
The British media had always been sympathetic to Fitt after his
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injury sustained
1970s,

in

Londonderry

in October 1968.

Throughout the

he had been presented as a man of moderation faced with

overwhelming odds.

This latest incident served to endear him further

with the journalists of Fleet Street.

The right wing British press

was quite prepared to exploit Fitt for propaganda purposes.
The day after the attack on Fitt's home,
P.I.R.A.
control
day,
first
28,

a member of the

was shot dead by soldiers pursuing his car which went out of
and

killed the three children of Mrs. Ann Maguire.

The next

the "Northern Ireland Peace People" movement was born.

At their

rally on August 14, some 10,000 people marched while on August
this number doubled.

Numbers grew as

Protestants joined the movement.

both Catholics and

Fitt welcomed their appearance:

No politician worthy of the name can now show less courage than
that seen in our streets within recent weeks by women and men.
Politicians must now listen to the clear voice of their own
constituents which has united with that of their political
opponents in a demand for action along the lines indicated by
them. 21
War-weariness and the media ensured that the movement found a
very receptive audience.
not to "go political",
identified

with

violence.

In short,

Paddy Devlin had warned the Peace People
but the movement became more and more

condemning Provisional

but not Security Force

the movement became anti-republican.

Kevin

Kelly describes the reason for the crusade's demise:
If nothing else, the Peace People proved that no public group can
possibly be non-political.
Even when an organization claims not
to be interested in economic or social debates, it is necessarily
taking a political position - one that favours the established
order by default.
It was this wilfully ignored factor that
ultimately caused the movement to peter-out less than one year
after that hot August afternoon in 1976. 22
Fitt himself came to realise the political realities of the
situation:
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I repeat that the S.D.L.P. wants to see every success visited upon
the Peace Movement in Northern Ireland, but at the end of the day
political decisions will have to be taken, and I know that the
people who are marching in support of peace will have to depend on
their elected representatives.
I only hope that I will be
one. 23
At the
officials

beginning of September, the British government changed

in

the Northern

Callaghan to replace

Ireland Office,

Rees,

the man chosen by

Roy Mason, personified the policy shift

towards criminalisation of the
He told me:

"disastrous."

and

Fitt considered it

Provisionals.

"Mason was arrogant and bumptious.

The

way he spoke on the T.V. was even driving me into the arms of the
I.R.A.

I was even beginning to think they were right.

S.D.L.P.

to

become more green

arrogant manner." 24
more readily with

- more nationalist - because of his

Fitt's remark suggests that
the

He drove the

he

identified

"green wing" of the S.D.L.P. during Mason's

tenure in Northern Ireland.
Mason

is

a very direct Yorkshireman, a coal miner at 14, and

very much on the
appointment

right wing of the

Labour Party.

Before his

he held a position in the Ministry of Defence.

He was to

implement a series of measures designed to crush the Provisionals,
and he showed

little

Fitt's opinion

has changed little.

he

commented:

"He

interest

is

upset at the arrangement
This shows that
differences

an

in promoting political initiatives.
On the night of the assignation

anti-Irish wee get", 25 and was

that

he refused to even meet Mason. 26

there was a personal

between the two men.

particularly enamoured of Fitt.

so

element

For his

in the political

part,

Mason was not

In a recent television interview he

described

Fitt

as being "like a tap, he can switch on and switch off

and

can

turn

he

from

hot to cold." 27

The relationship,
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despite their similar backgrounds, was at best acrimonious, and such
an unharmonious liaison was detrimental for Northern Irish politics.
The unionists,

conversely,

were delighted with the new man, who it

was thought would listen to the army and emphasise security. 28
In response to Mason's appointment,

issued a

"The first thing the British government must

statement declaring:
now do

the S.D.L.P.

is state bluntly what are their intentions, both short-term

and long-term, for the future of Northern Ireland."

It also asked if

the British were hiding behind the Loyalist veto:
When the British government repeatedly underline their guarantees
to the unionist population of membership of the United Kingdom,
are these guarantees unconditional?
Are there any terms to be
fulfilled in order to retain membership of the United Kingdom? If
so, what are they?
If not, is a section of the unionist
population, a tiny percentage of the U.K. population, to have a
permanent veto on how Northern Ireland is to be governed within
the U.K.? 29
Mason did not reply.
S.D.L.P.

The tone of the statement showed that the

politicians felt that they were to be ditched.

turned to Dublin.

The party

A four-man delegation comprising Fitt, Devlin,

Hume and Currie urged the Irish government to impress upon Britain
the necessity for a new initiative to end the political deadlock in
the

North. 30

This

administration was still
Callaghan,
apart

from

like Mason,
sporadic

partnership government.

policy

proved

reluctant to

fruitless.
involve

Cosgrave's

itself again and

gave little priority to political advance
utterances that there would have to be
Fitt finally agreed to meet Mason in October

after an escalation in sectarian violence. 31
In Britain meanwhile, the Labour Party had been defeated in two
by-elections and consequently Fitt and Maguire attained a greater
importance

in a period when the government hoped to push some
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controversial

Bills through the Commons.

Maguire came close to

practising the abstentionist policy favoured by republicans and had
rarely attended at Westminster.

On this occasion, however, he was

believed to have told Labour Whips that he would turn up to vote with
the government.

Fitt explained his position:

As far as the two by-elections defeats are concerned, it will not
affect my view about the necessity to support the government on
this occasion.
On such socialist measures as pay beds, aircraft
and shipbuilding nationalisation and comprehensive education, I
will certainly be supporting the government. However, on other
matters - particularly those relating to Northern Ireland - I will
have to review the situation as it comes along. 32
On his election to Westminster in 1966, Fitt had simply demanded
British rights for the citizens of Northern Ireland.
1970s,

however,

By the mid

he had drawn a sharp distinction between British

politics and Northern Irish politics.
In the event, the two Irishmen duly came through for the Labour
Party - it won by a bare one majority vote on a motion to cut short
discussion on the Shipbuilding and Aircraft Nationalisation Bill.
The voting was 311 for the government, against 310 for the combined
opposition parties.

Afterwards Fitt reconfirmed his position:

I only hope to be able to continue my representations to a
socialist government on behalf of my constituents, but if the time
should ever arise when there appears to be a conflict between the
interests of a British government and the welfare of my
constituents, I will have no hesitation in placing that welfare in
first priority. 33
What did Fitt mean by the "welfare of his constituents"? We can
assume that

he wanted the benefits of British socialist measures but

at the same time he made

it clear that his socialism would be

subordinated to nationalist principles.

This posture is ironic when

we consider that, privately at least, Fitt felt S.D.L.P. nationalism
was too strident.
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At the S.O.L.P.

Party conference at the end of the year, the

frustrations which existed became apparent

and there was a clear

desire from some members for a change of direction.

An attempt to

challenge the policy of partnership government within the United
Kingdom was met by Fitt:

"In the end we will be proved right.

We

believe that our policy of partnership and reconciliation is the
correct one and that it is the only policy that will bring peace to
Ireland." 34

Northern

The motion was defeated but a significant

one-third of the delegates present voted for a proposal to refer back
a document on party policy drawn up by the Executive.

The voting was

70 in support of existing party policy and 32 to refer it back.
Paddy

Devlin

independence

and

again
was

raised
supported

representative for Armagh,
towards unity. 35

house"
"I

by

question
Seamus

of negotiated
Mallon,

S.D.L.P.

who considered it a "viable half way
Fitt was totally against this

cannot foresee the day when

independence for Northern

the

Ireland.

idea:

I would support the idea of
It would leave the Catholic

community in a very vulnerable position. 1136

By 147 votes to 51

the conference agreed that the party should make its own study of the
prospects of negotiated independence, although it was emphasised that
this

did

not mean that the party accepted the principle of

independence.

The Belfast Telegraph reported that Fitt would

reconsider his position if the party adopted
pol icy. 37

In the event,

intention of pulling out,

when

independence as a

it was seen that Mason had no

the attraction of the

idea lost its

momentum.
The most serious challenge to party policy was a resolution put
forward by Paddy Duffy,

S.D.L.P.

representative for mid Ulster,

239

calling for British withdrawal:
we have to realise that any settlement for the North will have to
be put to the people of the South in a referendum. The fact that
a British presence continues to be a referee between the two
sections of our community prevents us from getting together to
solve our problems. 38
Mallon supported the motion:

"We oppose the British presence.

This party fundamentally wants to see the end of British rule in this
part of Ireland." 39

Fitt,

Hume and Currie argued against the

mot ion. 40

In the event the motion was defeated by 158 votes to

111

the

but

result

national ism. 41

indicated a further swing to old-style

Furthermore,

of

the

17 S.D.L.P.

convention

members 10 voted for the motion, including Devlin and Cooper.
the party, irreconcilable attitudes were developing.

Within

The maintenance

of a cohesive political party would be a difficult task for Fitt and
the leadership.
This confused political

scenario extended into 1977 with Fitt

to urge Mason to adopt some form of initiative. 42

continuing
Mason was

unmoved

emphatically

by such promptings:

"I should not like to say

and dogmatically that there will

initiatives from Her Majesty's Government,

be no political

but I am not satisfied

is right or opportune." 43

Hume voiced opinion

about the consequences of political inertia:

"The terrible danger is

that the time

that if constitutional

political

parties such as the S.D.L.P. are

seen to be having no success,

people will

turn away in another

direction and the only direction being offered is the gun."«
The erection of political
communities
S.D.L.P.

structures which would involve both

in the government of the province was still
policy.

Conservatives

At a debate

basic

in

London organized by Young

in January, Fitt argued:

"Then and only then will the
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I.R.A.,

U.D.A.,

U.V.F.,

Red Hand Commandos 45 and all

the other

despicable organisations and their set of initials which mean so much
tragedy

the

to

of

Northern

Ireland,

fade

into

. . f.1cance. 1146
ins1gn1

In March,

Brian Faulkner was

killed

in a riding accident.

Faulkner was the only unionist leader who could have perhaps gained
enough public support to enable a power-sharing government to take
root and become a permanent feature of Northern Ireland politics.
Fitt was quick to pay tribute:
I was a political opponent of his for many years but I found him
to be a man of absolute honour and integrity in his approach to
trying to create a power-sharing community in Northern Ireland.
Those who still believe in power-sharing will sadly miss his
influence in this field because he was convinced this was the only
way ahead for Northern Ireland. 47
Even with
unlikely

that

resurrected.

Faulkner's considerable political skill, it is highly
the

concept

of power-sharing could have been

His death spelt its permanent demise.

Meanwhile,

Mason continued to strive for a military solution to

the problems of Northern Ireland.

He told the House of Commons that

the British government had the will to win the battle against the
LR.A.:

What is required ... is for us to point out that this is a battle
not only of propaganda but of wills, and that we have the will to
win.
If the people will back the R.U.C. in its endeavours they
will find out that it is beating the terrorists step by step. In
1976, 934 persons were convicted, on indictment of scheduled
offences.
It is by giving the R.U.C. encouragement, standing by
law and order, and being able to process people throuqh the Courts
as common criminals that we shall beat the terrorists.4'B
Fitt was certainly no friend of the Provisionals, yet he was
frustrated

at Mason's lack of endeavour to establish devolved

government in Northern
Labour Party.

Ireland,

yet he still remained loyal to the

Both he and Maguire voted with the government in a
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Tory motion of no-confidence,

on March 23.

This result was 322 to

298 in favour of the government which was helped by a pact with the
Liberal Party. 49
Despite all Mason's efforts against the Provisionals, Paisley
claimed that not enough was
called a strike,
Commons,

being done on the security front and

demanding tougher measures.

Fitt declared in the

"the gauntlet thrown down by the fascists

in Northern

Ireland should be picked up by this democratic parliament. 1150
The strike lacked the emotion of 1974.

On April 29, shipyard

workers voted not to support the stoppage;
Vanguard

Official Unionist,

and Orange Order leaders had already expressed their

opposition.

Mason refused to be coerced and used the army and police

to respond to allegations of intimidation.

On May 3, the first day

of the strike, many factories remained open.

On May 6, power station

workers

refused to support the stoppage and it was finally called off

on May 13, with the U.D.A. largely discredited.
that the strike had been a success.

Only Paisley claimed

On the previous day Fitt had

made his views on Paisley quite clear at Westminster when he stated
that

"the hon.

psychiatric

Member for Antrim North

treatment and that he

blamed. "51 By contrast,
News,

is

in urgent need of

is more to be pitied than

Fitt praised Mason and told the

Irish

"His conduct during the strike leads me to withdraw anything I

said when

he was appointed.

would not

be bullied." 52

He showed himself to be a person who

Fitt also went as

guarded tribute to the R.U.C.

far as to give

He said that their action during the

strike had done much to improve relations between themselves and the
Catholic community.
transition

He claimed also that there could be no overnight

in the way Catholics regarded the police but the R.U.C.
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had

done much to

"engender a new trust."~

caused some consternation among his
s.o.L.P.,
Fein.

Such sentiments

"greener" colleagues

but provoked outright hostility from

Provisional

in the
Sinn

A statement described Fitt's comment as "totally ridiculous"

and claimed:
In the two weeks that he refers to, approximatell 10 cases of
torture at the R.U.C. Barracks at Castlereagh 5 have been
reported to our offices. It is this performance that symbolises
the true role of the Loyalist R.U.C. As the armed wing of Ulster
unionism, their history has been to smash any opposition to
English and Loyalist rule in the six occupied counties, a role
seen very clearly in this past nine years. It is very obvious
that Mr Fitt is merely doing the British government's
work. 55
The extent to which Fitt's comments may have been detrimental to
the S.D.L.P.

were tested

in the local government elections held in

the week following the strike.

Fitt declared that the election was

an opportunity for both communities to make their attitude to the men
of violence patently clear. 56

He again contested Belfast area

'G', and topped the poll.

The S.0.L.P.

did well

in the election.

It increased its vote

from 13.8% in 1973 to 20.6% and gained an extra 30 seats moving from
83

to

113.

The S.0.L.P.

could now claim to be the sole

representative of the minority community.

Fitt was delighted with

the result:
I have been in politics for many years, long before many of the
major groups were on the scene and tonight I can say that I have
derived greater pleasure and satisfaction from being at this time
the leader of one of the most important parties in Northern
I rel and. 57
Such assertions suggested that Fitt was content within the
S.D.L.P.

and

Nevertheless,

comfortable

with

its

direction

and policies.

the extent to which the "tail was wagging the head" is

open to conjecture.
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The Official

Unionists performed badly

gained just under 30% of the vote.
and the D.U.P. 12%.
s.D.L.P.

The Alliance Party gained 14%,

Parties

should have encouraged the Unionist

links with Paisley and review its policies.

clearly desired an end to direct rule:
through

the election, and

Fitt maintained that the strong support for the

and Alliance

Party to sever its

in

He

"The only way forward is

reconciliation and a partnership government that can bring

back to Northern

Ireland most of the powers now held by Ministers

seconded here from London."~
On August

10,

the Queen

began a two day visit to Northern

Ireland as part of her Silver Jubilee celebrations.

Since attendance

at royal functions by members of the party would have stretched their
credibility with many supporters to breaking-point, this visit put
Fitt and the S.D.L.P.

in

an awkward position . The fact that the

Queen's coming coincided with the anniversary of internment did not
make things
S.D.L.P.

any easier.

Fitt was flippant:

getting such a letter,
it.

Fitt and other leading

members declined invitations to attend receptions connected

with the visit.

about

Consequently,

"I have a hazy recollection of

but I have not yet decided what I should do

However, I would say that it is not the highest on my list

of priorities."~
The Queen's
Afterwards

presence provoked some rioting

Fitt acknowledged that the Queen was

in West Belfast.
likely to be a

"decent human person" but suggested that the violence was a result of
"British royalty and the Union Jack always being identified with one
section of the community in Northern
is

Ireland. 1160

This comment

interesting when we consider Fitt's later elevation

peerage.

to the
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The S.D.L.P.

had managed to tread a fine line between de facto

and de jure recognition of the state.

On most issues, with the

exception of the police, they had avoided controversy but the royal
visit posed a special problem.

The party had to take some stand and

decided to cling to its nationalist principles.
He

from this policy.

Fitt did not stray

insisted that the Loyalist community had

adopted an attitude of intransigence and arrogance.

He added:

"All

our appeals have been rejected and some minority representatives are
beginning to feel a little tired when they are being lectured to make
further concessions to unionism.

We have given so much.

We are not

prepared to give any more." 61
The S.D.L.P.

had managed to remain united when it had some

prospect of power.

After the Jubilee celebrations no political

initiative was formulated

and party members became disillusioned.

Many of them increased the nationalist content of their political
rhetoric.

Fitt's militant posturing is an example of his attempt to

keep up with this drift.
As a consequence of rising S.D.L.P. nationalism, Paddy Devlin
resigned

the

Chairmanship

Representatives Council.
Policy

Committee document called

party

leadership

the

S.D.L.P's

Constituency

This move was in response to an S.D.L.P.

greater emphasis upon the
the

of

for

"Facing Reality",

Irish dimension. 62
relinquishing

which urged

Devlin castigated
the

"left-of-centre

principles" advocated at its formation:
With one or two notable exceptions, none of the leading members has
done anything to promote these policies since 1974, and little
enough before that.
In spite of the fact that we are confronted
with the worst figures of unemployment, poverty, housing and
general income levels in Western Europe we have rarely heard a
cheep of protest from men who a short time ago had ministerial
responsibility for those very departments. 63
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Devlin's dissatisfaction with S.D.L.P. policy was widely known
for some time.

As both Devlin and Fitt were founder members of the

the party.
s.D.L.P.,

His strong criticism thus led to his expulsion from

sharing an urban and labour background, one would have

expected them to be natural allies, but this was not the case.
claimed,

"They did not get on well

Hume

at all."~ Currie confirmed

this viewpoint:
It was an up and down relationship and depended upon how one of
them reacted to particular things and to particular personalities
at particular times. It was never an easy relationship. Gerry, to
large extent, felt that he had to be careful about Devlin because
after all, Devlin was in West Belfast and could have created
difficulties there. 65
Fitt himself admits that their relationship was not satisfactory,
and felt that Devlin resented his success in West Belfast:
Paddy was from the Falls Road. I was not. I was an import from
the other side of the city, coming in. I was like Jesus Christ on
the Falls Road and Paddy was bound to resent this. A quite natural
feeling.
He always had a bit of a chip on his shoulder. My
natural ally in the S.D.L.P. was Austin Currie. It should have
been Paddy.
We were together on most things but there was always
the personal thing. 66
Devlin

on the other hand maintains that

supported him in his stance. 67

Fitt should have

As Devlin provided most of the

socialist input into S.D.L.P. policy, and Fitt always professed that
he was a socialist above anything else,
backed Devlin.

He did not do so.

he should logically have

Fitt followed the nationalist swing

of the party and a week after Devlin resigned said:
If the Unionist majority in the North are determined to become more
Orange than ever before in pursuit of their own culture, then it is
only to be expected that the minority who are part of the majority
in this island will want to assert their culture. And that, in
short, means the Irish dimension will always be S.D.L.P.
policy. 68
Fitt was quite unequivocal.

There was no doubt that on this

occasion he subordinated his socialism to nationalism.
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With

the

resignation

of

Devlin,

Fitt became the only

socialist-orientated member of the leadership, and was thus further
isolated.

Rather than being a left of centre party committed to

integrating the Catholic community into a constitutional framework
the S.D.L.P.

became increasingly like a crypto - Republican Party.

By not backing Devlin (even though he probably agreed with him) Fitt
indicated that he was prepared to submit to this direction.

If his

nationalist rhetoric was articulated for party purposes more than
personal

conviction

(as evidence has suggested) he may have felt to

relinquish the leadership would end any chance he had of dampening
S.D.L.P. nationalism.
The
1977. 69

Irish

Independence Party

(1.1.P.),

was formed in October

This new party was a direct challenge to the S.D.L.P.,

its leading figures
Tyrone,

being former Unity M.P.

Frank McManus,

and Fergus McAteer, son of the Nationalist

Party leader and a Londonderry Councillor.
British withdrawal
outs."

The new party sought

and attacked the S.D.L.P.

It was felt

for Fermanagh/South

that

for continual "sell

it could be a threat to the S.D.L.P. in

republican-inclined areas owing to their more militant profile.
When the S.D.L.P.
November,

held their seventh annual

Fitt was surprisingly optimistic

conference in

- "For the first time

since 1974 and the fall of the Executive there is hope that political
progress

can

consensus. 1170

be

made

in governing Northern

Ireland through

He argued that he and his party were eager to

reach an accommodation with the unionists but he again stressed the
Irish dimension.

He claimed that the unionists "must not ask us to

wave Union Jacks or to pay homage to every member of the British
royal

family who visits these shores.

We also have our culture and
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our cherished ideals." 71
Fitt's speech may well

have been designed to placate the

"greener" members of the S.D.L.P., as well as being a counter-attack
against the

1.1.P.

The conference by-passed, however, a full demand

for British withdrawal.
dropped

in the interests of party unity, although Mallon, Cooper and

Duffy all
of

Three motions in favour of such a move were

spoke positively on their behalf. 72

the party had been defeated.

The "green wing"

Nevertheless,

the

increased

nationalist arguments within the party weakened Fitt's position as
leader.
Fitt's optimism at the conference was due to
Mason's plan to re-open political dialogue.

knowledge of

At the end of November,

Mason held talks with the major parties, on the basis of setting up
an Assembly with no legislative powers.
delegation

in the discussions:

Fitt led the S.D.L.P.

"There are no guarantees of success,

but at least we must explore the situation." 73
The portents for

success were not good.

Mason's approach was

half-hearted and both the S.D.L.P. and the unionists had adopted more
intransigent positions.

The unionists were aided by the new Premier

of the Republic, Jack Lynch, who stressed his commitment to eventual
unification after being relatively quiet on the Northern problem
since his re-election in June.

The talks failed.

Fitt had to end the year by contenting himself with the Labour
Party's assurance that they were still committed to power-sharing.
He reported his meeting with Callaghan and Mason to the Irish News:
Jim Callaghan told me that in no circumstances would a Labour
government enter into a pact with unionists from Northern Ireland
which would lead to the exclusion of the Catholic minority in
future government.
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These talks confirm the confidence the S.D.L.P. has always held in
the Labour government, and we now look forward to a series of
talks to further cement the relationship which our party has with
the Labour Party as members of the socialist movement. 74
He still retained a blind

Fitt's optimism was unjustified.
faith

in the Labour Party's capacity and willingness to rectify the

problems of Northern

All

Ireland.

too often,

dialogue and soothing words placated Fitt.
extremely difficult and frustrating

high ministerial

The year 1977 had been an

time for him and the S.D.L.P;

1978 would be no better.
The S.D.L.P. were then pushed into a further nationalist stance
by the Conservative Party,

keen to woo the unionists.

Airey Neave

told the Commons that "power-sharing was no longer practical," Fitt
quickly responded to the suggestion.

"Airey Neave is electioneering

and is seeking the support of the unionist M.P's at Westminster.

He

could get their support at the cost of further bloodshed." 75
Eddie McGrady,
Down,

S.D.L.P.

constituency representative for South

warned that the S.D.L.P.

intolerance,
re-appraise

intransigence
its

and

"in the face of new expressions of
insincerity,

approach to constitutional

must

immediately

problems." 76

Fitt

supported his colleague:
This is a natural reaction to what Airey Neave has said. Mr Neave
is coming out four-square for a return to majority rule in
Northern Ireland, which is fully backing the unionist line on
integration.
Under no circumstances would we be prepared to
accept that, and, by taking up that kind of position, it is
naturally going to put us into a situation where we will have to
reassess our attitudes.
If that is what the Conservatives are
doing - and it appears to be a firm lurch to the right, with Mr
Neave playing the orange card - then it goes without saying what
our reaction would be. 77
Fitt presumably meant that the S.D.L.P. would play the "green"
card.
In May, Neave said that if the Conservatives came to power
th ey would carry out major government reforms in Northern Ireland,
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and if he was made Secretary of State for the province, that he would
introduce measures to restore more power to the local electorate.
Fitt was alarmed:
If Maggie Thatcher is ever prime minister - and this is something
I doubt very much will ever happen - she would do well to think of
someone else to head the representatives of the British government
here.
We have had our share of trouble and sorrow here but I
can't help thinking that it would be a lot worse with Mr Neave in
his naivety at the helm. 78
In the following month,

Fitt made

it quite clear why he had

supported the Labour government despite its apathy towards finding a
political

solution.

the minority

Interviewed on British television, he said that

in Northern Ireland would view with suspicion anything

which emanated from a Thatcher government:
It was different when it was led by Ted Heath because the minority
in Northern Ireland felt the Conservatives under Heath were trying
to resolve the problems of Northern Ireland. But certainly the
Conservatives as we see them now from Belfast, are extreme right
wing. 79
Fitt believed that

if there were a general election, it might

create a hung parliament.

If this happened, he feared the Tories

would restore power to the unionist ascendancy.

Fitt's dread of the

Tories therefore primarily stemmed from nationalist principles rather
than socialist noumenon.
The antagonistic relationship between the S.D.L.P.

and the

Conservative Party did not mean that its association with the Labour
Party was good.

Indeed, the opposite was true.

Fitt was anxious to

reaffirm that Callaghan was committed to power-sharing, but this was
not enough for some of his colleagues.
the more vocal
Party in

critics.

After an S.D.L.P. meeting with the Labour

February, he said:

of the Labour National

Mallon was predictably one of

"We left the prime minister and members

Executive in no doubt about our attitude
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towards them.

It is one of quite considerable anger and disgust over

their negative position." 80
Fitt had also forgotten his new found admiration for Mason after
the May 1977 strike, when Mason had accused the Republic of allowing
their territory to be used by Provisionals.

Fitt resented this and

argued that Mason was looking for a scapegoat because he had not
achieved military victory against the I.R.A.

He fulminated:

His arrogance and hostile attitude ensured that all the major
political
parties in Ireland, excluding the Loyalists and
unionists, stood together as never before in opposition to the
Secretary of State.
Whitelaw, Pym and Rees never united the anti-unionist political
parties in this island, but Mason by his arrogance and bombast has
achieved this
The days of this type of imperial arrogance
have aone even if it does come from a former Yorkshire
miner. 81
Mason's machinations had clearly exasperated Fitt, and he had
reverted to his initial opinion of the Secretary of State.

Fitt may

have had reservations about S.D.L.P. nationalism but Mason made him
question such feelings and prompted some stinging attacks.
Although Mason had not secured military victory against the
Provisionals,
themselves

he had come close - a point to which the Provisionals
admitted. 82

His

measures

had

forced

them to

reorganize and by early 1978, they had changed militarily into the
classic cell-structure of three or four activists.

On February 17,

12 people were killed when they bombed the La Mon Restaurant outside
Belfast.

This bomb exploded prematurely and the Provisionals

apologized to the relatives of the victims.

This, of course, was not

enough to prevent condemnation and Fitt, as was his habit, was one of
the first to denounce the action. 83
The

tragedy

of

La

Mon was

a further

setback for the
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Provisionals,

but proved only temporary.

The republican movement had

opened up another front which would ultimately lead to a sequence of
events that would transform nationalist politics and have a great
impact on the political career of Fitt.
When Rees had withdrawn Special Category Status in March 1976,
all

new convicted prisoners were to be treated the same - in other

words,

they would have to do penal work and wear prison clothes.

The

first convicted prisoner under the new policy was Kieran Nugent and
he set a precedent which others would follow by refusing to be
treated as an ordinary criminal, claiming political motivation for
his actions.

Consequently, he refused to wear prison clothes and was

eventually issued a prison blanket.

Nugent was the first to go on

"The Blanket." 84
In

February 1978,

Bernadette McAliskey
Action Committees,
March,

Provisional

Sinn Fein joined the P.O.,

(formerly Devlin), and others in the Relatives
to spotlight the condition of the prisoners.

In

the inmates intensified their protest for political status, by

beginning what became known as the "dirty protest." They refused to
wash or use toilet facilities, instead smeared their own excreta on
their

cell

walls and by the summer the protest

involved 250

republican prisoners.
In August, Archbishop Tomas O Fiaich, the Catholic Church's most
prominent

figure

in

Ireland,

described the conditions as
that

the

visited the H-Blocks.

0 Fiaich

"inhuman and degrading" and suggested

authorities recognise that republican prisoners were

different from common criminals. 85
The republicans were pleased by such utterances from a leading
member of the establishment - Fitt was not.

He now claims that
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because of what he considered a pro-Provisional stance by O'Fiaich he
seriously contemplated resigning his Westminster seat.
the
not

It was _only

intervention of his eldest daughter, Joan, which persuaded him
to

resign. 86

Fitt's opinion that the Provisionals were

simply murderers did not alter in the years ahead. August 24 saw the
tenth anniversary of the first Civil Rights march from Coalisland to
Dungannon and another was planned to mark the occasion.

Fitt claimed

that demonstration had nothing to do with the ideal behind the Civil
Rights Movement in 1968 and explained why he would not attend:
The march that took place on August 24, 1968 was a march which
demanded Civil Rights for everyone in Northern Ireland who had
been denied them.
They were those who thought they would be
denied jobs, homes and votes because of their religion or
politics. Tomorrow's march is under completely different auspices
and I certainly will not be there. Had the people who are running
this march listened to what we had to say in 1968 and took heed of
our position on violence, there would not have been 10 tragic
years in between and there would be no prisoners. 87
Currie also declared that he would not attend.
McAliskey was candid

Bernadette

in her assessment of why the two S.D.L.P. men

would not participate:
The frontline in the August '68 march were people who came in from
the outside to make their points and be seen. They all went on to
do different things.
But the people who organised the march and
who took part in the rank and file will be there tomorrow, and
they won't miss the big wigs from the city. 88
In November,
important shift

at

its annual conference, the S.D.L.P. adopted an

in party policy.

In the previous April, Paddy Duffy

had argued that Loyalist intransigence had made it pointless for the
S.D.L.P.

to continue to strive for power-sharing.

claimed,

the all

From now on, he

Ireland context should be pursued.M

time the conference was

By the

held, this attitude was shared by the vast

majority of rank and file S.D.L.P.

delegates.

Austin Currie had

proposed a motion that declared "disengagement to be both inevitable
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and desirable."

Even before the conference began, Fitt felt it

necessary to deny that

it was a return to old-style nationalism;

"This doesn't mean the S.D.L.P. is a green party in the sense that
people are trying to project it."
Currie's motion was passed overwhelmingly by the 400 delegates,
with only two votes against and one abstention.

Speaking at the end

of the conference, Fitt adamantly restated the party's commitment to
the reunification of Ireland:
Let me state it in quite blunt terms ... the S.D.L.P. does not
believe that the partition of this country was ever justified.
The S.D.L.P. wants to unite people of all religions and outlooks,
not only in Northern Ireland, but the whole of Ireland, so that we
can eventually bring about the reunification of this country by
consent, not coercion.
Fitt argued that

it was inevitable that the British would have

to withdraw and it was the task of his party to create the conditions
that could make British departure

"come all

the more soon" and

without the bloodshed that marked colonial disengagements in other
parts

of the world.

colleagues,

If Fitt was

he disguised it very well.

less nationalist than his
His speech contained only one

reference to party disunity which he described as "a very slight
splintering" of the unanimity which had brought all those political
parties together to oppose unionism. 89
In 1976, the S.D.L.P. leadership had successfully, but narrowly,
fought off a British withdrawal
again,

with greater ease.

situation had

reached

In 1977, it had done so

By the end of 1978,

such a level

majority of the S.D.L.P.
approach.

motion.

of stalemate,

the political
that the vast

wanted the party to change its political

It was thus decided to concentrate on the Anglo-Irish

dimension and seek support from the British and Irish governments,
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especially the

latter,

The

deadlock.

fact

to create political
that

Fitt remained

movement

and end the

leader of the party and

considering his rhetoric at the conference, one must conclude that he
was

again prepared to go along with the majority despite any personal

reservations he may have had.
The open enmity between Mason and Fitt continued into 1979.
February,

the

Secretary

Independent Radio
were the

of State had given

an

interview to

in which he suggested that the Official Unionists

party of moderation and that the S.D.L.P. and D.U.P. were

extremists. 90
Commons. 91

Fitt

launched

Soon afterwards

a

blistering

he made

attack

for

a

government

whose Northern

ambiguity

in

the

in this

pocket

of the

statement.

unionists." 92

Fitt was

Ireland and put
There was

no

prepared to suspend his

socialist principles and operate on nationalist tenets.
was

"I can't

Ireland Secretary has

antagonised most of the population of Northern
himself

in the

it clear that he would now

not support the Labour government in a vote of confidence:
vote

In

In short, he

inviting the scenario he most detested, a Tory government with

Neave as a possible Secretary of State.
Early in the following month he re-affirmed his position:
They (the Labour Government) had given into unionist blackmail
...
As a matter of pure political expediency it has done deals
with the unionist M.P's, the most notorious being the promise of
more seats for Northern Ireland at Westminster in return for
unionist votes to keep the Labour government in power. 93
Fitt

had

been against greater representation

for Ulster at

Westminster since May 1977, when Callaghan had given the go-ahead for

a special conference to examine the case, 94 and for the rest of
the year,
opposed any such move. 95
Fitt's resistance was
und erstandable.
Since the S.D.L.P. was formed the whole basis of its
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policy was that the solution to the Northern Ireland problem could
not be confined to the British context.
the

Irish

An

dimension.

representation

increase

That is why it insisted on
in

Northern

Irelandis

at Westminster would therefore be a negation of a

fundamental S.D.L.P. policy.
Despite S.D.L.P.
Bill

to

objections in April, Callaghan did bring in a

increase the number of Northern Irish M.P's to a minimum of

16 and a maximum of 18.

In November, Fitt told the Commons that any

increase in the number of seats for Northern Ireland at Westminster
would consolidate the British dimension and make it less likely that
unionist

representatives would seek any accommodation with the

minority

in

protestations,

creating

structures. 96

political

Callaghan persisted,

Despite Fitt's

and the second reading of the

Re-distribution of Seats (N.I.) Bill, proposing to increase Northern
Ireland representatives to 17, was passed in the Commons and welcomed
by the Conservative Party.

Fitt commented on the result:

"I do not

accept that this Bill was brought before the House with the intention
of giving fairness
Northern

Ireland." 97

and justice to the electorate and the M.P's of
The Bill

became law and was

for the 1983 Westminster election.

implemented

An editorial in the Irish News

interpreted the new legislation:
There is a simple explanation for the Callaghan government's show
of generosity towards the North by the decision to increase the
number of seats at Westminster - survival. Those extra seats
could provide the necessary votes to secure victory in vital and
close debates. 98
Fitt had made the same deduction and it was little wonder that
he had become so disgruntled.

In March 1979, his dismay with the

government was given renewed impetus by the allegations of Dr Robert
Irwin,

a police surgeon, who claimed on television that he knew of at
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least 150 people who had been seriously injured by the R.U.C. while
custody. 99

in

Amnesty

This testimony confirmed the findings

International

report

of. an

in June 1978, which expressed concern

about R.U.C. interrogation methods.

Fitt attacked both Mason and the

Chief Constable of the R.U.C.:
If Mr. Mason or the Chief Constable, Sir Kenneth Newman, claim
they are unaware of these practices then they prove themselves
guilty of incompetence.
If they were aware these practices were
taking place then they prove themselves to be liars. In either
case there is no longer any room for them in Northern
I rel and. 100
The British government issued the Bennett Report which accepted
that

there

occurred.

was

prima facie evidence of ill-treatment having

Mason belittled the findings by promising to act on only 2

of its 34 recommendations to counter R.U.C. "indiscretions."
While the controversy
again made

(over police brutality) continued, Fitt

it clear that he would not support the government and

indeed would possibly go as far as to aid the Conservatives.
I have made it clear to all these M.P's that under no circumstance
will I support the Labour government in a vote of confidence
because of the attitude of the Secretary of State and the policies
of the government in Northern Ireland. I intend to abstain, but I
may even vote for the Tories, if I see Enoch Powell 101 going
into the lobbies to support the government. 102
The minority Labour government was clearly in difficulties.
Despite agreeing,

under unionist pressure, to increase the number of

seats for Northern Ireland to 17, and despite having an informal pact
with the Liberal party, when a vote of no-confidence was tabled it was
certain to be a very close one.

Fitt, in an emotional speech to the

House of Commons, reiterated why he would no longer support the Labour
Party.

He told the House that this would be the "unhappiest" speech

he had ever articulated.

He maintained that throughout his time at

Westminster he had never voted in the Conservative Lobby even when it
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was "courageously trying to grapple" with the Northern

Ireland

He lamented the fall

of the

problem between 1970 and 1974.

power-sharing Executive and blamed the U.W.C. strike on the negligent
Labour government:
That strike terrified the Labour government. Since then, the
Labour government has been running away. They have not stood up
to unionists and loyalists extremists as they should have done
In all conscience I would be a liar and a traitor to the
people who sent me here if I were to go into the Lobby tonight
with the Labour government to express confidence in their handling
of the affairs of Northern Ireland ...
He made it clear on what basis he intended to cast his vote:
I have a loyalty to this government, to my own working class
movement in the United Kingdom and further afield. But I have a
greater loyalty to the people of Northern Ireland ... It is their
voice saying that because of what the government has done in the
past five years - disregarded the minority and appeased the
blackmailers of the Northern Ireland unionist majority - I cannot
go into the Lobby with them tonight. 103
Fitt duly abstained and the government was defeated by one vote 311 to 310.

Callaghan was forced to call a general election for May.

In that election the Labour Party was defeated and so began eleven and
a

half years of uninterupted anti-working class policies under

Margaret Thatcher and her Tory government.
There

is substance to the charge that Fitt had supported

successive Labour governments, who had, in the past, displayed a lack
of interest
moral

in Northern

Ireland and indeed a lack of political and

courage in defence of British Acts of parliament.

however,

Fitt finally had enough.

By 1979,

Two reasons influenced his change

of heart - the decision of the government to go ahead with legislation
for extra parliamentary seats for Ulster

(ostensibly to keep the

province in line with the rest of the United Kingdom);
disgust over the attitude of Roy Mason.
In his memoirs, James Callaghan talks of Fitt's abstension:

and his
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Gerry Fitt
... who had consistently supported the government in
previous vital votes, spoke and voted against us despite desperate
efforts by a number of Labour members to persuade him oth~rwise
Gerry was a brave man and a warm hearted impulsive character
but he took the wrong turning that night. 104
Fitt remains unrepentant:

"The unionists were dictating policy

to the Labour government so it was no longer a Labour government.
Any allegiance I had to the Labour Party evaporated.
the unionists

in,

and so

down that government."
years of Thatcherism,

I decided to abstain.

I wanted to bring

I asked him if, as a socialist and with the
he regretted his action.

that time there was nothing else I could do.
that prevailed,

I don't regret

it. " 105

He replied, "No, at

Given the circumstances
Fitt's assertion that

he is primarily a socialist hardly stands examination.
if

Fitt

was

I was keeping

particularly

representation at Westminster

perturbed
(and there

about

Furthermore,

greater

Ulster

is considerable evidence

that he was), it thus marks a distinct reversal of the sentiment and
content of his maiden speech at the House of Commons in 1966.

Then

he demanded the same rights and privileges for the people of Northern
Ireland which were enjoyed in the rest of the United Kingdom.
1979,

however,

In

he opposed a bill to increase the number of Northern

Ireland seats at Westminster.
machinations at parliament

This adds fuel to the charge that his

in the late 1960s were merely an attempt

to disrupt the unionist regime in a way which would be advantageous
to the ending of partition.
The 1979 general

election saw Fitt exhibit supreme confidence:

"There are some people saying this constituency is going to change
hands,
walk

but the people know what I have done for them and I'm going to
it."106

election,

He played on his role

claiming that

in bringing about the

intransigent unionists had sufficient votes
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to blackmail

"but on March 20 this year I

the Labour government,

brought that blackmail

Ironically,

to an end."

he urged the

electorate to return a strong Labour government who would be "able to
tell

the unionist parties where to go in their demands for a return

to the old Stormont ascendency rule - then something positive might
be achieved towards partnership rule in Northern Ireland."

None of

his opponents could possibly win, he claimed, as "A vote for them is
a vote for unionism." 107
the

His optimism was

election and was the only S.D.L.P.

justified,

he won

candidate returned to

Westminster.
In

the following month,
Northern

election.
constituency,

with

campaigns

began for the European

Ireland was to be a three-seater single
election by proportional

representation,

in

contrast to Britain, where the first-past-the-post-system remained.
The P.R.

scheme benefited the minority community, since the usual

practice might have seen the unionists carry off all three seats.
Fitt can take some credit for the continuation of P.R. in Ulster.
In February 1978,
calling

for

the

Ireland's first
that

it

would

Enoch Powell

had proposed an amendment,

first-past-the-post system to elect Northern

European M.P's.

Political commentators suggested

be a close vote. 108

Many left wing Labour

members feared that P.R. in Northern Ireland would eventually lead to
a

similar procedure in Britain,

electoral

performance.

to the detriment of Labour's

It was expected that the Conservatives would

probably support the unionists to a large extent.

Fitt encouraged

his Labour colleagues to support him and delivered an impassioned
speech in the Commons which argued that the first-past-the-post
system should not be used in Ulster because politics in the province
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was sectarian and the majority was

"artificially created" when

Northern Ireland was established. 109
Fitt succeeded in his task.
proposal

to bring Northern

British M.P's rejected Powell's

Ireland back into line with the rest of

the United Kingdom by 241 votes to 150.
"This result

outcome:

Fitt was delighted with the

is very good for Northern Ireland.

We will

take that third seat. "110
John Hume was selected by the S.D.L.P. to represent them in the
election and he conducted a vigorous pro-European campaign,
contrast to the anti-European
Paisley,

West and Taylor.

stance of the unionist politicians -

Hume, as expected, was elected, polling

140,622 votes,

24.6% of the total vote.

combined total

of the two Official

short of the quota,

in

He won more votes than the

Unionists, but was marginally

being elected on the third count. 111 Barry

White argues that the

"European election confirmed that Hume was

popularly regarded as the real leader of nationalist opinion in the
North. "112

This assertion

is valid since Hume had, after all,

pushed the share of the S.D.L.P. poll to a record high.
threatened Fitt's leadership it was

If anybody

indeed Hume, a point noted by

Fortnight:
The S.D.L.P. are also having to face up to some changes in the
power balance. In the good old days you could point to the Social
Democatic and Labour parts of the Party without too much
difficulty. The Labour men were based in Belfast, and the rest in
the country. Now with Paddy Devlin long since gone, Gerry Fitt is
the only Labour man left. And who could blame him for feeling a
bit uneasy at the phenomenal performance of John Hume in the
European election.
The article also suggested that the orientation of the party was
changing:
areas,

"The word

is that most of the votes came from country

and that priests and schoolmasters were working hard at
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If

11113

this

speculation was true,

Fitt's position as

leader was being further weakened.
Meanwhile

Fitt

continued

his

incessant

attacks

on the

Commenting on an upsurge in sectarian violence after

Provisionals.

the European election, he called them the most "desperate cowards in
history." 114

Irish

The

Provisionals

remained

undeterred.

August saw one of their most ruthless and dramatic operations, when
late in the month,

they detonated three bombs

incidents on either side of the border.

in two separate

One killed Lord Mountbatten,

members of his family and a 15-year-old Enniskillen boy on a boat off
the County Sligo coast,
outside Warrenpoint

and the others killed 18 British soldiers

in County Down.

Fitt was appa 11 ed. 115 The

killings prevented a planned visit by Pope John Paul II into the
North during his visit to

Ireland.

Fitt claimed,

"where the

Paisleyites failed the P.I.R.A. had succeeded." 116
At

Drogheda in the Republic,

the Pope addressed a crowd

estimated at around 250,000 in October 1979 and begged all those
engaged in violence to desist.

The Provisionals rejected the Pope's

plea in a statement claiming that only force could remove the British
presence. 117
Warrenpoint,
request,

Fitt now maintains that the deaths

in Sligo and

combined with the Provisionals repudiation of the Papal

made him severely disillusioned with politics in Northern

Irel and. 118

It

in

allegiance to the concept of nationalism could be

Fitt's

is not unreasonable to suggest that a wavering

attributed to Provisional violence.
At the S.D.L.P. party conference that year a new policy document
entitled

"Towards a new Ireland" was overwhelmingly passed after a
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debate on the motion that:
conference deplores the failure by successive British governments
to recognise the real nature of the Northern Irish problem and
calls on the British and Irish governments to agree to and promote
a joint Anglo-Irish process of political, social and economic
development within which the representatives of the two traditions
in Northern Ireland would work in partnership towards the creation
of peace, stability and lasting unity within Ireland.
The S.D.L.P.

had decided to no longer seek an internal solution
They initiated the Anglo-Irish process.

with the unionists.
had been very hopeful
frequently lamented

Fitt

about the prospects of power-sharing and had

its failure.

He was distressed at the party's

decision to abandon that aspiration.
The most controversial

motion at the conference was proposed

from the mid-Ulster branches which suggested that the S.D.L.P. open
contacts with the leadership of "all
organizations who belong to the

political

and paramilitary

Irish tradition with a view to

establishing a common ground for reconciliation with those of the
British tradition."

The motion was rejected, but the fact that it

was proposed at all

would have alarmed Fitt, who had established

himself as a most

implacable opponent of the Provisionals and was

opposed to any form of dialogue with them.

The writing was on the

wall for the party leader. 119
Following the S.D.L.P.
Minister
initiative.

of

conference,

State for Northern

Humphrey Atkins the new

Ireland,

launched a political

At the end of November 1979, the government published a

document on a proposed conference between the constitutional parties.
This stated that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland was
not a topic for discussion and there was no mention of an Irish
dimension.

This did not placate the S.D.L.P.

November 20, gave the document a guarded welcome.

Fitt however, on
He remarked:
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At a quick reading I find some of the proposals are very
interesting so far as they go out of their way to give protection
to the minority in Northern Ireland ... I believe the proposals
are worthy of the deepest consideration and that is certainly.what
my party will be doing at the earliest opportunity. 120
Fitt's

comments

were

another

example

of his

impulsive

individualism since he was not representing the party by them.

The

next evening the party executive and constituency representatives met
and unanimously decided not to enter into talks unless they included
discussions on the
following

Irish dimension.

Fitt was present but on the

day resigned from the S.D.L.P.,

decision

not to participate in talks as

quitting.

He described the ruling as

disastrous"

and

that

in an emotional

blaming the party's
the main reason for

"completely misguided and

statement added:

"I can only say

I have a feeling of inutterable sadness to see at this time the

party which

I helped to create with others, turning so violently on

the concepts on which it was founded."
He claimed that republicans had gained greater influence in the
party,

"I

have noticed that in the absence of a political initiative

being taken,

there

ranks of the S.D.L.P.

is a strong republican element emerging in the

... "'

and went on to repudiate nationalism:

Nationalism has been a political concept in Ireland over many,
many years but I suggest that it has never brought peace to the
people of the six counties.
I for one have never been a
nationalist
to
the
total
exclusion of my socialist
ideals. 121
Fitt's declaration

is remarkable.

Eight months previously he

had made a crucial abstension in a vote of confidence in the Labour
government.

He knew full well that his decision could bring down a

socialist government and replace
Conservative administration.

This

it with an anti-working class
is

indeed what happened.

subordinated his socialism to nationalism.

Now,

however,

He
he

264

repudiated nationalism after declaring

in the May 1979 general

election that the vote for his opponents was "a vote for unionism."
This all

suggested that Fitt's political thinking had either become

confused

(reinforcing the suggestion that he had never formulated a

coherent political ideology), or had come to contain some dualism, or
both.
The duality can be explained - the fact that Fitt had come to a
decision to renounce nationalism indicates that he had changed his
political

opinion.

Chapters

II,

non-sectarian socialist rhetoric,
Fitt was a nationalist.
the

power-sharing

important than an
failure,

III

and

IV showed that despite

and some cross community support,

What changed his mind? The answer lies with

experiment.
internal

Fitt's nationalism became less

Northern Ireland solution.

Despite its

Fitt clung tenaciously to the belief that amity between

politicians could be established,

leading to the formation of a

devolved form of government with power-sharing.

Conversely, an

important element in the S.D.L.P. drew different conclusions from the
failure of the Executive and this
increasingly influential.

"green"

element would become

It likewise became embittered by the

manner in which power-sharing collapsed but became convinced that a
more forceful

approach by the British government would have ensured

the new institution's survival.
British

government,

This element lost confidence in the

(something that Fitt inexplicably did not)

especially in the light of Mason's
political

attitude, whose disregard for

initiatives drove the S.D.L.P.

to embark upon a policy

giving greater significance both to the

Irish dimension and the

withdrawal

of British troops.

more nationalist position.

In short, the S.D.L.P. reverted to a

The seeds of conflict between the leader
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and his colleagues were there for all

to see.

The duality or

confusion in Fitt's politics can be explained simply by the fact that
he remained leader.
s.D.L.P.

In order to maintain party unity, he endorsed

policy regarding the

and at crucial

Irish dimension at party conferences

points (e.g. Devlin's resignation), yet paradoxicaly

when he resigned no one seemed surprised.
that by November 1979,

It can only be concluded

Fitt's nationalist sentiment had become so

negligible that his position in the S.D.L.P. was no longer tenable.
The reaction to Fitt's resignation not only re-confirmed (not
that it needed

it) the polarized nature of Northern Irish politics,

but also showed now how his profile had changed within the respective
communities.
The nationalist community,
predictably critical.

as represented by Sinn Fein, were

A spokesman claimed that the resignation was

the "tantrum of a defeated bullyboy who for so long had enjoyed total
domination over those he purported to lead and represent." 122
There were not too many tears in the S.D.L.P. either at Fitt's
departure.

There was a general feeling that Fitt spent too much time

at Westminster and had lost touch with grass-roots sentiment.

Mallon

maintained that he was "not surprised", and Duffy claimed, "Gerry is
totally

and

abso 1ute ly

on

his

own. 11123

Fitt had become

isolated and no longer represented the nationalist aspirations that
the S.D.L.P. had come to express.
Although the Irish News editorial did not deviate from orthodoxy
in being supportive of Fitt, it did make the following crucial point:
"Mr.

Fitt says there has been a strong republican element in the

ranks of the party.
surprise many who will

His strong repudiation of nationalism will
recall

that Mr.

Fitt was once known as a

266
socialist Republican. "124
The main organ of the unionist community the Belfast News
Letter, suggested in its editorial:
While the resignation of Mr. Fitt from the leadership of the
S.D.L.P. comes as no surprise, its significance cannot be ignored,
not only is it a reflection of internal dissension within the
party but clear confirmation that the S.D.L.P. is essentially a
republican organisation dedicated first and above all to a policy
of Irish unity. 125
The

more moderate Belfast Telegraph editorial

contained a

similar sentiment:
Mr. Gerry Fitt's resignation from membership, as well as
leadership, of the S.D.L.P. should come as no real surprise to
those who have been aware of his increasing disillusion with its
nationalist grass-roots.
A point had been reached when the West
Belfast pragmatist had to part company with a rural-based party
which
Rut
nationalist
principle
before
practical
politics. 1 6
William Craig,

who had done more than most to bring down the

power-sharing Executive, commented:
I'm sorry that it has happened but Mr Fitt is unquestionably right
in this matter. He would not be a leader worth his salt if he did
not back up his convictions in this way. It's a sad day for the
S.D.L.P. but for politics it is very good to see a man who has the
qualities of leadership. 127
In the Republic, the Irish Press editorial commented:
Mr Fitt, a brave, articulate and diligent representative of his
people now goes into the wilderness, possibly to be a lone
representative in West Belfast. Whether justly or unjustly his
eclipse will be seen as that of yet another of the long line of
Irish representatives at Westminster who succumbed to the fatal
"tone of the House" and became isolated from their followers in
Northern I rel and. 128
This opinion was merely a watered-down version of republican
sentiment.
Republican

The headline of the November 25,
News

Supporters of this

simply

read,

"Fitt

1978,

edition of

- British Apologist. 11129

view attacked Fitt's home, the worst incident

being the one aforementioned, which occurred in August 1976.

There
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were others,

however, which were sufficiently violent to be recorded

by the press . 130
West Belfast's chronic social
strong
the

deprivation would have been a

inducement to violence and indeed to the romantic idealism of

I.R.A.

worst

In December 1976, Belfast housing was declared to be the
Europe. 131

in

jobless total
same year,

the

In January 1978,

there was the highest

in the city since 1940. 132

In August of that

'Child Poverty Action Group' published a document

asserting that nearly one third of Northern
living below the poverty line. 133
remained

inactive on such

issues.

This

Irish families were

is not to say that Fitt

He often spoke vigorously at

Westminster in an attempt to highlight and endeavour to improve the
situation. 134

The

forum at Westminster had however,

increasingly immaterial

to large sections of his constituency.

continued army harassment,
Courts,
many

become
The

the events at Castlereagh, the Diplock

combined with the social deprivation, was bound to alienate
working-class

nationalists.

Thatcher's monetaristic and

anti-working class policies were to make the situation even worse.
While Fitt remained a committed parliamentarian, Provisional
Sinn Fein began to develop into a radical political party, involving
itself in the community, Trade Unions, housing and employment issues,
as well

as demanding British withdrawal, and the abolition of the

border.

Aided by some dramatic events, the political wing of the

I.R.A. would come to threaten Gerry Fitt's seat.
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CHAPTER VII
FROM GERRY FITT TO GERRY ADAMS
As

its title suggests, Chapter VII traces the events which led

to the loss of Fitt's Westminster seat to Gerry Adams, head of Sinn
Fein,

the political

wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army

It also includes an account of Fitt's elevation to the

(P.I.R.A.).
House of Lords.

Whereas the previous chapters have tended to focus exclusively
on Fitt,

Chapter VII

examines Fitt's career in relation to the

evolution of the republican movement.
developments

are

inextricably related.

It shows that the two
Fitt's politics became

increasingly unacceptable to a large percentage of nationalist voters
who consequently discarded him for a politicized Sinn Fein.
At the end of the 1970s Fitt was very much an isolated figure.
The Conservative victory in the May election had imperilled his
relationship with the Labour Party and his resignation from the
S.D.L.P.

left him without political colleagues.

He added to this by

distancing himself from important politicians in the Republic.
Towards the end of 1979, pressure had built up on the Taoiseach,
Jack Lynch,

from within his own party.

Many Fianna Fail people

argued that he was too acquiescent towards the British.

In December,

Lynch resigned and gave way to Charles Haughey as party leader and
Taoiseach.
the

In 1970, Haughey had been acquitted of supplying guns to

newly formed

commentators,

Provisionals,

but many politicians and media

as well as citizens of the Republic, felt that he might

be a hardline republican. Fitt was unhappy about these developments.
He argued that the forces

that were opposing Lynch in Fianna Fail

were the same that opposed him in the S.D.L.P.
274

Lynch had adopted a
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moderate

stance on the problems of Northern
with this attitude. 1

identified

Fitt had further shifted ground.

Ireland and

This declaration

Fitt

showed that

In the past he had argued that the

Republic's government could have made more effort to end partition.
In 1979 he had little to fear;

Haughey proved no more militant than

his predecessor.
Fitt
Socialist"

continued

in

politics under the label

"Independent

and would cling to this classification as steadfastly as

he had done to the power-sharing concept.

His socialist arguments at

Westminster retained their familiar characteristics.
replaced with concrete examples of injustice.

Ideology was

In March 1980, he

attacked Thatcherite policy in Northern Ireland:
I am sure that Ministers will accept that not only in this part of
the United Kingdom but in Northern Ireland every facet of life has
been affected by the new Tory government's doctrinaire and
monetaristic - if there is such a word ... policies.
There is no doubt that the effects of the doctrinaire approach of
this government have been an absolute disaster for Northern
Ireland.
Children's school meals, the cost of housing, the
deterioration in the number of jobs and the diminution of the
number of home helps - all the things that made life bearable for
the people of Northern Ireland have been disastrously affected by
the approach of this government.
Needless to say, Fitt did not publicize the fact that it was he
who had helped the Conservatives

into office.

Although he had

reverted to socialism at Westminster he was no theorist.
by a Tory M.P.

how increased expenditure was

simplistically replied,
that divides

internal

Provisional

Sinn

Fein was

re-organization and re-assessment,

rejuvination.

to be funded, he

"The way of solving the problem is the issue

the two sides of this House." 2

somewhat rootless,

When asked

While

Fitt was

in the process of
leading to eventual
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In June 1979, a major shift in republican policy was articulated
and consequently implemented.
ceremony at Bodenstown

At the annual Wolfe Tone commemoration

in County Kildare,

Gerry Adams, now Vice

President of Provisional Sinn Fein, made an important speech on party
progress and future
resistance

policy.

He praised the "blanket men" for their

to the criminalization process

and al so predictably

criticised the governments of both Britain and the Irish Republic.
The innovative aspect of Adams'

statement was the denial that the

severance of the British connection was the organization's only
goal.

Adams was

keen for the movement to abandon the simplistic

notion of how to solve the Irish question.
British withdrawal

He rejected the idea that

was the panacea to the problem and promoted a

socialist programme:
As republicans we stand with the have-nots against the haves. We
stand with the under privileged, the young, the unemployed, the
workers - the people of no property. We are for the ownership of
Ireland by the people of Ireland and we believe that national
freedom entails economic and cultural independence and that one
without the other is useless.
Adams was directing an appeal
Belfast he was ploughing fertile

to the disadvantaged.
ground.

In West

He was anxious not to

alienate conservative republicans, his socialist rhetoric being fused
with traditional republican sentiment to widen the appeal:
We are opposed to big business, to multi-nationalism, to
gombeenism, to sectarianism and to the maintenance of a privileged
class.
We stand opposed to all forms and all manifestations of
imperialism and capitalism.
We stand for an Ireland, free,
united, socialist and gaelic.
Adams then voiced what he felt was the inadequacy of republican
strategy:

"Our most glaring weakness to date lies in our failure to

develop revolutionary politics and to build a strong political
alternative

to

so-called

constitutional

politics. "3

The
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importance of Adams'

oration lies in the fact that Provisional Sinn

Fein had decided that a "Brits Out" policy was no longer enough.
Ultimate victory would be achieved only if the muscle of the I.R.A.
was

reinforced with a political

constitutionalists."

alternative to the

"so-called

To facilitate this development,

the party

adopted a left-wing political

programme.

Fitt and his former

colleagues in the S.D.L.P. were threatened by this tactic.
While

republicans

re-appraised their strategy Fitt became

increasingly popular with elements

in the British establishment, a

consequence of his continued refusal to be intimidated by the I.R.A.
However,

some of this admiration was unwelcome.

In February 1980, he

turned down an award from the Ross McWhirter Foundation (McWhirter
was an active right-winger and vigorous opponent of the I.R.A. who
was shot by the Provisionals on his doorstep

in 1974).

Fitt

explained that he declined to accept the award not because he had any
opposition to commemorating the memory of McWhirther, but because he
was a socialist.

foundation

He added:

"I have also refused it because the

appears to have associations with right wing organizations

which take a different political view from myself." 4
However,

the fact

itself significant.

that the award was offered at all was in
The British right wing press had sought to use

Fitt's abhorrence of the
time.

I.R.A. for propaganda purposes for a long

Right wing elements in the McWhirter Foundation were keen to

reward an

Irish politician who had disowned his nationalist past and

continually attacked the Provisionals.
John Hume had succeeded Fitt as leader of the S.D.L.P. and
Seamus Mallon was

installed as his deputy.

bitterness about Hume;

Fitt now speaks with

"John Hume does not like Protestants.

John
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is an anti-Prod.
them.

He

is a Derry Catholic.

That is not to say he is malicious.

He cannot understand

He just cannot understand

Austin Currie maintains that the relationship between

them." 5

the two leaders of the S.D.L.P. "was always a difficult one" although
for long periods they co-operated closely.

He suggests that Hume

increasingly came to articulate S.D.L.P. policy and Fitt consequently
could not find
have

aggravated

his own niche. 6
their political

certainly different.

Personal

antagonism may well

disagreements.

Both men are

Fitt has a tendency to think that education

negates a working-class background.

Hume was likely to be frustrated

that for many years Fitt held the only political forum available.
any case

it was a demanding relationship.

In

It is surprising that a

public break did not occur earlier.
Fitt took no one with him when he left the S.D.L.P.

His

distaste for organization had mitigated against the party evolving a
strong political network in West Belfast.
critical

This lack of structure was

in ensuing years and was in contrast to Provisional Sinn

Fein's new-found commitment to establish a challenging political
presence in the area.
Fitt had thus reverted to his role as "lone operator," content
to rely on personal charisma and Westminster contacts.

In the years

ahead he not only attacked the Provisionals, but also the S.D.L.P.,
placing himself outside nationalist politics as expressed by its two
major proponents.
Ironically,

He had become something of a political aberration.
the S.D.L.P.

reversed

its position on the Atkins'

talks and agreed to attend after some political manoeuvering by the
Northern

Ireland Secretary.

Atkins stated that all parties would be

allowed to submit papers on any topic of their choosing.

Hume was
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not against the

idea of talks,

but was adamant that the Irish

dimension

should be discussed.

The conference was doomed. to

failure.

The Official

kept to their decision not to

Atkins

attend.

Unionists

had

ruled

Stormont-type arrangements.

out

wanted the latter.

described

talks

as

Sunningdale-type and

The S.D.L.P. wanted the former, Paisley

and the D.U.P.
the

both

At Westminster Fitt correctly

"charade." 7

a

assessment with an attack on the S.D.L.P.

Fitt followed

his

He told the Belfast

Telegraph that his former party had planned to wreck the talks:
I know with absolute certainty that if the S.D.L.P. had been
offered a power-sharing arrangement as before - under the
Sunningdale Executive - they would have said thank you very much
but we want an institutionalised Irish dimension - a Council of
Ireland. 8
He argued that such a disposition effectively precluded any
unionist from finding an agreement.
Eddie McGrady,

now Chief Whip of the S.D.L.P. countered with a

valid point:
The policies of the S.D.L.P. were determined at our last annual
conference in November, up to which time Gerry was leader and
presumably was in full support of the party. He certainly didn't
indicate any contrary opinions at the time. In fact he was the
main speaker before the constitutional debate at the party
conference. 9
McGrady had cleverly ridiculed Fitt's political statements.
In May,

Fitt publicly announced that he would concede the Irish

dimension for power-sharing:
What we must do is to go out and find a solution within Northern
Ireland on the power-sharing issue. After you have done that and
allowed time to build up trust between the communities, then you
can begin to think about Irish dimensions.
To try to
institutionalize them both at the same time is self
defeating. 10
He

had finally revealed

experiment)

(six years after the Sunningdale

that he considered power-sharing and the Irish dimension

-~~
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as mutually exclusive.
The Irish Times reported Fitt saying:
There are no more Brian Faulkner's around. There's no unionists
that I can see in Northern Ireland who would be prepared to talk
to anyone about an Irish dimension, much less Irish unity ... I
would not let a demand for an Irish dimension prevent me, or
prevent the minority, from participating in governmental
structures created at Stormont. 11
He was now prepared to say almost anything to assuage Protestant
fears on the
Fitt's

Irish dimension.

If there had been any doubts about

inclination at this juncture,

political

disclosures ended any hint of ambiguity.

these emphatic

The aspiration of a united

Ireland had been an important component of Fitt's political success.
Now,

however,

as a short-term objective,

relinquished the goal of a united Ireland.

he had

unequivocally

Instead, he continued to

lament the failure of the Sunningdale experiment 12 and accused
the S.D.L.P.

of being merely the Northern wing of the Fianna Fail

Party . 13
It could be argued that Fitt had not abandoned his commitment to
a

united

Ireland

as

an

ultimate goal

power-sharing his main political
stone."

but had merely made

aspiration as a sort of "stepping

In other words his tactics rather than his principles were

flexible.

There

previous years,

is little evidence to substantiate this.

Unlike

he never indulged in nationalist rhetoric and if he

had considered power-sharing a "stepping stone" he would have been
guilty of trying to dupe the Protestant community.
Meanwhile the prison protest,

which had begun with Kieran

Nugent's refusal to wear prison clothes, had gradually escalated.

As

a gesture of solidarity with their male colleagues, the women in
Armagh gaol

began their own dirty protest in February 1980.

British
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efforts to break the deadlock had no success.
In May,
Morrison,

Provisional Sinn Fein held a seminar on prisons.

Danny

now editor of An Phoblacht/Republican News, articulated the

party's position in the protest:
Republican strategy and the way forward on the P.O.W. issue must
be based on two basic principles. Firstly, to secure political
status for P.O.Ws in Ireland and comparable conditions and
repatriation for those seeking it in English prisons. Secondly,
to articulate, exploit and propagandise on the prison struggle, to
show how it constitutes an important part of the overall struggle,
and to show that the prison struggle is not merely a manifestation
of republican resistance to British policy but also a
manifestation
of
the British government's attitude to
Ireland. 14
The prison protest had given

Provisional

Sinn Fein its best

propaganda vehicles since internment and Bloody Sunday.
aware

that

the

issue could and should be used to build up

anti-British feeling.
support for

Morrison was

This,

Provisional

it was hoped, would be converted into

Sinn Fein itself,

and by extension, the

Provisional I.R.A.
On October 10, in a move designed to increase the impetus of the
protest,

republican prisoners announced that they were commencing a

hunger strike on October 27.

On October 23, Atkins had offered

civilian-type clothing to the prisoners.

After some deliberation the

offer was rejected because it failed to meet their central demand i.e.

being given political status.

Therefore, on October 27, seven

republican prisoners refused food, vowing that they would fast either
until

their demands were met or until they died of starvation.

stakes had been raised considerably.

The

The repercussions of the hunger

strikes would transform nationalist politics.

They were also to have

a profound impact on the career of Gerry Fitt.
On November 10,

Fitt made his most controversial speech in the
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House of Commons.

Jim Molyneaux, leader of the Official Unionists,

set the tone of the debate:
It is important for the world to know and for distinguished
churchmen to remember that I.R.A. hunger strikers are not
misguided petty thieves or pick pockets in need of correction on
spiritual guidance. They are not even men who have been convicted
of murder in a fit of rage. They are evil men who have planned
and plotted in cold blood to take innocent lives. They are beasts
who have gunned down their fellow men and pumped hot lead into
their twitching bodies. 15
Fitt then

spoke and recalled having successfully pleaded for

political status in 1972, saying:
I have to tell the House that I bitterly regret having made those
representations.
At that time there were 80 republican prisoners
and 40 Loyalist prisoners.
I believed that, because of the
special circumstances at that time, the granting of political
special category status would end the strife. I was terribly
wrong.
He then catalogued numerous

incidents when both

I.R.A. and

Loyalist violence had caused death throughout the decade.

He did

not, however, mention any deaths caused by the security forces.
Fitt pledged himself to support the introduction of humane
prison reforms,

but urged the British government to stand firm

against the granting of political status:
The government should make it clear to those engaged in the hunger
strike that they will not obtain political status. By telling the
truth,
and telling it in such a way that it cannot be
misunderstood
it is possible that the men on hunger strike
will realise the error of their ways and bring the strike to an
end.
I do not want to see those men dying. I do not want to see
anyone dying.
The government must show their resolution and not
allow themselves to be blackmailed by people giving support to the
hunger strike ...
I ask the Secretary of State to be as humane as possible to every
prisoner in Northern Ireland, of whatever political or religious
belief - but not to make the mistake of granting political
status.
That mistake was made in 1972. I believe that it led to
the taking of many innocent lives in Northern Ireland. 16
Fitt's views on republican political

prisoners had certainly

changed since 1962 when he considered them "men of principle." He
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saw the hunger strikes in simplistic terms and while many Catholics
admired his stand against violence many more felt it quite gratuitous
to call

upon the Thatcher government not to give in.

Gerry Adams

commented on what he perceived was the mood of the nationalist
community after Fitt's speech:
I think Fitt's stance was seen precisely for what it was, that
here was a man who had come from what he alleged was a socialist
republican position and was now siding with the British government
against men who were in prison and who were quite clearly in the
eyes of a large section of the community not criminals and who
were left with nothing but to go on hunger strike. To oppose
those demands may have been legitimate enough but to give Thatcher
succour was seen by many people as perhaps the last straw. 17
Fitt's rationale for the stance he took as regards the hunger
strike has changed little:
When the hunger strike started it was a very emotional thing. It
was totally tribal. No reason or intellect went into it. When it
started I was in the position of recalling all the coffins that I
had carried through graveyards and a lot of them were victims of
the I.R.A. Some of them were women and children and I was in the
position of being expected to lend my support to the men who
actually carried out these murders. There was no way I could do
that. 18
Reaction to Fitt's speech at the time was predictably varied and
further revealed how his profile had altered.

The S.D.L.P. had

stayed aloof from the controversy, intent to await the outcome of a
Thatcher-Haughey summit
were quick to respond,

in December.

Provisional Sinn Fein however,

a spokesman claiming, "We believe that Fitt

has lost touch with the nationalist working class and are confident
that provided with an alternative choice, our people will positively
reject

Gerry

Fitt's unionism." 19

Bernadette Devlin McAliskey

described the speech as "murderous" and called Fitt, "a shadow of a
man. n20

Moderate unionism,
Telegraph was,

as expressed by the editorial of the Belfast

on the other hand, impressed, claiming that Fitt had
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shown

"considerable political

and moral

courage"

by disregarding

"tribal loyalties. "21
This contrasted sharply with the views of newspapers in the
Republic.

The

Irish

reprimanded Fitt for
nothing

but

Conversely,

a

Press was particularly vicious.

"attacking his own people" and claimed he was

"stage

Irishman"

duped

by

the

British. 22

whilst the pro-Fianna Fail Irish Press castigated Fitt;

leading members of the Orange Order praised him.
Smyth,

An editorial

The Reverend Martin

Grand Master of the Orange Order in Ireland, described Fitt's

speech as "courageous. 1123
There were calls from nationalist quarters for Fitt to resign
his Westminster seat and contest a by-election on the hunger strike
issue.

Fitt retorted that he had received over 200 letters from all

over the country supporting his position and only four dissenting.
He claimed that most of them came from deprived areas of Belfast, as
well

as from all sections of the community.

He also reported having

received a telegram from 33 employees of the Irish Press applauding
his stand:
that

"This

is the authentic voice of the people, and shows

I am on the right path. "24

The future would tell

if

Fitt's views were representative of the views of his constituents.
The

Conservative

Throughout

November,

government

was

the administration

unmoved by the strike.
insisted that political

status was a concession that would never be met.
prisoners decided to
December 15,

Consequently, the

intensify their protest still further and on

twenty three prisoners joined the original seven.

Four

days later the protest was suddenly called off.
On December 17, the Northern Ireland office had made a tentative
bid to resolve the dispute.

The prisoners were told that a paper
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which contained some sort of trade off was being prepared.
turned out,

the hunger strike was called off before the details of

what appeared to be an offer were known.
fasters

One of the original seven

had deteriorated more rapidly than the rest.

Sean McKenna,

By December 17,

was almost totally blind and lapsing into a coma.

other six strikers,
prisoners),

As it

and Bobby Sands

were now in a dilemma.

The

(leader of the Provisional
They had to decide whether to

await the British proposal, and thereby allow McKenna to die, or to
end the strike
their demands.

in the hope that the British proposals would meet
They chose the latter.

The hunger strike ended in confusion, but there was naturally a
general
victory,

feeling of relief.

Initially, Provisional Sinn Fein claimed

whereas the British claimed that they had granted nothing

and had not changed their position since the start of the protest.
In the event,

the prisoners were far from satisfied with what had

been offered. 25

The termination of the strike did restore some

calm over the Christmas period, but this was to be shortlived.
Early in the new year,

Fitt argued that 1981 could be as

significant a turning point as the Battle of the Boyne or the Easter
rising,

if the British and

decisively.

Irish governments

acted quickly and

His reasoning was prompted by the Thatcher-Haughey

summit which had taken place ten days prior to the ending of the
hunger strike.

(The post-summit communique pledged that special

consideration would be given to
within the islands).
that the

"the totality of relationships"

Fitt optimistically thought there was some hope

"terrible agony" of Northern Ireland may finally be drawing

to a close.
"The Provisional

He thought that the Provisionals were a spent force:
I.R.A.

staked everything on their trump card, the
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recent failed

hunger strike for political status.

By its failure

they have shown they have nothing else to offer but mindless
violence." 26
Fitt was wrong on both counts.

Despite all the media hype, the

communique after the summit represented little more than empty
Thatcher and Haughey placed different emphasis on the

jargon.
statement,
appealed

and the Provisionals were far from finished.
to them to lay down their arms

Mallon

and go political

-

Provisional Sinn Fein responded:
If Mr Mallon and his colleagues wish to see the creation of a
society free from the spectre of death and suffering, then it is
about time they climbed off the fence and set themselves the task
of unequivocally demanding the withdrawal of that destructive and
divisive influence.
Playing politics and cowtowing to the British is what has us in
the present situation.
It is time the S.D.L.P. learned that lesson. 27
Clearly,
political

the Provisionals were not yet ready to enter the

arena,

undiminished.

but

their

capacity

In January alone,

for

violence remained

seven people were killed and

thirteen injured due to I.R.A. operations.
On January 27,
prisoners'

refusal

there was violence

in the H-blocks over the

to conform to prison regulations and

it was

announced the following day that a second hunger strike would begin
on March 1.
tactics.

For the second protest, the prisoners changed their

Instead of simply demanding

"political

centered their effort on five specific demands:
their own clothing
forms
times;

of penal

instead of prison uniforms;

labour;

free

status,"

they

the right to wear
exemption from all

association with one another at all

the right to organize their own recreational and educational
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programmes and full

restoration of the time off their sentences to

which

be entitled

they

would
Bobby

rules. 28

Sands

went

if they conformed with prison
on strike first,

later to be

followed by the others at two-weekly intervals.
Soon after the strike began, Frank Maguire, the Independent M.P.
for Fermanagh/South Tyrone,
by-election

died.

it caused were to have

His death and the resulting
important ramifications for

minority politics in Northern Ireland.
Meanwhile,

Fitt continued to criticise the S.D.L.P.,

again

arguing that his former colleagues were too close to the Fianna Fail
Party:
On leaving the party, I stated that I thought it was becoming too
closely aligned with Fianna Fail and more particularly with a
certain militant wing within that party.
My priorities have always been the safety and welfare, not only of
my own constituents, but everyone in Northern Ireland and the
fortunes of political parties in the South are not of the same
importance to me. 29
Hume replied that Fitt sounded very much like a "cracked record"
and the rift between the two former colleagues would widen still
further. 30
There

was

some speculation as regards who would be the

anti-unionist

candidate

to

contest the Fermanagh/South Tyrone

by-election.

The first to put his name forward was Noel Maguire,

brother of the dead M.P.

It was also suggested that Bernadette

McAliskey contest the seat,

in the belief that she would obtain a

strong

personal

vote,

having recently been the victim of an

unsuccessful

murder attempt by Loyalist gunmen.

In the event she

stood down,

after reaching an agreement with Provisional Sinn Fein

that Bobby Sands be put forward to highlight the hunger strike and
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British

The S.D.L.P.

intransigence.

forwarded Austin Currie as a

candidate. 31
In a constituency with a small nationalist majority, there were
thus three proposed anti-unionist candidates
Currie and one unionist candidate,
unionists would win easily.

- Sands, Maguire and

Harry West.

If all stood, the

The decision now facing the S.D.L.P. was

whether to participate or withdraw,

and

in the end it was the

arguments of those against contesting the election which carried the
day.

This again can be construed as a furthering of the nationalist

sentiment

in the party.

This decision had far-reaching consequences

when Maguire withdrew on the day of nominations after a personal
appeal by the Sands family.
Fitt predictably criticised the S.D.L.P. resolution.

He said

the party could no longer claim to be a Labour Party, or one of
reconciliation:

"It

non-unionist voters

is a shame, an outrage and a gross betrayal of
in this constituency who have been put into a

position where they have no candidate for which they can vote in
conformity with their opposition to violence. 1132

In the 1960s

Fitt's politics were largely based on denigration with the Unionist
Party being the prey.

In the 1980s disparagement was also Fitt's

main political

weapon.

was rebuked.

There was an element of spite in Fitt's slighting

language.
The S.D.L.P.

Nevertheless,

However, the S.D.L.P. was now the party that

his attack in this instance was justified.

had posed as constitutional nationalists but they had

bowed to tribal considerations and allowed an I.R.A. man a free run.
Adams understandably welcomed the two-horse race outcome and was
confident of the result:

"The election of Bobby Sands will serve as

an acid test for those who reject British attempts to criminalise
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opposition to their presence in this country. 1133
As the election drew closer, Fitt claimed that there was serious
dissension
contest
11

in the ranks of the S.D.L.P. because of its failure to
seat. 34

the

abstain. 1135

Fitt was correct;

contest all

there was a degree of conflict

elections at the next general election, which included
Fitt was defiant:

West Belfast.

before the S.D.L.P.
long

voters was to

but this was patched up when it was agreed to

within the party,

area

His advice to S.D.L.P.

after

11

I was representing West Belfast

was in existence and I will be representing the
the S.D.L.P.

has ceased to be a force

in

Bel fast. 1136
Sands'
political
throughout

election campaign was aided by Provisional Sinn Fein's
organization,
the

representative,
H-Block/Political

area.
instead

with

Adams

Morrison campaigning

Sands did not stand as
his

platform

Prisoner stand.

nationalist support.

and

a Sinn Fein

was based on an anti-

This attracted a broad spectrum of

Frank McManus (former Unity M.P. for the area},

Bernadette Devlin McAliskey and Noel Maguire all lent their support
to the campaign.

The nationalist population was asked to vote in

support of the prisoners' five demands, not for the fact that Sands
was a republican and believed in the armed struggle.
Election day was April
86.8%.

9,

with a predictably high turnout of

Sands was victorious,

polling 30,492 votes to West's

29,046. 37

The result

indicated that all

strains of nationalism

had merged

in support of the prisoners.

After 41 days on hunger

strike and after reportedly losing 28 pounds in weight, Bobby Sands
became a Member of Parliament.
Danny Morrison commented on the outcome:
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This result has finally proved through the ballot box, how deep
the support is for republican prisoners. The people of Fermanagh
and South Tyrone have spoken on behalf of the Irish nation. He
(Sands) will not resign the seat. The hunger strike will take its
course. 38
Fitt was alarmed, saying that the result was a "mandate for the
Provisional I.R.A.," and feared the consequences:
There will certainly be untold repercussions for a long time to
come, and it will lead to greater polarisation and alienation
between the two communities, especially in Fermanagh and South
Tyrone where the Protestant population will believe that their
Catholic neighbours are giving overt support to the I.R.A. 39
Fitt overestimated the extent to which vote for Sands was a vote
for the

Many Catholics voted for Sands to highlight the

I.R.A.

H-block campaign and to prevent him from losing his life.

Fitt's

hatred for the Provisionals had induced an obdurate attitude.

Adams

used the result as an opportunity to attack Fitt:
The result of the by-election had proved many things - not least
that Mr Gerry Fitt's call to the electorate was totally ignored by
the nationalist people of the area. Fitt placed his political
reputation against the lives of the hunger-strikers and suffered
the consequences of his despicable treachery.
He challenged Fitt to resign his seat and claimed the people of West
Belfast would give him the same answer as did the people of Fermanagh
and South Tyrone. 40
Sands could no longer simply be regarded as a terrorist - he was
now a democratically elected M.P.

However, the election victory had

no effect on the British government and Thatcher remained steadfast
in her refusal
died.

to meet the concessions demanded.

Two days later, 100,000 people attended his funeral.

after Sands'

Embassy.

A week

death, Francis Hughes, the second hunger striker, died,

and was followed within two weeks
O'Hara.

On May 5, Sands

In Dublin,

by Raymond McCreesh and Patsy

there was severe rioting outside the British
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On May 20, the day before McCreesh and O'Hara died, polling took
place for the local
atmosphere,

government election.

Provisional

In an extremely tense

Sinn Fein persisted with

its abstention

Fitt again contested the election for Belfast area 'G'.

policy.

He

did not prepare a manifesto or an election address, but preferred to
rely on his past record as a public representative.

He defined what

he considered to be the issues involved:
So far as I am concerned those who are opposed to me in this
election have made it quite clear that their opposition is based
on my stand in relation to terrorism and its supporters.
I therefore fully accept that a vote for me is a vote against the
gunman,
and I leave this decision to the electorate of
Bel fast. 41
If Fitt was correct, that a vote for him was a vote against the
gunmen,

the ramifications of the results were grave

constitutional ism.

Fitt polled only 541

indeed for

first-preference votes,

which was only 5.4% of the votes cast and 900 below the quota
required for election.
The result showed how polarised the community had become.

Sam

Ashby of the D.U.P. and Fergus O'Hare of the P.O. were both elected
on the first count.

Sammy Millar, a member of the U.D.A, was also

elected.

The Alliance candidate fared badly and for Fitt, the result

was

disaster,

a

as

the

first-preference votes.

S.D.L.P.

candidate

gained

more

After twenty three years Fitt's career as a

Belfast City Councillor was over. After his elimination he claimed,
I put in my nomination papers in the full knowledge that I was going
II

to be defeated",

adding

"I hope the electors haven't made as big a

mistake as I think they have. "42
Sean MacStiofain,
1970 to 1972,

who was Chief of Staff of the P.I.R.A. from

made an observation that can be applied to this
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He claimed:

election.

"It has always

been a feature of Irish

attitudes that while backing for the revolutionary movement may ebb
and

flow at different times,

prisoners and their families
believe

people's sympathy for republican
Fitt refused to

is constant."~

that despite their deeds the militant members of the
remain

movement

republican
community. 44

integral

an

This helps explain why the

people had abandoned Fitt.

part

of

their

"nationally minded"

O'Hare interpreted his triumph:

It shows that the people in the area support the prisoners five
demands, not the programme put forward by any other anti-unionist
candidate. My vote trebled that of other anti-unionist candidates
and quadrupled that of Gerry Fitt's. It was a total rejection of
Mr Fitt's stance in the election and his attacks on the
prisoners.
We call on him to step down from his Westminster seat
and put his present views to the electorate. 45
There can be no doubt that Fitt's stance on the hunger strike
had been rejected by nationalists.

A week after the results had been

declared he spoke with some bitterness:
I have no intention of leaving my home. However, I certainly do
not feel as committed to this area as I once did. After last
week's election in which I lost my City Council seat, it would be
more than human for me to open my door to people with the same
enthusiasm I once did.
I expect that within two or three weeks
people who did not vote for me will come back to my advice centre
at home with their giro, electricity bill, housing executive and
other problems. 46
With all
replacements

four of the initial hunger strikers now dead and their
in the early stages of their protest, there was a chance

that interest
case.
prisoners

in the prison issue might diminish.

On June 11,

the Irish Republic went to the polls with nine

- four of whom were on hunger strike - nominated as

candidates for the Dail.
by

This was not the

the strike.

Cavan/Monaghan and

The Southern election was markedly affected

Two prisoners were elected - Kieran Docherty in
Patrick Agnew,

a blanket man,

in Louth.

The
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impetus of the protest was thus retained.
Fine Gael

Haughey was ousted and

and the Labour Party formed a Coalition government.

Dr

Garret Fitzgerald took office at the beginning of July.
In the North,

after four deaths,

both the prisoners and the

British government took up entrenched positions.
McDonnell

On July 8, Joe

died and on July 13, Martin Hurson became the sixth hunger

striker to perish.
Throughout
deadlock.

July,

further efforts were made to break the

Fitzgerald's government formally appealed to the United

States to intervene,
embroiled in the

but President Reagan was disinclined to become
The deaths continued;

Irish problem.

at the

beginning of August both Kevin Lynch of the I.N.L.A. and Kieran
Docherty T.D. had died.
Despite the continuing deaths, attention again became focused on
the political

arena.

Welsh Nationalist M.P. Daifydd Elis Thomas had

managed to get the writ for the by-election (caused by Sands' death)
passed through the House of Commons.

Fitt was totally opposed to the

motion and asked the speaker:
Have you taken into account, Mr Speaker, that the emaciated dead
or dying body of an I.R.A. hunger striker is a more lethal weapon
than an armalite rifle in the arms of the men of violence?
By accepting the motion now, the House may be condemning hunger
strikers and others to death. 47
Despite Fitt's arguments,

the date for the

Fermanagh/South

Tyrone by-election was set for August 20.
After the death of Sands,
which

prevented

Westminster.

the House of Commons passed a Bill

convicted felons

from running for a seat at

This measure was intended to prevent a second hunger

striker contesting Fermanagh/South Tyrone.

As a result, Owen Carron,
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who had acted as Sands'

election agent,

was selected as a proxy

political prisoner.
The

by-election again placed the S.D.L.P.

predicament.
Fein,

in a difficult

They were well aware that Carron was a member of Sinn

although he was not standing on that platform.

was division
taken.

in the party,

Although there

the decision not to contest was again

The idea of a split in the nationalist vote that would enable

a unionist to win,
condemned

the

had been the deciding factor.

ruling

and

accused

the

Fitt quickly

party of "political

cowardice."~
During Carron's election campaign, the ninth hunger striker, Tom
On the actual

McElwee died.

day of the poll the tenth and as it

turned out,

final

also died.

In a return of 88.2% Carron actually managed to increase

Sands'

hunger striker,

vote by 786, polling 31,278.

and former U.D.R.

Michael Devine, of the I.N.L.A.

The Official Unionist candidate

Major Ken Maginnis, polled 29,048 votes - almost

exactly the same as West had managed against Sands. 49 The vote
showed two things.

First, it illustrated the nationalist community's

concern for the plight of the prisoners and their displeasure with
Britain's stance.

Second,

it demonstrated yet again the deep

sectarian division in the constituency.
The hunger strike finally came to an end in October.

Ten

prisoners had died and the families of those still fasting pledged to
intervene to prevent further deaths.

On October 3, 1981, the six

remaining hunger strikers ended the protest.
The election victories of Sands and Carron and of the two T.D's
in June convinced many in the republican movement of the validity of
the

political

approach.

They would soon decide to give_ the
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electorate a further alternative.
During the hunger strikes, Fitt's home was repeatedly attacked
with petrol

bombs by nationalists angered with his attitude.

Crowds

often gathered and chanted "Fitt the Brit." He was clearly becoming
identified as an agent of British governmental policy in Northern
Ireland.

This notion was reinforced by the recurrent veneration

expressed by the British media.

For example, the London Times ran an

article entitled "Fitt - an M.P. under siege," praising him for his
bravery. 50

To be fair to Fitt,

there

is no doubt that he

displayed courage that won admiration from all kinds of people.

He

was a shrewd politician and could have chosen to bend with the wind
in order to survive.

He,

however, never modified his view:

I have done nothing wrong that would have brought harm or 1nJury
to anyone.
I've condemned bloodshed and violence. I condemned
the hunger strike. It was a tragic loss of life. Since then very
nastf things have happened but I've learned to live with
it. 5

Fitt was now permanently guarded by detectives wherever he went.
At the Provisional

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis

in November, 1981,

republicans officially decided to contest elections in the North.
Danny Morrison explained the strategy:

"Who here really believes we

can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object
if,

with a ballot paper in this hand, and an armalite in this hand,

we take power in Ireland?"~
In December the party issued the following statement:
The deaths of our comrades on hunger strike must mark a watershed
in this struggle.
People looking back on this era in 10 years
time must say, yes, it was the selfless idealism of ten young men
in 1981 which turned the course of Irish history and led to the
reunification of this country.
But events do not just harpen.
to us to make them happen.

They are made to happen.

It is up
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Fitt was unimpressed with
contest elections.
"anarchy"

Provisional Sinn Fein's decision to

He claimed that the I.R.A. were intent to create

and maintained that the situation at the close of 1981 was

as tense as the period of the U.W.C. strike in 1974. 54
The 1980s had thus far been extremely difficult for Fitt.
Furthermore,

prospects for the future looked no brighter.

He now had

a formidable and resurgent republican movement to contend with whose
ballot box - armalite strategy would threaten his Westminster seat.
In comparison to 1981, 1982 was less fraught with tension.

In

their New Year message, Provisional Sinn Fein repeated that it would
be contesting local and Westminster elections in the coming years.

A

statement from Richard McAuley, Vice Chairman of the Ulster Executive
of

the

party,

suggested that

1982 held many challenges for

republicanism:
I have no doubt that, with the experiences gained in 1981 and
given our political development, we can rise to the occasion and
provide the nationalist population with the positive leadership
they demand.
The indomitable spirit of Irish resistance to
British aggression was courageously demonstrated in the principle
stand taken by our imprisoned comrades and the deaths of our 10
H-Block marthyrs.
1981 saw Sinn Fein commit itself to challenge
the electoral monopoly of the bankrupt and collaborationist
S.D.L.P. and if, in the coming year, such an op~ortunity arises,
the republican movement will not be found wanting. 5
While Provisional Sinn Fein advanced into 1982 with some aplomb,
Fitt's position was somewhat precarious.

He was no longer leader, or

even a member of the S.D.L.P., and had been heavily defeated in local
government.

Many,

particularly in nationalist circles, felt that

Fitt now spoke for no one except himself.
reflected

in newspaper coverage in Northern Ireland - the Irish News

being the clearest example.
his local

This circumstance was

government defeat

In the 1960s and 1970s and indeed up to
in 1981, the Irish News quoted Fitt's
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views extensively.

However,

after the hunger strike period, much

less attention was devoted to him.
situation.

First,

irrelevant,

Two reasons explain. this

Fitt was perceived as becoming

increasingly

despite still being the M.P. for West Belfast and second,

it reflected the fact

that he no longer expressed a traditional

nationalist/Catholic attitude.

In other words, he did not represent

the views of his constituents.
In September 1981, James Prior had replaced Atkins as Northern
Ireland Secretary of State.

In his first statement he said that he

was prepared to lay his political

reputation "on the line" in an

effort to secure a political settlement.

His "rolling devolution"

plan envisaged a 78 member elected assembly which would initially
have a consultative role only.

However, its powers could later be

extended to include the devolution of local government departments,
on

the

condition

that

it achieved sufficient cross-community

support. 56
The

S.D.L.P.

unworkable. 57

They still

Anglo-Irish context,
the Official

and Taoiseach Haughey dismissed the plan as
wished to see more progress

not in an internal solution.

in the

Furthermore, even

Unionist Party was against the plan, considering it no

more than a revival of power-sharing.

At Westminster in April, Fitt

pointed out that three main elements had expressed opposition and if
they maintained their attitude and received a mandate, there would be
no hope in forming

an executive. 58

By the end of the month,

Fitt's realism had been converted to hope:
take this chance.

"I believe we have to

We should tell the people of Northern Ireland we

are now giving you the opportunity to take into your own hands the
success or failure of your destiny."~

Essentially,

Fitt had
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been reduced to being a mere commentator on political matters rather
than an

influential

figure.

Previously he had at least had the

appearance of importance but now his self imposed isolation resulted
in the loss of even that.
Paisley's view of the prior plan laid bare the stark realities
of the situation;

"The White Paper must have some good since it has

raised the hackles of Mr Haughey and the S.D.L.P."M
well

He was

aware that a lack of emphasis on the Irish dimension would not

have pleased the constitutional nationalists.
While the arguments continued over Prior's proposals, Britain
and Argentina had gone to war over the Falkland Islands.
conflict again

This

indicated a difference of opinion between Fitt and

nationalist elements.

It also showed Fitt further identifying with

British policy rather than Irish sentiment.
Haughey was opposed to Britain's Falklands operation, which was
reflected

in his refusal

Argentinians.

to back British sanctions against the

Public statements also made it quite apparent where

his sympathies lay.

The cordial relationship between the Taoiseach

and Thatcher thus cooled considerably.
S.D.L.P.,

as

This was a blow to the

it seemed to end any hope for

future Anglo-Irish

developments.
Fitt took a very much different view from the Irish Premier.
His declaration to the Defence Secretary at Westminster in May shows
how pro-British he had become:

"Will

he

accept that the

bellicose and belligerent statements emanating from the extremely
anti-British government in Dublin are not representative of the Irish
people,

who

conflict?" 61

do

not

see

Britain as the aggressor in this
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Fitt's assertion can only really have been made on the basis of
intuition.

This does seem to suggest that he was increasingly

looking at

Ireland from the distant Westminster perspective.

people living

Irish

in England may well have been influenced by the jargon

of the British press, but it is highly improbable and unlikely that
Catholic Ireland would have endorsed British action.
Sinn Fein for
Falklands

in An

Thatcher:

its part, castigated the British attitude to the

Phoblacht/Republican News. 62

"You have to be prepared to defend the things in which you

believe and be prepared to use force
secure

The paper quoted

the

future

of

if that is the only way to

liberty and self-determination"

before

criticising what they considered outright hypocrisy:
It has been said before and we repeat: it is no crime and there
is no moral wrong in lifting a stone, raising the muzzle of a
rifle or planting a bomb against those who oppress our country,
against those who terrorise our people. And that is one lesson
well learnt from the hypocrisy of British guns in the South
Atlantic.~
Ironically,
election to

both

Fitt and Sinn

Fein called for the proposed

Prior's Assembly to be contested.

Sinn Fein were ready

to seek support at the polls for the first time in the North in the
present round of the troubles,

albeit on an abstentionist ticket.

Fitt recommended that the S.D.L.P. also contest the election:
I advise the S.D.L.P. to fight the election. I know that it will
fight, because, if it does not, it will hand the seats over to
abstainers and to Provisional Sinn Fein.
A conglomerate of
loonies
and
head
cases
will
win seats in those
circumstances. 64
As the prospect of an autumn poll became increasingly likely,
there were signs of internal

dissent within the S.D.L.P. over its

attitude to such an election.

Fitt was well aware of this.

end of July he asked Prior at Westminster:

At the
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Will he take it from me, as a founder member and former leader of
the S.D.L.P., that not all its members are opposed to fighting
elections, that a small contingent is taking orders from the
Taoiseach, whose advice is not to take part in the electioni, and
that the S.D.L.P. as a party will, unless the moon or the sun
falls from the sky, be fighting the elections? 65
Adams also argued against a boycott:
We call for all republican supporters to mobilise behind Sinn
Fein's campaign to smash the new Stormont and British rule in
Ireland.
The S.D.L.P. are intent once again on masquerading as the sole
representatives of the nationalist people, and on the earliest
pretext will give Prior the respectability which he needs. We
have their past record on this. The time has come to confront
them, to break their monopoly and offer the nationalist people a
new leadership. 66
Fitt proved to be correct.
the election,
Official

The S.D.L.P. did decide to contest

but like Sinn Fein, on an abstentionist ticket.

The

Unionist Party, despite its continued opposition to Prior's

plan, also decided to contest.
Despite urging the S.D.L.P. to fight the election, Fitt himself
did not take part.
the Assembly,

His reason was that he saw no hope or future for

as the "desperate" needs of the people had been pushed

aside by "protagonists in pursuit of total nationalism and unionism."
He

was again critical

domination,

of the S.D.L.P:

not reconciliation."

losing votes to the S.D.L.P.

career was over:

in my political

about

Fitt must have been fearful of
and Sinn Fein.

influenced his decision not to contest.
political

"They are all

This must also have

He denied, however, that his

"I believe that I have proved consistent

ideals on which

I fought in my first and my last

election campaigns.

It may be that these policies may no longer be

acceptable.

it can only be shown in the next Westminster

elections. 1167
murder. "68

If so,

He accused Sinn Fein of seeking a "mandate for
The Sinn Fein manifesto countered:

"For far too
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long the British government has been able to rely upon politicians
from the nationalist community going to Stormont Castle, queuing for
talks and picking up cheques."~
The result of the general

election,

held in the republic in

February 1982 had been a disappointment to Sinn Fein.

They had hoped

that the anti-British feeling, manifested during the hunger strikes,
would be retained and converted into political support.

But their

seven candidates only managed to hold half the H-Block vote of June
1981 and they did not gain any seats. Despite this, they entered the
Assembly elections with a high degree of confidence.

The electorate

contained a new generation of disillusioned Catholics who had endured
a decade of social deprivation, violence and political deadlock.

The

hunger strikes had politicized many.
The results of the election justified Sinn Fein optimism.

They

took five of the 78 seats with more than 10% of the first preference
votes and showed an advance of 2.5% over the aggregate pro-H-Block
vote

in the 1981

local government elections.

This performance was

even more impressive due to the fact that they only put up candidates
in seven of the twelve constituencies and managed to top the poll in
two.

Carron in Fermanagh/South Tyrone and ominously for Fitt, Adams

in West Belfast. 70

Adams called on Fitt to

his salary to the people living
flats

and

candidate,

Moyard." 71

Joe

"resign or donate

in atrocious conditions in Divis

Hendron,

the defeated S.D.L.P.

explained why he felt Adams had won:

"I think Sinn Fein

benefited from the votes of young people in the 18 - 25 age group who
used the party to register a vote against the harassment they have
suffered from the security forces
Whatever,

over the past ten years." 72

a clear result of the Assembly elections was quite simply
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the fact that Sinn Fein's electoral

strategy had been totally

vindicated.
In their 1983 New Year's message, Sinn Fein vowed to follow up
its success at the Assembly elections and renewed its pledge to
overthrow British rule by promising to expose "weak-kneed nationalist
parties." 73

An editorial

in the

Fein's claim had some validity:

Irish News suggested that Sinn

"If the S.D.L.P. are to arrest the

slide to Sinn Fein they must re-organise and redouble their efforts
in

places

like

West

Belfast

where the Sinn Fein star is

rising. " 74

1983 was

also to be a Westminster election year.

In February,

the first clashes took place between the likely candidates, namely
Fitt,

Adams and S.D.L.P.

Oxford University,
the P.I.R.A.:
politics.

Assemblyman Hendron.

During a debate at

Fitt launched a scathing attack on Sinn Fein and

"A vote for Sinn Fein

is a vote for the gun in

All Sinn Fein candidates had been told at their Ard Fheis

that they had to unanimously support the armed struggle, which means
the shooting of defenceless people." 75
Reacting to Fitt's attack, Adams said that it was significant it
had been issued from England:

"Where he feels more at home than in

the ghettos of Moyard or Divis flats, where Sinn Fein is attempting
to represent the people in their everyday social
problems."

and economic

He accused Fitt of "supporting the British presence in

Ireland with the inevitable violence which emanates from the barrels
of British army and R.U.C.
and described him as
S.D.L.P.
which

seat.

guns." 76

Hendron also attacked Fitt

"the absentee M.P."

He claimed:

"This is an

Stand aside and let the seat be won by the S.D.L.P.,

is opposed to all

forms of violence,

and

is prepared to
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represent the people of West Belfast." 77
While

Fitt

was receiving this criticism from politicians

representing the nationalist community, the British press continued
to praise him.
J.R.A.

The Daily Telegraph, in a leader article said the

hated Fitt with a unique passion as the man from their

community who "sees them for what they are."n
Other British newspapers devoted considerable space regarding
the continued attacks on
full

page headlined,

article

entitled

wonder that

Fitt's home.

The Daily Express carried a

"Fitt's Fortress"~ and the Daily Mail an

"We

shall

not be moved." 80

It

is little

Fitt was increasingly being discredited as a creature of

the British.
As the election,
attacks on Sinn Fein:

set for June 9, drew closer, Fitt renewed his
"Sinn Fein have said they will take control in

Ireland with a ballot in one hand and an armalite in the other.
yes,

Ah

the ballot for those who are with them - the bullet for those

who aren't." 81
He also continued to castigate the S.D.L.P.:
Some people may have been mesmerised by the Assembly Election
results last year.
Let me remind them that Sinn Fein owes such
success as it had last time to the decisions of a cowardly
S.D.L.P. policy, which twice gave the Provisionals a free run in
Fermanagh/South Tyrone. 82
The Sinn Fein manifesto insisted that they would campaign
vigorously for a united

Ireland, a democrataic socialist republic,

free from foreign occupation and sectarian rule.
entitled

The manifesto

"The Voice of Principled Leadership" stated that Sinn Fein

welcomed the opportunity to again demonstrate the:

"Growing support

for our principled stand against the British government and Loyalism,
and our unapologetic stand in support of national reunification and
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in

defence

of

the right of Irish people to resist British

occupation."~
Fitt argued that the electorate had a stark choice:

"They must

choose between the fascist tactics of the Provisionals and the
democratic

standards

decades." 84
week ago

I have sought to cherish and uphold for

By May 30,

"A

he demonstrated some confidence:

I would have said that Adams was going to win.

second and Joe Hendron third.

I'd be

Now I'm saying that Adams and I are

going to fight like hells gates and Hendron will still come third."
When further pressed about his chances, he replied:
If I lost this election I wouldn't feel bitter with myself, but
I'd feel the people of West Belfast were voting for violence, and
I wouldn't want to live in a constituency or a country where
people were deliberately casting their votes for a continuation of
the tragedy we have had down all those years. 85
To Hendron, Fitt was "only splitting the moderate vote." 86
Fitt,

Adams and Hendron were not the only Catholic candidates

contesting West Belfast.

The Workers Party put forward Mary McMahon,

whose only realistic goal

was to increase her party's share of the

vote.
The

Irish News claimed that

16,000 unionist voters

in 1983 there were approximately

in the West Belfast constituency. 87 The

impact of that vote was reduced by the failure of the Official
Unionists and the D.U.P.
result,

to agree on a "unity" candidate.

As a

Tommy Passmore represented the Official Unionists and George

Haffey the D.U.P.

There was considerable speculation that unionists

would cast their vote for Fitt in an attempt to defeat Adams.

The

Orange Standard, in an article entitled "Fitt The Brit's Great Grit,"
gives this suggestion validity:
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Today West Belfast is a very different place, politically. With
the very extensive movement of population in the past 12 years,
the Official Unionist position has been seriously undermined, and
the battle is no longer between unionism and nationalism, but
between Gerry Fitt's independent stance and republicanism of the
most extreme form, and, of course, the S.D.L.P.
It may well be that if the Unionist Parties discover that the
balance of probability is that the West Belfast seat is not
winnnable by them, then they will be faced with the option of
making a choice between Mr Fitt and those who oppose him.
Should this prove to be the case, then wouldn't it be a
magnanimous gesture for the anti-republican, anti-nationalist and
anti-S.D.L.P. sectors of the electorate in that constituency to
throw their weight behind the present occupant, who, one is given
to understand,
already receives the support of individual
unionists. 88
Fitt's politics had

been so transformed that he was now deemed

to be sufficiently anti-nationalist to allow unionists to vote for
him.
Hendron considered himself to be the main threat to Adams:
"Gerry Fitt

is a total rank outsider, he just does not count.

vote for him is ensuring a victory for Sinn Fein.

Any

I am the only one

who can beat Gerry Adams. 1189
On June 7, Fitt took out a full page advertisement in the Irish
News

listing

his

achievements

during

the

previous sixteen

years. 90

In a conversation with a journalist just prior to the

election,

he talked of what he considered were the trials of being

"outside a tribe":

"There is a great deal of comfort and security to

belong to one tribe or another in Northern Ireland.

If you don't

belong to one of those tribes you are regarded as something of an
eccentric,

a bit of a looney or a traitor."

He pictured the scenario

if Sinn Fein polled a substantial vote:

If any significant section of the Northern Irish Catholic people
votes for Sinn Fein candidates, whether they win seats or not, it
points a very dark scenario. Because it will be seen then by the
Protestants that the Catholics are voting for violence.
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My seat is nothing compared to what the outcome of that could be.
It would be bad, very bad, it would be frightening. All the
Catholic population would be maligned. Maybe it is fortuitous
that the Catholic population is being given this choice at this
time, before the situation gets really out of hand. It may be
hopeful that they are being given this chance to reject violent
men and their violent gospels.
If this rejection of violence
comes from the ballot box - people will start to breathe. 91
Fitt's hopes were dashed

- Sinn

Fein achieved a 13.4% poll,

which was 3% up on the Assembly election.

Furthermore, Adams was

elected M.P. for West Belfast, with Fitt coming third behind Hendron.
Fitt's defeat on June 9,

1983 marked an end of an era, about

which he commented:
It is a victory which will appear, and which will certainly be
interpreted by the outside world, that the Catholic population are
endorsing candidates who are openly associated with, and political
apologists for the men of violence. I think that holds a very
dark future for Northern Ireland and the whole of Ireland. 92
Adams'

victory was on a minority vote,

while Fitt's vote

represented a considerable improvement from the 1981 Local government
election when he only managed to poll 541 as against 3,006 in 1977.
Passmore and Haffey only achieved a combined total of 4,834, so Fitt
claimed that he had secured Protestant support:
Half my votes come from Protestant working class in the Shankill
Road and half came from working class in the Falls Road. I have
striven all my political life to unite the Catholic and Protestant
working classes in this tragically divided city, and that is what
I did yesterday. 93
He told the Belfast News Letter, "It made me feel like a nigger
in

Alabama

who

had been voted

in by the Ku Klux Kl an. "94

Republicans did not deny that Protestants had voted for Fitt but they
forwarded a different reason:
In view of his unpopularity amongst nationalists, it is clear that
a large section of Fitt's 10,326 votes came from Loyalists.
Contrary to his claim that he had succeeded in uniting the
Protestant and Catholic working class,
the vote merely
demonstrates that even a Catholic can win Loyalist support if he
is sufficiently pro-British. 95
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The 1981

Local

come to see

government election showed that many voters had

Fitt as

something of a political parasite.

Fitt did make a considerable comeback in the
election.
voting

However,

1983 Westminster

Evidence does indeed suggest that there was some tactical
against

Sinn

Fein by Protestant voters.

The Ulster

acknowledged that "in the absence of a candidate of stature who would
swing the vote away from the I.R.A's Sinn Fein, Gerry Fitt secured a
big percentage of their votes." 96
is given

This tactical

voting theory

further substance by the 1987 Westminster election.

On the

basis of the combined Hendron/Fitt vote in 1983, Adams should not
have won in 1987.

However, he did.

Although unionists may have felt

they could have cast their vote in favour of Fitt in 1983 (who after
all

had now renounced the concept of nationalism) they perhaps could

not bring themselves

to vote for Hendron and the S.D.L.P. who had

endorsed the Anglo Irish Agreement, an agreement so repugnant to the
vast majority of Protestants.
Although there are grounds then to suggest that Protestant
voting

in

West

considerations,
Catholics

and

sentiment

Belfast

it would
indeed some

and

in

Protestants voted for

a sense of loyalty.

Fitt because of

In terms of traditional

Few could argue that in the limited avenues that were open to

assistance.

no

by tactical

Fitt worked extremely hard over the

him he helped or at least tried to

become

influenced

be misleading not to acknowledge that many

constituency clientalist effort
years.

1983 was

people who sought his

Yet over the years the plight of Fitt's constituents had

increasingly desperate and

longer

help

sufficed. 97

Many

Fitt's brand of welfare politics
young

disgruntled nationalist

voters demanded radical change and felt Sinn Fein could provide it.
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Reaction in Britain was summed up by James Prior, who considered
Fitt's

defeat

"disastrous"

and

the British authorities were

understandably alarmed by Sinn Fein's success. 98
In the Republic,

there was a general lamentation expressed by
The Cork Examiner typified the

the media over Fitt's defeat.
prevailing sentiment:

Gerry Adams gained their (Sinn Fein) sole seat and this was at the
expense of the 17 year old career of the former S.D.L.P. leader
and parliamentarian of great moral courage, Gerry Fitt. This
outcome, in a constituency in which Mr Fitt could not conduct a
normal canvass because of violent conditions, will sadden many
admirers of his steadfastness over the lengthy years of Northern
strife. 99
Even the

Irish Press, which had been so critical of Fitt during

the hunger strikes, bemoaned his plight:
Perhaps the most impressive result of the day - and in some ways
the saddest - was that of Gerry Fitt whose long parliamentary
career ended with his defeat in West Belfast. But Mr Fitt, whose
political courage and social commitment were always beyond
question, said farewell in the most impressive manner possible
notching up a very creditable 10,000 votes when his opponents had
been predicting that he would be lucky to get even a third of that
vote.
West Belfast Protestant and Catholic, ignored the pundits
and remembered the hard work Mr Fitt had put in on their behalf
for almost 20 years. 100
There had been some predictions that Fitt would be elevated to
the

House

commented:

of Lords and after his election defeat,

his wife

"If Mrs Thatcher knows what this man has done for the

people of West Belfast,

she'll promote him to the House of Lords -

but I doubt if he would accept it." 101
On June 19, the London Sunday Times reported "Many M.P's of all
parties also hope to see Gerry Fitt, defeated Independent Socialist
M.P.

for West Belfast,

Upper House." 102

continue his parliamentary service in the

On July 22,

1983 it was announced that Fitt

had been offered and had accepted a life peerage.

He remarked:
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I do not think I have done anything to be honoured about. What I
have done in politics I have felt to be right. I took decisions
which were not supported by everyone
I have over the past 11 years been under serious attack by
Provisional I.R.A. supporters and other republican elements.
Prior to that, I was viciously attacked by Loyalist supporters. I
have always and always will, make my feelings known against I.R.A.
violence and Loyalist violence. 1ro
The announcement was predictably criticised by Adams:
This peerage exposes absolutely the anti-democratic nature of the
British system of government when a failed politician who has been
rejected by the people of North Belfast in a Council election and
by the people of West Belfast in a Westminster election, is then
installed in a position of making and influencing foreign law for
use against these people. 1~
Ironically,
unionists

an Official Unionist spokesman said, "I don't think

are greatly excited about

celebrate
Lords." 105

the

elevation

of

a

it.

We are not going to

republican

to the House of

The spokesman was presumably aware of the

ironic

content of his statement.
Just over two weeks prior to the peerage declaration, on July 3,
Fitt's home had been badly damaged
perpetrators had broken
burned

it

in an arson attack.

The

into the house, removed the furniture and

in the back yard before setting fire to the house itself.

Fitt was adamant that the Provisionals had carried out the raid and
admitted defeat,

"They have succeeded after 11 years to drive me out

of this house." 106
Sinn Fein,
Fitt."

for their part, condemned the burning of "Fortress

Joe Austin, Chairman of North Belfast Sinn Fein, declared the

burning "a wanton and mindless act of destruction." 107
Fitt now claims that it was that latest attack on his home and
in particular,

the destruction of his wedding photos, which made him

accept the peerage as a form of retaliation. 108

The adulation
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by

the

British

media,

establishment and
perhaps

the continuing favour of the British

indeed the violence his family were subjected to

made Fitt's decision

political
would not

inevitable.

integrity must be questioned.

Nevertheless,

Fitt's

A disciple of James Connolly

become a Peer of the Realm.

The two positions are

diametrically opposed.
Predictably,

in Britain,

his undertaking to join the Lords was

welcomed by politicians (both Michael Foot, then leader of the Labour
Party,
the

and Thatcher had forwarded his name) and the media alike.
Republic there was little,

press. 109
selected

The

Irish

if any,

Independent editorial

and rightly so. 11110

In

condemnation from the
claimed:

"Fitt was

This sentiment differed greatly

from the editorial of the Irish News (which for so many years had an
almost sycophantic relationship with Fitt):
Gerry Fitt's acceptance of a peerage from Britain can only be
regarded by the nationalist population of the North as a sort of
betrayal.
In spite of the carefully orchestrated publicity of the
past weeks, it had been hoped even to the last moment, that this
brave, but misguided former idol of the nationalist community,
would stop short of giving total credibility to institutions that
are
so directly opposed to every principle he once
represented. 111
On October 26,
Hill,
the

Gerry Fitt was ennobled as Baron Fitt of Bells

after taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Queen. 112 As
Irish News

interpreted:

socialist docker." 113

"It was a strange day for the one time

"'

1'<• •
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CONCLUSION
I believe that political opportunists although they may win short
term successes, generally fail in the long run, because in due
course people find them out. One cannot forever be a republican
in Belfast and a socialist in London, a nationalist at Stormont
and a British subject at Westminster.
Nor can one build an
enduring political career upon a great heap of irresponsible
criticism and denigration. (Terence O'Neill, Irish News, May 25,
1968).
The above quotation has already appeared in the main body of
this dissertation,

but a second adduction is justified as O'Neill's

statements neatly encapsulate Gerry Fitt's tactical

ploys.

Fitt

endeavoured to defy Aesop's dictum that you cannot please all of the
people all of the time.
all

things

to all

Particularly in the 1960s, Fitt strove to be

men.

Therefore, the remarkable volte-face, from

Republican Socialist to

Peer of the Realm is

remarkable as

neither a republican nor a socialist in the

true

Fitt was

sense.

He was,

however,

in reality not so

a nationalist who became so

disillusioned with the ideology that he felt able to join the British
House of Lords.

By considering each of Fitt's political labels in

turn, I shall attempt to show how perceptive O'Neill was.
In
believes

contemporary

Irish terms,

in uniting Ireland by physical force.

to this tradition.
prisoners

considering

"political

opponents"

of unionism.

granting of political

is

someone who

Fitt was sympathetic

In 1962 Fitt demanded the release of republican

political

however,

a republican

them

"men of principle"

and

In 1972 he called for the

status for republican

prisoners.

By 1980,

he denounced republicans on hunger strike and asked the

British government to deny their political demands.

His stance would

suggest that Fitt radically altered his views on republicans and came
to betray his original ideals.

This appraisal, however, is much too
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simplistic.

It does not appreciate that Fitt's republicanism, when

exhibited,

was tactical and furthermore it fails to recognise that he

operated in shifting historical circumstances.
Chapter

I established that the 1.R.A. campaign of 1956 - 1962

was nothing more than a series of border incidents impinging little
on the

life of the citizens

demonstrated

in either the north or south.

that the republican movement did

It

not reflect the

aspirations of nationalists and that the policy of physical force was
no longer viable.
placed

in

Fitt's apparent republicanism in the 1960s must be

this context.

republican

He was cunning enough to discern that

laurels would be helpful, if not absolutely necessary, to

a budding Catholic politician.
this

period.

Fitt was nothing if not versatile in

He was supportive of the republican prisoners and made

sure he was

seen at the annual

deference to the republican dead.

Easter parades designed to show
In essence, in the early 1960s,

Fitt's republicanism was tactical and opportunistic.
Likewise,
"Republican

when Fitt and Harry Diamond joined forces in 1964, the
Labour Party" was

considerations.
tag with

the true

based on

tactical

In time, Fitt was able to jettison this republican

no difficulty.

Westminster,

a mere label

he freely

Furthermore,

in

his maiden

speech at

acknowledged that he was not a republican in

sense and posed as

working class grievances.

a working-class British subject with

Although he appeared to have republican

sympathies in Belfast, he showed no such inclination in London.
Although

Fitt, occasionally flirted with rhetoric that suggested

"unconstitutional" methods
politicians,
In

the

of political agitation, he was, like all

totally unprepared

1970s

his

previous

for the re-emergence of the I.R.A.
republican

posturing was

totally
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inappropriate and he consistently condemned the I.R.A.
was

Although Fitt

never a true republican, he had played the role sufficiently well

to convince many in Belfast of his sincerity, thus his condemnation
of the

I.R.A. seemed strangely inconsistent in the light of previous

posturing.
of gross

This apparent transfiguration left Fitt open to charges
betrayal

belated final

with the elevation to the House of Lords the

insult.

Yet, when one considers the nature of Fitt's

republicanism, his peerage is not so paradoxical.
Like his

republicanism,

Fitt's socialism was largely tactical.

It was also extremely vague and based on intuition rather than on
political

theory as the paucity of his writings illustrate.

socialism was based on bread

and butter issues, or if you like,

politics of the welfare state.

Nevertheless, it must be stressed

that Fitt was extremely conscientious
working class,

His

in his endeavours for the

albeit on a clientelist basis.

Indeed, it would be

more appropriate to label Fitt as a "fixer" rather than a socialist,
his socialism being more akin to populism.
Early in his career,

Fitt had the ability to articulate the

socialist arguments of James Connolly and bring them into play when
necessary.
election
Connolly.

This strategy was instrumental in winning election after
in the 1960s.

Yet Fitt was not in the same tradition as

Fitt sought change through parliamentary means whereas

Connolly sought

it through the militancy of the working class.

Despite some of his rhetoric Fitt was a moderate reformer;
was a Revolutionary Socialist.

Connolly

This was no more evident than when

the Northern State's existence was

threatened and Fitt decided to

distance

himself

ideals.

Fitt's present argument that Connolly made a mistake by his

from elements

intent on realizing Connolly's
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involvement

in the 1916 Easter rebellion is an admission that his

allegiance to Connolly became qualified.

In short, Fitt's politics

had nothing to do with the Connolly tradition of socialism.
if there

Indeed,

is an Irish historical figure that can be likened to Fitt,

it is John Redmond.

Like Fitt, Redmond exhibited a tremendous faith

that the British parliament could right

Ireland's wrongs. F.S.L.

Lyons said of Redmond:

"He seems to have found it difficult to hate

Englishmen

English." 1

and things

The same could be said of

Fitt.
By the 1970s,
stopped.

Fitt's references to Connolly had virtually

He was the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party

(S.D.L.P.)

which, despite Fitt's early protestations to the contrary,

was not a socialist party.
to the Provisionals'
policy.

It became the voice of Catholics opposed

campaign and was mildly reformist in social

Fitt was adamant that he was a socialist in a socialist

party but on two crucial issues he demonstrated that this was not the
case.

First,

when Paddy Devlin resigned from the S.D.L.P. on

socialist principles,
instrumental
1979,

Fitt did not support him.

in bringing down the Labour government in Britain in

an action he does not regret,

anti-working
Furthermore,

Second, Fitt was

class

despite eleven years of

policies orchestrated by Margaret Thatcher.

Fitt's peerage undoubtedly allows his critics to mock

his socialist principles.

An Irish socialist should not end up in

the House of Lords.
In retrospect
differentiate

it is also clear that Fitt did not or could not

between

revolutionary

democracy of the Labour Party.

socialism

and the social

A feature of Fitt's career was his

belief that the social democracy of the Labour Party would solve the
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problems of Northern Ireland.

He was confident that it could deliver

an end to sectarian injustice and discrimination.

However, it became

obvious that the Labour Party lacked the will to put the necessary
pressure on the unionist majority.

Fitt never grasped the fact that

British

fear

politicians

tended

to

Ireland as a political

graveyard. 2
In the 1960s the Labour government did not help Fitt address the
iniquities of unionism.
belief that his
the line.
Rees'

Despite this, in the 1970s he clung to the

"socialist colleagues" would make the unionists toe

They did not.

promise

materialise.

that

They failed to endorse power-sharing.

Sunningdale

would

be

Orme's promise to the S.D.L.P.

ratified did not
that the Northern

Ireland Office would act strongly against U.W.C. strikers did not
happen.

Wilson's

speech

counter-productive.

to

the

Loyalist

strikers

was

Rees went on to placate the Provisionals,

belittling the

importance and political credibility of the S.D.L.P.

When he ended

internment it was too late.

own words,

he was

"an anti Irish wee get." When Fitt brought down

the Labour government
anything else.

As for Mason, in Fitt's

in 1979 it was as much to do with pique as

In short, it can be said that Fitt's socialism did

not run very deep and his faith in the social democracy of the Labour
Party was unrewarded.
Although
examination,
working

socialist credentials do not stand close

it cannot be denied that he had a deep affinity with the

class.

Furthermore,
stemmed,

Fitt's

He had a "them and us"

type of attitude.

Fitt secured some Protestant support at elections which

particularly in the 1960s, from his stance as a champion of

the working class.

Considering the sectarian nature of Northern
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Irish

society,

this was a worthy achievement.

Protestants as well
clinic.

A

In the 196Os

as Catholics brought their problems to his

growing

reputation

for hard work as a public

representative for the working class enabled him to partially cross
the religious divide in Northern Irish politics.

This was reflected

in his ability to retain the Dock seat which no one had managed to do
before and was
1966.

However,

when

instrumental in his winning the West Belfast seat in
although Fitt may have had some Protestant admirers

in the S.D.L.P.,

the party itself was unable to attract the

corporate Protestant community.
In 1983 the question of cross-community support for Fitt was
re-opened.

It would not be unreasonable to conclude that although

many Protestants voted for Fitt as an anti-I.R.A. move, some cast
their vote out of a sense of loyalty for past favours.

Indeed, some

Catholics also did so.
Although

it can be argued that the political labels republican

and socialist cannot be applied to Fitt with total accuracy, there is
no doubt that in his early career he was a nationalist.
Chapters

II,

III and IV established that Fitt was a nationalist

politician with very strong views on the unification of Ireland.

His

retrospective assertion that he was not interested in nationalism is
simply an attempt to rewrite history.
maiden

One only has to look at his

speech at Stormont in 1962 (when he strongly articulated his

desire to see a united Ireland) and his public speech after the West
Belfast triumph of 1966
renounce the ideal

(when he declared that

of national

unity)

he would never

to establish that Fitt was

indeed a nationalist.
Of course,

Fitt's nationalism was much more pronounced outside
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Westminster.

In the United States,

nationalist.

Furthermore,

government of the
partition.

for example,

he was openly

he was not adverse to criticising the

Irish Republic for not doing enough to end

Clearly,

Fitt was a nationalist and there

is a

contradiction between his current anti-nationalist position as a Peer
of the Realm and the political position on which he built his support
and which helped him win numerous electoral contests.
It

is clear that Fitt's political

point.

The watershed was power-sharing.

antenna shifted at some
This local emphasis was far

removed from the traditional nationalist emphasis on the whole Irish
Fitt became convinced of the merit of power-sharing. 3

nation.
Fitt's

retrospective

assertion

that

he

wanted nothing from

Sunningdale as a cross community Executive had already been agreed,
negates years of his nationalist rhetoric.

After the fall of the

Executive Fitt spoke of power-sharing as a golden age and made its
restoration

his main political aim.

Fitt's position, therefore, had

changed from wanting to initiate the demise of the Northern state to
reform of it and then collaboration in its continued existence.

It

would be naive in the extreme to suggest that politicians do not
change their policies when circumstances suit.

Fitt, however, feels

unable to acknowledge that his politics changed, thus leaving himself
open to charges of political opportunism.
The

idea that power-sharing was a watershed in Fitt's career is

not a neat concept.
benefits,
became
position

Although he became convinced of power-sharing's

he led a party that was not.

In contrast, the S.D.L.P.

increasingly nationalist orientated.

Fitt supported this

in public but evidence suggests that in private he did not.

He played a very duplicitous game that was reflected in two political
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manoeuvres that were completely contradictory.
In

1979 he brought down the Labour government on principles of

nationalism
Westminster.

arguing

against

greater

Ulster representation at

This was a complete reversal

of his

position as

articulated

in his maiden Westminster speech which demanded parity of

democracy.

Eight months later he resigned his leadership of the

S.D.L.P.

because the party had become, in his opinion, too stridently

nationalist.

He had now crossed the political divide and repudiated

nationalism.

His joining of the House of Lords was tantamount to

giving unconditional

support to British policy on Northern Ireland

and endorsing the continuation of partition.

In effect, Fitt had

become a unionist.
The question that
animal

was

begs answering

is what kind of political

Fitt that he could entertain various political labels and

traverse such a strange political

course? The answer lies in his

individuality and his instinct to survive politically.
political

labels of republican,

non-adhesive quality,

Although the

socialist and nationalist had a

Fitt was always a "survivor." The political

transference from Dock Irish Labour to Republican Labour to S.D.L.P.
to

Independent to House of Lords were all made with the minimum of

fuss.

It was not really that a one time Republican Socialist entered

the Upper House but rather a political chameleon who refused to be
denied a political forum even though he knew it would stretch if not
ruin

his

political credibility.

To Fitt the political limelight was

more

important than political ideology.

Of course, Fitt's stance on

the hunger strikes does not fit into this pattern of survival.

It

can only be assumed that Fitt took his position on this life and
death issue on moral grounds.
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individuality.
Chapter

instincts

survival

Fitt's

II

He never doubted

demonstrated that

in Chapter

I.

complemented

his own

Fitt's

symptomatic of the metamorphosis
outlined

were

political

by

his

intuition.

1966 election victory was not

in Catholic politics

that was

Although he may have been aided by the

increased desire for representation and attendance at Westminster he
was essentially a "lone operator" uninterested in large parties.
clung to

his

He

individualism and would not accept the Labour whip.

Nevertheless,

although

Fitt was not a member of the Northern Irish

Catholic middle class that emerged in the late 1950s, he became their
political

leader.

The incongruity of this is shown by Fitt's severe

clashes with the middle class

National

Democratic Party and his

acceptance of the leadership of the S.D.L.P. which incorporated and
was greatly influenced by the N.D.P.
Fitt was correct to hold on to his independence for he was never
cut out to

be a party politician, as his spell with the S.D.L.P.

proved.

No doubt there was considerable pressure on him to join the

S.D.L.P.

yet he was aware that if he failed to join he would lose the

political

limelight.

publishing magnate,
noted

Ian

Paisley

In reality he was only the titular head.
Cecil

King,

in

The

his diary of January 18, 1974,

"has no opinion of Fitt, but regards Hume as the

effective leader of the S.D.L.P." 4
Fitt's figurehead
from the fact
history.

that

His maiden

position

in the S.D.L.P. should not detract

he has made a mark in both British and Irish
speech at Westminster

in

1966 stands as a

landmark in Irish history as does his direct and dramatic involvement
in the Derry civil rights march in 1968.

Both actions ensured that

he played a major role in destabilizing the Stormont government and,
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in consequence the Northern state.

In addition, he was instrumental

in bringing British troops to Belfast, with a resultant quagmire of
political

and armed struggle which created a political dilemma for

him that

he could never resolve.

It should also be remembered that

for a day he was acting Chief Minister for Northern Ireland in the
period of power-sharing.

Furthermore, many on the British left will

also remember him for his

part

in bringing Margaret Thatcher to

power.
How Fitt will
defined.

He

Republicans

is perceived differently by different people.

simply see him as an Irish Quisling.

tabloid

Even the

be so well

In truth, insufficient years have passed to make a balanced

assessment.

the

be viewed historically can not

press

in Britain praise him as

On the other hand,
"Lord Courage." 5

Irish News has put him on the road to rehabilitation only a

few years after castigating him for his elevation to the peerage.

In

an editorial marking twenty years of the "troubles" the paper states:
The historical
will show that
the Northern
compromise with
courage that was
One thing
colourful

record for every objective observer and researcher
Fitt was one of the outstanding public figures of
Ireland scene who, from the outset, did not
violence.
He revealed a political and moral
truly remarkable. 6

is certain about Gerry Fitt, he was one of the most

figures

in Irish politics.

When defeated by Adams in June

1983 admirers and critics alike would have agreed that it was the end
of an era.
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TABLE ONE
1958 STORMONT GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

Oliver, W

Fitt, G

(Unionist)
(Dock Irish Labour)

3,156

2,900

Unionist gain : Majority 256

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE TWO

1958 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

* Elected: * Fitt, G
* Atcheson, w
* O'Kane, J

(Dock Irish Labour)

1,862

(Unionist)

1,838

(Dock Irish Labour)

1,828

Cardwell, J

(Unionist)

1,806

Wil 1i ams on, D

(Unionist)

1,681

Hawkes, H

(Independent Unionist)

Two Dock Irish Labour gains from Unionists

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

403
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TABLE THREE

1961 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

* Elected *
*
*

Fitt, G

(Dock Irish Labour)

1,984

Gallagher, J

(Dock Irish Labour)

1,947

Atcheson, W

(Unionist)

1,593

McNeil, J.A

(Unionist)

1,494

Wi 11 i amson, D

(Unionist)

1,332

No change

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE FOUR

1962 STORMONT GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

Fitt, G

(Dock Irish Labour)

3,288

Oliver, W

(Unionist)

2,781

Dock Irish Labour gain Majority 507

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE FIVE

1964 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST -

* Elected: *
*
*

DOCK

Fitt, G

(Republican Labour)

2,140

Fitzpatrick, T

(Republican Labour)

2,002

McMenamin, J

(Republican Labour)

1,916

(Unionist)

1,401

McDowell, w

(Unionist)

1,337

Maginnis, C

(Unionist)

1,291

Wilson, P

(Labour)

McMaster,

s

One Republican Labour gain from Unionists

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

731
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TABLE SIX

1964 WESTMINSTER ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

Kilfedder, J

(Unionist)

21,337

Diamond, H

(Republican Labour)

14,678

Boyd, W

(Northern Ireland Labour Party)

12,571

McMillan, L

(Republican)

3,256

No change Unionist Majority 6,659

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

333

TABLE SEVEN

1965 STORMONT GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

Fitt, G

(Republican Labour)

3,326

Oliver, W

(Unionist)

2,016

No change Republican Labour majority 1,310

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE EIGHT

1966 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

Fitt, G

(Republican Labour)

26,292

Kilfedder, J

(Unionist)

24,281

Unionist loss to Republican Labour:

Republican Labour majority 2,011

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE NINE

1967 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

ALDERMAN

Fitt, G

(Republican Labour)

2,499

Millar, F

(Unionist)

1,426

COUNCILLORS

Fitzpatrick, T

(Republican Labour)

2,405

Kelley, P

(Republican Labour)

2,274

Kennedy, P

(Republican Labour)

2,231

Fenton, R

(Unionist)

1,407

Duff, S

(Unionist)

1,319

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE TEN

1969 STORMONT ELECTION

BELFAST - DOCK

Fitt, G

(Republican Labour)

3,274

Smith, H

(Unionist)

1,936

Republican Labour majority 1,338

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE ELEVEN
1970 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION
BELFAST - WEST

Fitt, G

(Republican Labour)

30,649

McRoberts, B

(Unionist)

27,451

No change Republican Labour majority 3,198

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE TWELVE
1972 LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY-ELECTION
BELFAST - DOCK

Fitt, A

(Independent)

Robb, D

(Constitution Party)

2,536

288

Majority 2,248

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE THIRTEEN

1973 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST AREA 'G'

* Elected
Laird, M

(Unionist)

3,632

1

Ditty, H

(Unionist)

3,556

1

Fitt, G

(Social Democratic &Labour Party)

2,876

1

Kidd, H

(Unionist)

2,651

1

Millar, S

(Independent Unionist)

2,291

2

* McKeown, M (Independent Unionist)

572

15

*
*
*
*
*

McAlea, J

(Republican Club)

376

Boyle, J

(Northern Ireland Labour Party)

368

McGlade, F

(Republican Club)

291

O'Kane, J

(Republican Labour)

193

Pak.enham, T (Northern Ireland Labour Party)

182

O'Hara, D

(Republican Club)

174

Shark.ley, J

(Northern Ireland Labour Party)

132

Saunders, M (Independent)

52

Scullion, H (Republican Labour)

19

Rigby, J

13

(Independent)

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

340

TABLE FOURTEEN

1973 ASSEMBLY ELECTION

BELFAST NORTH

1st Pref

(The Six Elected)

Fitt, G

(Social Democratic & Labour Party)

McQuade, J

(Democratic Unionist Loyalist

8,264

1

5,148

11

Hall Thompson, L (Official Unionist)

5,694

14

Morgan W.J

(Official Unionist)

5,190

15

Millar, F

(Unionist)

4,187

15

Ferguson, J

(Alliance)

1,958

15

Coal it ion)

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE FIFTEEN

February 1974 Westminster General Election

BELFAST - WEST

Fitt, G

(Social Democratic &Labour Party)

McQuade, J

(Democratic Unionist Party - United
Ulster Unionist Council)

19,554

17,374

Price, A

(Independent)

5,612

Brady, J

(Republican Club)

3,088

Boyd, W.R.

(Northern Ireland Labour Party)

1,989

No change Social Democratic & Labour Party majority

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

2,180
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TABLE SIXTEEN

OCTOBER 1974 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

Fitt, G

(Social Democratic & Labour Party)

McQuade, J

(Democratic Unionist Party - United
Ulster Unionist Council)

O'Kane, K

21,821

16,265

(Republican Club)

3,547
2,690

Gibson,

s

(Volunteer Political Party)

Kerins,

p

(Communist)

No change Social Democratic & Labour Party majority

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

203

5,556
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TABLE SEVENTEEN

1975 CONVENTION ELECTION

BELFAST - NORTH

1st Pref Count
Fitt, G

(Social Democratic & Labour
Party)

Bell, W

6,268

1

5,687

7

5,558

8

3,577

10

4,132

10

(Independent - United Ulster
Unionist Council)

Morgan, W

1

(Unionist - United Ulster
Unionist Council)

Millar, F

6,454

(Unionist - United Ulster
Unionist Council)

Hall-Thompson, L (Unionist Party of Northern
Ireland)
Annon, W.T.

(Democratic Unionist Party United Ulster Unionist Council)

6 Elected (Quota 6,230)

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE EIGHTEEN

1977 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST 'G'

First Preference

* Fitt, G
* Ashby, F. E.
* Ditty, H.
* Lynch, s.
* Walker, C.

(Social Democratic & Labour Party)

3,006

(Democratic Unionist Party)

1,377

(Official Unionist)

1.043

(Republican Club)

1,323

(Official Unionist)

779

Haffney, G.A.

(Democratic Unionist Party)

742

Laird, M.

(Official Unionist)

592

Millar, S.

(Official Unionist)

515

Kidd, H.

(Independent Unionist)

387

(Alliance)

320

* McKeown, M.

* Elected

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE NINETEEN

1979 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

Fitt, G

(Social Democratic &Labour Party)

Passmore, T

(Official Unionist)

8,245

Dick.son, w

(Democratic Unionist Party)

3,716

Brennan, B

(Republican Club)

2,284

Cousins,

(Alliance)

2,024

J

Peters, D

16,480

(Northern Ireland Labour Party)

(Spoiled votes 2,283)

No change Social Democratic &Labour Party majority 8,235

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

540
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TABLE TWENTY

1981 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION

BELFAST - AREA G - 1st PREFERENCE

Ashby, FE

(Democratic Unionist Party)

2,076

O'Hare, F

(Peoples Democracy)

1,953

Walker, C

(Official Unionist)

1,173

Millar, s

(New Ulster Political Research Group)

1,420

Lynch, S

(Workers Party Republican Club)

750

Feeney, B

(Social Democratic & Labour Party)

749

Ditty, H

(Official Unionist)

596

Fitt, G

(Socialist)

541

Coggle, J A

(Democratic Unionist Party)

392

McGarry, P J

(Alliance)

313

NB:

The New Ulster Research Group were the Political Wing of the
U.D.A.

Result supplied by the Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE TWENTY ONE

1982 ASSEMBLY ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

4 Elected (Quota 6,852)

Count

1st Pref

Adams, G

(Provisional Sinn Fein)

1

8,740

Hendron, J

(Social Democratic & Labour Party)

5

5,207

Passmore, T

(Official Unionist)

8

4,505

8

2,733

Glendenning, W (Alliance)

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office
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TABLE TWENTY TWO

1983 WESTMINSTER GENERAL ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

Adams, G

(Provisional Sinn Fein)

16,379

Hendron, J

(Social Democratic l Labour Party)

10,934

Fitt, G

(Independent)

10,326

Passmore, T

(Official Unionist)

2,435

Haffey, GA

(Democratic Unionist Party)

2,399

McMahon, Ms M (Workers Party)

Provisional Sinn Fein majority 5,445

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

1,893
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TABLE TWENTY THREE

1987 WESTMINSTER ELECTION

BELFAST - WEST

Adams,

G

Hendron, Dr
Millar,

J

F

McMahon, Ms M

(Sinn Fein)

16,862

(Social Democratic & Labour Party)

14,641

(Democratic Unionist Party)

7,646

(Workers Party)

1,819

Sinn Fein majority 2,221
No change

Result supplied by Belfast Public Records Office

GLOSSARY

c.o.u.

Campaign for Democracy in Ulster.

C.S.J.

Campaign for Social Justice.

O.U.P.

Democratic Unionist Party.

E.E.C.

European Economic Community.

I. I.P.

Irish Independence Party.

I.N.L.A.

Irish National Liberation Army.

I. R.A.

Irish Republican Party.

I.T.G.W.U.

Irish Transport and General Workers Union.

M.P.

Member of Parliament.

N.O.P.

National Democratic Party.

N.

I.

Northern Ireland.

N. I.C.R.A.

Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association.

N.I.L.P.

Northern Ireland Labour Party.

N.P.F.

National Political Front.

O.I.R.A.

Official Irish Republican Army.

P.O.

Peoples Democracy.

P.I.R.A.

Provisional Irish Republican Army.

P.R.

Proportional Representation.

R. T.E.

Radio Telefis Eireann.

R.U.C.

Royal Ulster Constabulary.

S.D.L.P.

Social Democratic and Labour Party.

T.O.

Member of the Dail.

U.D.A.

Ulster Defence Association.
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U.D.R.

Ulster Defence Regiment.

U.F.F.

Ulster Freedom Fighters.

U.K.

United Kingdom.

U.N.

United Nations.

U.P.A.

Ulster Protestant Action.

u.u.u.c.

United Ulster Unionist Coalition.

U.V.F.

Ulster Volunteer Force.

u.w.c.

Ulster Workers Council.

V.P.P.

Volunteer Political Party.
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